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Introduction 
I. Purpose and methodology 
This research assesses China's likely future behaviour in relation to the South 
China Sea disputes, critically evaluating two prominent, related topics of discussion 
among the International Relations scholars since the late 1980s. One of these topics is 
theoretical: to what extent is the flourishing `liberal peace' argument in International 
Relations theory valid when applied to China's international behaviour, and towards the 
South China Sea disputes in particular'? The advocates of the `liberal peace' argument 
have spent much energy attempting to prove the positive correlation between peace and 
such factors as democracy and economic interdependence, using statistical models. In 
addition, one faction of the liberal school emphasises the effectiveness of institutions 
which supposedly impose constraints on a state through international rules and 
agreements. However, liberals' arguments fail to engage with some critical points. First 
of all, whether a state goes to war is not a matter of probability but a political decision. 
Secondly, the costs of sacrificing economic ties and violating internationally-agreed 
obligations surely affect a decision to go to war. However, if a state perceives that its 
vital national interests are at risk, such costs will have little influence on decision-making. 
In addition, liberals' argument ignores the importance of the political framework in 
which economic interdependence functions. Furthermore, liberals do not pay attention to 
the facts that institutions are usually established by the initiative of a hegemon and its 
supporters, and that the rules and norms of institutions generally reflect the distribution 
of power among their members. This dissertation illustrates the way in which realist 
thinking (involving consideration of survival, balance of power and relative gain) still 
forms the foundation for states' behaviour. 
Introduction 
The other topic relevant in this dissertation is empirical and concerns which of the 
conflicting opinions about China's future geopolitical orientation is more accurate: that 
China will become an assertive regional hegemon as her economy develops and her 
military is modernised, or that she will not obtain even regional hegemonic status for 
some decades to come due to her lack of economic and military power. The first view 
generally draws the conclusion that China should somehow be contained, while the 
second view concludes that other states need to engage China so that the latter can be 
tied into the international community. A major problem with arguments of this type is 
that China's likely behaviour tends to be predicted on the basis of research on specific 
issues. In particular, military factors, such as China's increasing defence budget, its 
vigorous purchase of advanced weapons particularly from Russia, and the PLA's weight 
in the government's decision-making, have been overempahsised. Although stronger 
military capabilities may provide a government with wider foreign policy options, states 
- including China - usually do not use force just because their military capabilities 
become stronger. Understanding the nature of states and the factors that drive states' 
behaviour is necessary in order to avoid extreme conclusions. This dissertation tries to 
integrate the existing empirical studies and theoretical assumptions in International 
Relations theory. 
The reason for focusing on the South China Sea is that this case is important in the 
sense that the disputes there are not just territorial conflicts involving China and other 
claimants. The South China Sea disputes involve many factors such as fisheries, energy, 
and extra-regional powers' strategic and economic interests, besides the overlapping 
territorial sovereign claims. In addition, economic interdependence between China and 
regional states has deepened since the 1990s, and the region has international institutions 
such as APEC and the ARF where economic and security issues, respectively, are 
I 
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discussed. The last two factors make this case particularly suitable for the application of 
IR theory. This dissertation will demonstrate that geopolitical considerations are 
dominant not only in China's decision-making but also in the ASEAN states' attitudes 
towards China and the disputes themselves. 
Since this research is based on the beliefs that political problems can only be 
resolved politically and that whether or not a state will resort to war in order to solve an 
international conflict is not a matter of probability based on the correlation among 
variables such as democracy, trade relations, and alliance, statistical models are not used. 
Rather, this research depends on documentary evidence. 
This research will contribute to the study of international relations in two ways. 
The first contribution is to demonstrate the validity of realist thinking. Since most realists 
pay attention to the security sphere and tend to ignore such factors as economic 
interdependence and international institutions, on which liberals focus, illustrating how 
China has been skilful in using economic interdependent relations and international 
institutions as a power resource to achieve its political and economic objectives will 
compensate for realists' weak points. The second contribution is related to the case 
study: the South China Sea disputes. There seems to be a consensus among `China 
watchers' about China's future behaviour in the South China Sea that Beijing will expand 
in the Spratlys in a way described as `creeping assertiveness'. However, they have not 
provided any theoretically-informed assessment of whether this behaviour is in 
accordance with the realism on which China's foreign policy is based. By applying power 
analysis, which is examined in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, China's foreign policy 
practice and International Relations theory will be bridged. 
I 
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2. The scope of the research 
To provide a theoretical framework, realist and liberal perspectives in International 
Relations theory have been selected. Although Marxism might seem to be important. 
especially in studying China, the principles which have governed Beijing's foreign policy 
have been realist considerations such as national interest, sovereignty (more specifically 
the so-called the nineteenth century notion of absolute sovereignty) and balance of 
power. The practice of Marxism has been largely restricted to the implementation of 
domestic policies and there seems to be little evidence that it has influenced China's 
international behaviour, with the exception of her support for communist insurgent 
movements in other states between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. In addition, 
Marxism as an ideology to unite the Chinese state has been in decline since the 
introduction of Deng's Open Door policy in 1979, and it now serves as little more than 
rhetoric, especially after the demise of the communist regimes in East Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, China's economy has developed by adjusting itself to capitalist 
rules and practices, leading the Beijing government to create the controversial notion of 
`socialist capitalism'. Thus, Marxism is, in practical terms, irrelevant. 
Since the 1980s, what Robert 0. Keohane labelled `reflective' approaches' (such 
as postmodernism, critical theory and constructivism) emerged. Although each approach 
is different from others (and traditional International Relations theory) on how 
international relations should be understood, what is common to reflective approaches is 
to criticise and/or question one or more of core assumptions of traditional International 
Relations theory from epistemological and ontological grounds. However, the major 
purpose of this dissertation (that is, to counter-argue against the `liberal peace' argument 
from a realist point of view and demonstrate that realism has stronger explanatory power 
4 
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in understanding China's foreign relations, based on empirical observations) best fits in a 
rationalist and positivist framework. Thus, reflectivists' favourite agendas such as 
deconstruction of a "dichotomy of sovereignty versus anarchy" and double reading of 
text (postmodernism), 2 relationship between power and knowledge and between power 
and value (postmodernism and critical theory), ' intersubjectivity of international system 
(constructivism)4 are beyond my scope. 5 However, sections about formation of human 
' Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in Robert O. Keohane 
(ed. ), International Institutions and State Pov r. Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989), p. 161. 
2 See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique", Millennium 17(2), 1988, pp. 227-262. Quotation was drawn at p. 230. (Emphasis in 
original. ) 
3 See, for example, ibid.; and Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory", in Robert O. Keohane (ed. ), Neorealism and Its Critics (New Yoek: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 204-254. 
4 See, for example, Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory", International Organization 41(3), 1987, pp. 335-370. 
5 For literature written by reflectivists and that about reflectivists and recent trend in International 
Relations theory, see, for example, Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism" in Robert O. Keohane 
(ed. ), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Jans Bartelson, A 
Geneology of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ken Booth, "Dare not to 
Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 328-350; Chris Brown, 
International Relations Theory: New Normative Approach, (Henel Hempstead, Harverster Wheatsheaf, 
1992); Chris Brown, "International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community", in Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith (eds. ), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 90- 
109; Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater with Richard Devetak, 
Matthew Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (Hampshire: Macinilland Press, 
1996), pp. 145-178; Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater with 
Richard Devetak, Matthew Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (Hampshire: 
Macmilland Press, 1996), p. 179-209; Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism (London : 
Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, "Rationalism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater with 
Richard Devetak, Matthew Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (Hampshire: 
Macmilland Press, 1996), pp. 93-118; Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Descipline: A Geneology of 
International Relations Theory", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), International Relations Theory 
Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 1-3 7; Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds. ), 
International Relations Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); Steve Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory", in John Baylis and Stive Smith (eds. ), 
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 165-190; Jacqui True, "Feminism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklatcr 
with Richard Devetak, Matthew Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations 
(Hampshire: Macmilland Press, 1996), pp. 210-251; Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (eds. ), 
Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations (Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1994); John A. Vasques, "The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific 
Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(eds. ), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 217-240; RJ. B 
Walker, "History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations", Millennium 18(2), 1989. 
pp. 163-183; R. J. B Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Ole Wxver, "Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons 
Instead of Paradigms", in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waver (eds. ), The Future of International 
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motivation and that of strategic culture in this dissertation (chapter 3) may offer a 
response to leading constructivist Wendt's argument that states' identities and interests 
are shaped through interaction among them. 
This research focuses on identifying the most influential factor on China's attitude 
towards the South China Sea disputes. Thus, such issues as what makes states peaceful. 
what kind of great power China will become when her economic and military have been 
strengthened, how the West should treat Beijing, and the significance of Asia-Pacific 
regionalism, are beyond the scope of this study. 
3. Research design 
Chapter 1 identifies the international factors that affect states' behaviour by 
examining realism and liberalism (both commercial liberalism and liberal institutionalism). 
This chapter shows that realist elements such as survival and geopolitical considerations 
are more influential factors than economic interdependence and institutions. 
In Chapter 2, three elements (balance of power, economic interdependence and 
institutions) examined in Chapter 1 are assessed in relation to China's international 
behaviour. While it is argued that China's foreign policy is based more on the balance of 
power considerations than on the binding effects of economic interdependence and 
international institutions, it is also illustrated that China is skilful in maximising its gains 
and minimising its costs and obligations, through conducting power politics vis-a-vis its 
Relations: Masters in the Making? (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-37: Alexander 
Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", International 
Organization 46(2), 1992, pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State", American Political Science Review 88(2), 1994, pp. 384-396; Alexander \Vendt, 
"Constructing International Politics", International Security 20(1), 1995, pp. 71-81: Alexander \Vendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge Press, 1999); and N iarysia Zal(ewýki and 
Cynthia Enloe, "Questions about Identity in International Relations", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(eds. ), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 279-305. 
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weaker neighbours and using economic interdependent relations and institutions in its 
favour. 
Although Chapter 1 shows that the balance of power element appears to be the 
most influential compared to economic interdependence and institutions, these are all 
international factors in the sense that they are beyond one state's control. However. 
states' foreign policy-making is also influenced by various domestic factors. This is the 
point where what is called the `level of analysis' problem in IR theory arises: put simply 
in relation to this research, which factors, either international or domestic, are more 
influential? Chapter 3 focuses on this issue, by investigating domestic factors such as 
regime type (democratic peace), decision-making system and culture. While recognising 
the importance of domestic factors, it will be argued that international factors are more 
influential on states' behaviour: they provide a state with a menu of available options. 
Which option the state actually selects depends on the state's domestic factors. 
This argument is applied to China in Chapter 4. It will show that in the most 
bellicose era under Mao, who is believed to have made personally almost all important 
foreign policy decisions, these decisions were dominated by security concerns and 
geopolitical considerations. As China's security environment has evolved, the nature of 
the CCP regime, its decision-making mechanism, China's national goals, and its strategic 
thinking have changed accordingly. Thus, the conclusion in Chapter 3- that international 
factors determine the range of action a state can take - fits China well. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the South China Sea disputes. It not only introduces a brief 
history of the disputes, but also considers the value of the South China Sea for China in 
terms of economic and strategic interests. China's past behaviour in the South China Sea 
has been based primarily on geopolitical considerations. However, the PLA's capabilit\ 
is also important: when the Spratlys were beyond its armed forces' reach until the late 
7 
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1980s, China could do little more than protest verbally against other claimants' 
`infringement' of Chinese sovereignty. As the PLA Nary has increased its capability 
since the late 1980s, China strengthened its claim by establishing a military presence in 
the Spratlys. Thus, the governing principles for China's attitude towards the South China 
Sea disputes can be said to be a combination of the balance of power consideration with 
the extent of the PLA's capabilities. China's future behaviour is likely to be characterised 
by `creeping assertiveness', which refers to seizing features in the Spratlys in a low- 
profile manner so as not to induce a united diplomatic front on ASEAN's part or US 
intervention in response to Chinese behaviour in the Spratlys. 
However, `creeping assertiveness' appears too self-restrained for an increasingly 
assertive and realpolitik-oriented China. Chapter 6 tries to integrate empirical 
observations and theoretical assumptions, by applying the power analysis that was 
examined in Chapter 1. It is argued that power balance between China and the ASEAN 
states is favourable to China. Creeping assertiveness also enables Beijing to pursue two 
contradictory policies in Southeast Asia: regaining `lost territories' and maintaining good 
relations with regional states. It does not induce the United States' political and military 
intervention in response to Beijing's behaviour in the South China Sea. If China becomes 
an assertive regional hegemon in the future, it will not be just because the PLA's 
capabilities have been strengthened, but more because Beijing was successful in 
establishing a situation in which it can act relatively freely, taking advantage of the 
ASEAN governments' disarray and manipulating economic interdependence and 
international institutions to its advantage. This conclusion is in accordance with realist 
assumptions. 
8 
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Chapter 1 
International Factors Affecting States' BehaN four 
Introduction 
How to prevent wars and how to maintain peace have been traditional concerns in 
International Relations theory. Different views have provided the basis for different 
schools of thought. From the time of Thucydides and Machiavelli, the view that relative 
power vis-a-vis potential or actual adversaries determines the fate of the state (survival 
or annihilation) has traditionally been dominant. This realist' view was altered by 
liberalism' by the time World War One was over in 1919. Liberals argue that the cause of 
that war was attributed to the failure of the balance of power system; thus, the failure of 
politics based on realist views. Then US President Woodrow Wilson claimed that peace 
As discussed below, realism puts importance on such elements as statism, survival and power. 
However, there are some outstanding differences between traditional realism and neorealism, which 
was established by Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979). While traditional 
realism views states' struggle for power as deriving from human nature, and regards power as an end 
in itself, neorealism argues that an anarchical international system, not human nature, is the cause of 
states' struggle for power, and defines power as a means to achieve states' goals. Since then, 
neorealism has been dominant in realist thinking. Neorealism is sometimes called structural realign. 
For arguments that attempt to establish `real' structural realism by developing Waltz's Theory of 
International Politics, see Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For another 
classification and concise explanations, see Timothy Dunn, "Realism" in John Baylis and Steve Smith 
(eds. ), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 112-114. For classical literature by realists, see Edward Hallett 
Can, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace 
and Power (New York: Knopf, 1978); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Although realism refers to neorealism in this dissertation, the teen 
`realism' rather than `neo-realism' is used, in order to contrast it with liberalism. 
2 Liberalism contains a number of strands, and categorisation of liberalism varies from author to author. 
For example, Zacher and Matthew identify five strands: 1) republican liberalism; 2) interdependence 
liberalism; 3) cognitive liberalism; 4) sociological liberalism; and 5) institutional liberalism. Doyle' 
famous article "Liberalism and World Politics" is based on economic pacifism, republican imperialism 
and international confederation. And Keohane categorised 1) commercial liberalism; 2) democratic 
liberalism and 3) regulatory liberalism. See Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, "Liberal 
International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed. ), 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 120-137; Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", American 
Political Science Review 80(4), 1986, pp. 1151-1169 and "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited", in 
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed. ), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 83-106; and Robert 0. Keohane. 
"Economic Limits of Modem Politics: International Liberalism Reconsidered", unpublished paper, 
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would be established using international organisations, a collective security system and 
enlarged economic relations. 
However, this liberal thinking was overturned by World War Two, and realist 
thinking regained the status of the mainstream in International Relations theory until the 
end of the Cold War (1989). During the Cold War, rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union created two militarily and economically independent blocs. Economic 
activities were conducted mostly within each bloc. In the West, each ally of the United 
States enjoyed economic development in the framework of the Bretton Woods system, 
which consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD: 
better known as the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and economic interdependence among 
US allies deepened. Focusing on this deepening economic interdependence, liberals 
began to assert in the 1970s that state sovereignty had been eroded, and that economic 
factors had become more important as national security than military threat. The first `oil 
shock' of 1973 highlighted the so-called North-South problem, in which less developed 
Third World countries attempted to gain economic leverage against developed, industrial 
countries; this was manifest in the declaration of the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) in 1974. The oil factor was an additional factor contributing to a feeling among 
developed countries in general that the importance of economics surpassed security 
concerns. 
By the time of the final phase of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, writing by liberals 
in the International Relations (IR) discipline was pronouncing the triumph of the 'Liberal 
1986, cited in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", World Politics 40(2), 1988, pp. 245- 
246. 
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Peace -). 3 Research examining the correlation between democracy and peace. and between 
trade and peace, using statistical analysis has flourished, concluding that there is positive 
correlation. In particular, the notion that `democracies do not fight each other has 
become widespread. 
The liberals are right to some extent. However, `war-free' does not necessarily 
mean `dispute-free'. The reduction of military threat from the Soviet bloc resulting from 
the end of the Cold War enabled the US and its allies to focus more on the problems 
which affect their citizens' well-being. As a consequence, disputes among them over 
such issues as trade imbalance, the level of exchange rate, openness of market, and de- 
regulation of agricultural products became more visible. 
In addition, looking at the Third World provides us with a picture of the world 
which is different from developed countries'. The 1990s witnessed the Gulf War and a 
number of bloody ethnic conflicts including Bosnia and Kosovo. Military forces were 
used in these cases in order to resolve the problem, or at least to stop violations against 
international laws and human rights. In the last two cases, United Nations (UN) forces 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces were deployed, respectively, 
under the name of `humanitarian intervention'. Thus, the world after the Cold War has 
not been as peaceful as liberals had expected in the late 1980s, and realism seems to be 
still valid in many confrontational situations - political, economic, and military - where 
the pursuit of national interests still dominates. 
One more factor that should be mentioned is that a faction of the liberal school 
started arguing in the late 1970s that international institutions and international regimes 
are effective in managing states' behaviour through binding them with rules and 
3 Typical examples of this literature are Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; and Francis Fukuyanna, 
The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992). 
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regulations. Since a state participates in many institutions and regimes. its successful 
cheating in one issue area would meet other states' sanctions and or retaliation in 
different issue areas. Thus, international institutions and regimes deter such a state from 
violating the rules and make it behave cooperatively (or peacefully). 
Although scholars writing on International Relations theory have tended to focus 
on what makes a state peaceful (or cooperative), this chapter will attempt to identify the 
most influential international factor on states' behaviour, be it peaceful or aggressive 
(cooperative or selfish). In order to do so, the next section reviews the basic assumptions 
of realism and liberalism. In terms of liberalism, commercial liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism will be examined. This is followed by a section which focuses on power, 
economic interdependence and the institutions which represent the core element of each 
school of thought already examined. Economic interdependence and institutions are 
relevant as a basis of discussion in the later chapters, because China and most 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states deepened their economic 
relations during the 1990s, at least until the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. In addition, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
play important roles in providing regional states, and extra-regional great powers as well, 
with opportunities to discuss economic and security issues, respectively. Discussion of 
democracy (type of regime), a domestic rather than an international factor, will be 
deferred until Chapter 3. 
1. Basic assumptions of realism, commercial liberalism and liberal institutionalism 
concerning influences on states' behaviour 
1) Realism 
Realism's claims are as follows. The international political system is sharply 
distinguished from national politics which is the realm of authority, of administration, and 
12 
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of law. 4 Since it is comprised of sovereign states, in Waltz's words functionally 'like 
units', ' there is no higher authority than the state. The situation is one of anarchy. This 
means that because no one regulates or orders states, unless international organisations 
are allowed to do so, no one prevents other states from being aggressive to each other. 
In this sense, anarchy also implies disorder and chaos. 6 Thus, states must depend on self- 
help with whatever means they have for their survival. 
In the self-help system, states have to compete with other states, pursuing power 
both militarily and economically not only to protect themselves but also to gain an 
advantage over other states, 7 thereby deterring others from attacking them. ' In order to 
achieve survival, states always consider the issue of relative gain ('who will get more`)'). 
In pursuing greater gain, states' behaviour is regarded as rational. Rationality means that 
states "have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and 
benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximise their utility in light both of those 
preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality". 9 Concerns over relative 
gains make it difficult for states to cooperate, because conflicts of national interest are 
inevitable. 
Although states have to depend mainly on their own capabilities, these 
`capabilities' vary from state to state, in terms of size of territory and population, wealth 
and military strength. In other words, states are differently positioned in the international 
system in terms of power. If a state is considerably weaker than its potential enemies, 
4 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 113. See also U. B. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the 
Challenge of World Politics", Alternatives 15(1), 1990, p. 15. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 95. 
6 Ibid., p. 114. 
Ibid., p. 105. 
8 John Garnett, "Introduction", in John Garnett (ed. ), Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in 
Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan St. Martin's press, 1970), p. 25. 
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that state's possible destinies are either being beaten and absorbed by the enemies in a 
war, or forming an alliance with a stronger third country or countries to deter adversaries 
from attacking it. The latter option, the balance of power, has been exercised historically. 
because "the best safeguard against international conflict was the prevention of one state 
emerging with predominant power", 10 and because an imbalance of power may tempt an 
ambitious state to risk an adventure. " 
This realist view has met with criticism from liberals. First of all, they allege that 
realism neglects the impact of economic factors in international politics. Realists reply 
that they have never neglected the interaction between economic issues and security. But 
they argue that as COCOM (Coordinating Committee for the Control of Strategic Trade 
with Communist Countries) during the Cold War demonstrates, patterns of economic 
relations are largely determined by political/military relations. In this sense, `high politics' 
(security-related issues) still rank higher than `low politics' (economic-related issues). 
Second, liberals criticise the realist logic that states tend to form alliances in order 
to establish a balance of power as lacking theoretical consistency. They argue that 
anarchy (absence of higher authority) does not mean that states should form alliances, 
use force or resist cooperation with each other. 12 However, from the realist point of 
view, there is no logical inconsistency because states need to use whatever means they 
have in order to survive. These include balancing, use of force, diplomatic manoeuvring 
and even cooperation. For example, the formation of two blocs (the West and the East) 
on the Eurasian continent just after World War Two was a balancing act between the 
9 Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Robert 0. Keohanc 
(ed. ), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), p. 11. 
10 Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of 
International Relations (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 71. 
" Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 132. 
12 Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", 
International Organization 48(2), 1994, pp. 330-333. 
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United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the two superpowers also 
cooperated in the arms control area, as in the creation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) regime, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II, and Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START). From the 1980s, reduction of conventional weapons in 
Europe based on agreements by the two sides was also negotiated. Thus, which means a 
state will use depend on the state's strategic environment and its diplomatic, economic 
and military capability. 
In sum, the realists' view is that sovereign states, the primary actors in international 
relations, struggle for power in an anarchic world in order to survive. Since states' top 
priority is survival, they are considered to seek to maximise their national interest 
rationally, mainly through military power, backed by economic strength. The more 
power states gain, the more secure they will be. For realists, security is a derivative of 
power. 
13 
2) Commercial liberalism 
Economic pacifism in liberal thinking can be traced back to two main origins. The 
first is the Kantian idea that connects the liberal economic system to the domestic 
political system (democracy). The basic logic here is that individuals who benefit from 
trade eventually form a group with political influence against autocracy (which is 
responsible for waging wars) thus, a state ultimately becomes a democracy. Democratic 
government respects individuals' rights and property, and will refrain from attempting 
13 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 2. Garnett defines national security as 
"a feeling of confidence that the disasters of war and the vagaries of international political life can be 
avoided or absorbed, either by ultimate victory or good management, so that the state, its institutions 
and its way of life can continue to exist in a fundamentally unimpaired fashion". He also points out 
that "security ... must 
imply a state of tranquillity, an absence of fear of disturbing element, in 
relation to state objectives". And Robert McNamara's concept of security is "not only confidence on 
the part of the state in its ability to maintain its prosperity and way of life, but also the freedom to 
develop and improve its position in the future". Garnett, "Introduction", p. 31. 
l5 
Chapter 1: International Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
war (which sacrifices citizens' property). Thus, in commercial liberals' view. trade 
promotes the spread of democracy and peace. 
In addition, trade has some utility from the domestic point of view. First of all, 
trade contributes to a state's pursuit of four basic goals: namely, accumulation of 
national income, maintenance of social stability, strengthening of the state's political 
power, and economic growth. 14 Continuing economic growth implies a positive effect in 
terms of creating jobs, thus easing the problems of unemployment and low welfare level. 
which are the major causes of social instability. Moreover, flourishing trade brings a state 
considerable revenue, which in turn enables it not only to import goods and materials 
necessary for further economic growth and its citizens' daily life, but also to purchase 
weapons to strengthen its military capability in absolute terms. Externally, a strong 
economy serves as power, providing the government with broader international policy 
options and making it easier to pursue its foreign goals. When economic power works, a 
state does not have to resort to military power. 
The idea that trade leads to peace, applied to the international level, originates with 
Ricardo's idea of comparative advantage. 15 By exporting goods with comparative 
advantage, states will enjoy prosperity. As trade ties with other states deepen, the 
common interest in maintaining economic gain from trade will work as a constraint on 
states' use of force. Becoming vulnerable economically to other states makes a state less 
war-prone, because a state needs to avoid the costs caused by the disruption of trade, in 
an interdependent situation. If every state respects the idea that political and economic 
disputes can not be resolved by force without undue costs because of interdependence. 
this will become an established norm, thus constraining states from resorting to force. 
14 Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", World Politics 28(3), 
1976, pp. 317-318. 
16 
I 
Chapter 1: International Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
Moreover, under the condition that goods and materials are available through trade. the 
necessity for conquering territory to achieve greater prosperity «rill no longer eist. 
Furthermore, technological development in weapons made the cost of war remarkably 
high. Thus, war is both too costly and an anachronism in commercial liberals view. 16 
This liberal view was succinctly expressed by the US Secretary of State in the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration (1933-45), Cordell Hull: "[I]f goods can't cross 
borders, soldiers will". " In fact, liberals argue, the decade before World War Two 
witnessed not only low trade levels but also the prevalence of `begger-thy-neighbour' 
policies among the major powers, under which tariffs rose, capital flow was controlled 
and competition of currency depreciation was conducted. 
Based on the assessment that `begger-thy-neighbour' policies in the 1930s 
contributed to World War Two, the establishment of international organizations which 
would take responsibility for reconstruction and promotion of global economy was 
agreed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. GATT (since 1995 the World Trade 
Organisation, or WTO) became responsible for setting the standards of level of tariff, 
subsidies, quotas, trade agreements and general trade practice. Regarding exchange 
rates, it was agreed that a fixed exchange rate system is necessary for stable trade and 
investment in the long-term. The value of each currency was calculated in relation to 
gold and the US dollar. This system was operated with the US guarantee that I ounce of 
gold would be converted with US$35, until the early 1970s. Basically, no fluctuation 
exchange rate above 1 percent was allowed, except by mutual consultation. The IMF 
15 If country A can produce 2 units ofX and 3 units of Yin the same time, A has comparative advantage 
in Y. 
16 Ralph Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Poutr to National 
Advantage (London: William Heinemann, 1914). 
17 Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the 
Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), cited in Bruce E. \loon, 
Dilemmas of International Trade (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 75. 
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was established in 1945 to facilitate such international consultation, and also to lend 
money to states with trade deficits. The purpose of the loan is to reduce trade deficits 
through promoting competitiveness. Thus, the money should be invested in infrastructure 
and/or key export industries. In order to reconstruct nations after the devastation of war. 
an enormous amount of capital was necessary. The IBRD (World Bank) was established 
to supply the capital at low-interest. '8 These three institutions constitute the Bretton 
Woods system, which - according to liberals - deepened global economic 
interdependence, thereby effectively preventing another war among industrialised states 
from breaking out. 
These explanations of the relationship between trade and peace have been criticised 
by realists on several grounds. First of all, the liberal case cannot explain why World War 
One occurred. The world before World War One was highly interdependent, and 
Germany was Britain's second largest trading partner. 19 What happened under the name 
of `free trade' in the decade before World War Two was actually colonialism and 
imperialism, in which major powers engaged in frequent military clashes outside their 
borders in pursuit of their own national interests. In order to achieve national goals, 
trading policies were manoeuvred to "establish and maintain inequitable economic 
relationships". 20 
Second, trading may result only in aiding an adversary. This concern was expressed 
by Sir Henry Parnell, who was the strongest supporter of the highly protectionist Corn 
Law of 1815. He pointed out that England's heavy imports of wheat and flour from 
18 Theodore A. Coulouinbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Potiwr and 
Justice, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 328 and p. 321; and \Villiam Nester, 
International Relations: GeoPolitical and GeoEconomic Conflict and Cooperation (Ne York: 
HarperCollins, 1995), p. 310. 
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence", in Charles P. Kindleberger (ed), The 
International Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970), p. 208. 
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France in 1810 enabled "Napoleon to both quell an insurrection in southern France and 
collect heavy export duties that were used to strengthen the French war effort". 2' 
Anxieties of this kind are widely held today among Japanese and American politicians 
and bureaucrats, in relation to China. It is feared that China will be better able to develop 
advanced weapons systems based on imported dual-use high technology, which may then 
be used against Japan and the US, efficiently exploiting the benefit of trade with and 
investment from Japan and the US. 
Thirdly, contrary to the liberals' claim that vulnerability is generated by a network 
of interdependent relations, realists argue that states involved in interdependent 
economic relations will try even harder to reduce such vulnerability. For example, Beijing 
has made efforts to reduce its dependence on imported oil, particularly from the Middle 
East, by developing its own oilfields and by diversifying oil suppliers. 22 
An even more important point is that liberals tend to ignore the political dimension. 
First of all, it seems to be natural that, after World War Two, the world was peace- 
prone, because war as a measure to achieve states' goals was no longer legitimate. In 
other words, war was seen by states as costly, not only economically but also politically. 
Second, but more importantly, the Cold War period was one in which deepening 
economic interdependence could not be separated from the fixed alliance system under 
the prevailing conditions of superpower rivalry and a `balance of terror' created by 
nuclear weapons. 23 Generally speaking, the beneficiaries of economic interdependence 
were developed industrialised countries, which were all allies of the United States and of 
20 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? ". 
Journal of Peace Research 33(1), 1996, p. 32. 
21 Moon, Dilemmas of International Trade, p. 30. 
22 For details, see Chapter 5. 
23 Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case", 
International Organization 38(4), 1984, p. 606. 
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each other. Flourishing economic activities were enabled by this political structure. Thus. 
as Gilpin points out, liberals "neglected the political base on which this interdependent 
world economy rested". 24 Thus, as long as economic interdependence is inseparable from 
the politico-military system, liberals cannot legitimately single out economic 
interdependence as the greatest contributor to peace during the period of study. 
In short, commercial liberals assert that as interdependence increases, the 
likelihood of war decreases, because the cost of war, which is heightened by military- 
technological development, makes war unprofitable, and because trading is a more 
rational option in an interdependent world. 25 On the other hand, realists claim that states, 
worrying about being vulnerable under the self-help system, would be motivated to 
control or secure access to necessary materials and goods. 26 Although liberals claim that 
trade makes access to resources easier, this view assumes the prevalence of peace. What 
realists argue is that this access could not be assured once military conflict with trading 
partners begins. Realists warn of the worst case scenario. Thus, realists assert that 
security competition would be accelerated. 27 
Moreover, economic and political disputes over market share and trade balance are 
also a characteristic of the international system, and this is why, for example, the United 
States has put even greater pressure on Tokyo since the 1980s in order to force Japan 
both to restrict its exports to, and to increase its imports from, the United States. 
Furthermore, the Clinton administration has demanded tangible results, not just the 
24 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert 0. Keohane (cd. ), 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), p. 312. 
25 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modena World 
(New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 24-25. 
26 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 106. 
27 John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", International 
Security 15(1), 1990, p. 45; and Robert Gilpin, "Economic Interdependence and National 
Security in 
Historical Perspective", in Kalus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds. ), Economic Issues and National 
Security (Laurence, Kansas: Allen, 1977), pp. 40-41. 
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Japanese government's promise to make its best efforts. Japan strongly criticises this US 
approach as one of `governed trade'. Although the disputes over trade between the 
United States and Japan can be dated back to the 1960s, when the Soviet-US 
confrontation was relatively intense, the US government has sometimes tended to place 
more emphasis on the importance of alliance than on trade balance. This was particularly 
true during the early 1980s. In this sense, high-politics was placed above love-politics. 
Economic factors are important, but "they always work in the context of the political 
struggle among groups and nations". 28 
3) Liberal institutionalism 
Emphasis on the significance for state behaviour of international institutions is also 
a strand of traditional liberal thinking, which can be dated back to Kant. It was not until 
1919 that institutionalism had a chance to assert itself in international politics, where 
realist thinking had traditionally been dominant. Advocates of liberal institutionalism, 
including the then US President Willson, argued that the war was a result of failure of the 
balance of power among the major states, and that it was necessary to create a 
mechanism which would prevent another Great War from breaking out. The outcome 
was the collective security system under the League of Nations. 
Although institutionalists' ambition was upset by World War Two, the subsequent 
establishment of new international organisations such as United Nations and the three 
major organisations of the Bretton Woods system (GATT, IMF, and World Bank) 
provided them with another ground on which to stand. Thus, the first decade after the 
war was devoted by academic liberal institutionalists to reviewing to what extent these 
institutions were effective in resolving problems. 
28 Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", p. 310. 
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What the institutionalists found out was that, in reality, power politics was 
conducted inside these organizations. 29 As the gap between ideal and reality widened in 
the 1970s, international institutionalism was challenged by realists who questioned 
whether institutions really matter. For example, the United Nations could do nothing 
significant to stop the US war against North Vietnam; the Bretton Woods system 
suddenly almost collapsed in 1971 due to the USA's unilateral decision to suspend the 
conversion between gold and the dollar; and the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries' (OPEC's) successful quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973 brought panic in 
most industrial countries by threatening to undermine their economies, while no 
international organization was available to resolve or negotiate the problem. 
Facing the realists' challenge led international institutionalists to study regimes. 
Until then, liberal institutionalism did not have a strong theoretical orientation. At the 
initial stage of studying regimes, the primary focus was on how regimes are formed, how 
they are maintained, how they transform, and in what circumstances the distribution of 
power among the core states in the regime changes. 3° After that, the focus shifted to how 
institutions can contribute to make states cooperative. 
Using game theory, particularly the Prisoners' Dilemma Game (see below), liberal 
institutionalism asserts that states are not always trapped in a situation where each state 
acts selfishly with the purpose of avoiding the worst outcome, thereby creating the 
second worst outcome. One of the main reasons why states may sometimes act in a way 
which leads to the second worst outcome is that they lack clear information regarding 
29 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions-". 
International Organization 52(4), 1998, p. 733. 
30 The definition of international regimes is `principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area". See Stephen Krasner, "Structural 
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables", in Stephen Krasner (cad), 
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. l. For a comprehensive study of 
regimes, see his volume. 
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the other side's behaviour. Thus, if institutions can provide the necessary information and 
take measures such as monitoring, enforcement and imposing sanctions to ensure that 
states are unable to deceive each other, institutions can influence states' behaviour in 
such a direction that the latter are willing to cooperate. 
However, as discussed later, realists argue that what is important is relative gain, a 
distributional problem, rather than securing the bigger absolute gain. States' concern 
about relative gain make it difficult for them to cooperate. 31 The counter-argument has 
been made that such occasions in which cooperation among states is almost impossible 
are quite rare. 32 Nonetheless, liberal institutionalism has been searching for a convincing 
mechanism to explain why states cooperate in spite of their concerns over relative gain. 
2. Factors that influence states' behaviour 
The previous section reviewed some major schools of International Relations 
theory; namely, realism, commercial liberalism, and liberal institutionalism. A wide 
divergence in views was observed among these schools as to what makes states peaceful 
or cooperative. The next section focuses on power, economic interdependence and 
institutions, the core element of each school, and examines how these factors affect 
states' behaviour. 
31 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism", International Organization 42(3), 1988, pp. 485-507; and John J. Mearsheiiner, 
"The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security 19(3), 1994/95, pp. 5-49. 
32 Dancan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation", American Politic al 
Science Review 85,1991, pp. 701-726; and Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in 
International Relations Theory", American Political Science Review 85,1991, pp. 1303-1320. 
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1) Power 
(1) Definition of power 
Realists claim that states struggle for power in order to survive in an anarchic 
world, while leading liberal institutionalists Keohane and Nye state that asymmetrical 
interdependence is a source of power. What, then, is power? 
According to Knorr, "Power can be used either to establish influence by means of 
coercion or, without coercive intent to defend or change the status quo between 
actors". 33 Robert Dahl argues that power is the ability to heighten the probability of 
favourable outcomes, 34 while Morgenthau argues that power "may comprise anything 
that establishes and maintains control of man over man". 35 In Michael Howard's words, 
power is "the capacity of individuals or groups to control and organise their environment 
to conform with their physical requirements or their code of moral values". 36 From these 
definitions, it is clear that the essence of power contains at least two elements, namely, 
coercion and influence. 
Coercion is not a must, as long as a state can influence others. Whether coercive or 
non-coercive means are more effective will depend on the state's objective ('scope') and 
who or what is the target of influence ('domain'). 37 Once a coercive measure is 
employed, it must be effective. Otherwise, not only may the state that uses threats fail to 
achieve its object, but also its power relations with the coerced party may be changed. 
Suppose state A demanded that B do X and threatened to do Y if B failed to meet A's 
33 Klaus Knorr, Poiwr and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (London: Macmillan, 
1973), p. 3. 
34 Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science 2(3), 1957, pp. 201-215. 
35 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 9. 
36 Michael Howard, "Military Power and International Order", in John Garnett (ed. ), Theories of Peace 
and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan St. Martin's Prei,. 
1970), pp. 41-42. 
37 David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies", tit orld 
Politics 31(2), 1978, p. 163. See also Dahl, "The Concept of Power", p. 203. 
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demand. Whether A's threat is effective vis-a-vis B in respect of doing X, should be 
considered from several viewpoints. The first element belongs to A: whether _-A's will 
is 
firm enough to influence B and to do Y, when necessary. 
The second element belongs to B. As Knorr points out, it includes: 1) B's estimate 
of the costs of complying with A's threat; 2) B's estimate of the costs of defying A's 
threat; 3) B's bargaining skill relative to A's; and 4) B's propensity to act rationally and 
to assume risks. 38 Other than these, at least the following conditions must be met if A's 
coercion is to succeed: (1) there must be a conflict of interests or values between A and 
B; 39 (2) B prefers doing X to accepting Y; (3) the cost of doing X is smaller than that of 
tolerating Y; (4) B believes that A would do Y without fail, if B refuses to do X, (5) A 
knows that B prefers X to Y; and (6) B bows to A's demand. These conditions imply that 
effective coercion is not achieved only by the efforts by A, the coercing side. "Power 
comes out of this relation, not from the power holder alone". 40 In this sense, power is 
relational, and without identifying at least the scope and domain, power analysis could be 
meaningless. Among those conditions, B's preference order may be one of the most 
important factors, because if B prefers Y to X even if the cost of tolerating Y is much 
greater than that of doing X, B may choose to reject A's original demand, rendering A's 
threat ineffective. Thus, A's knowledge about B's preference order (which B prefers. X 
or 1) is equally important to B's preference order. China's attempted intimidation of 
Taiwan during the latter's presidential elections in 1996 and 2000 is an interesting 
example. During the 1996 election, Beijing conducted missile exercises off Taiwan with 
38 Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 16. 
39 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), p. 21. 
40 Stefano Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis", International 
Organizaton 47(3), 1993, p. 453. See also Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World 
Politics", p. 171; and 
Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, p. 21. Bachrach and Baratz 
describe the difference between 
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the purpose of discouraging the Taiwanese from choosing Lee Teng-hui. However, he 
was elected. Beijing should have learnt that threatening did not work. Still it tried to 
influence the outcome of the 2000 election to prevent Chen Shui-bian being elected. in 
vain. On neither occasion, did the mainland directly attack Taiwan. thereby rendering its 
threats ineffective. Whether or not coercion is effective depends on whether or not the 
target is willing to be coerced. China's intimidation case demonstrates the limited utility 
of coercion. 
The third element is the degree of B's vulnerability against A's threat. For example, 
following Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba in 1959, in October 1960 the 
United States embargoed all exports to Cuba (except for food and medicine). However, 
the Soviet Union was available as an ally for Cuba; thus, the US attempt to reverse 
Cuban socialism by coercion was unsuccessful. By the same token, the Soviet Union was 
unsuccessful in keeping Yugoslavia in its bloc in 1948, when the latter asserted its 
independence. Although Yugoslavia was dependent for her trade and aid on the Soviet 
Union and other communist countries, she could resist Soviet pressure by extending her 
trading partners to Western countries. 41 These cases show that when the target states are 
not so vulnerable, as they can find alternative partners, coercive measures are ineffective. 
Fourthly, the objective of coercion (scope) sometimes matters. For example, when 
`high politics' such as a state's independence or a regime's survival is at issue, the 
coerced party will often resist economic sanctions (in particular) relatively successfully. 
Saddam Hussein is still in power nearly ten years after the Gulf War, despite continuous 
economic sanctions. Fidel Castro has continued to govern Cuba even after the demise of 
the Soviet Union, despite worsening economic conditions. 
power and force as follows: "in a power relationship it is B who chooses what to do, while in the force 
relationship it is A". Ibid., p. 28. 
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Finally, the difference between power resources (potential power) and actual 
power should be considered. Power resources are defined as the means by which one 
actor can influence the behavior of other actors". Thus, by definition, those who possess 
"the most power resources will have the most potential power or ability to get others to 
do things they would not otherwise do". 42 However, potential power is not always 
turned into actual exercise of power. Using the example above, if B does X, A does not 
need to exercise actual power (that is, to do 1). In this sense, exercise of power is a 
reflection of an ineffective threat. 
The more important factor for the relationship between power resources and actual 
power may be a `translation' problem. Keohane and Nye argue that since asymmetrical 
interdependence "by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes", the focus should be on 
"the `translation' in the political bargaining process". 43 For example, A had a great power 
resource, but did not have a strong enough will to convert it to actual power, or lacked 
the skill for satisfactory conversion. In Baldwin's phrase, "he had the cards but played 
them poorly". 44 Thus, power cannot be measured merely by tangible resources of power 
('hard' factors) such as military forces and Gross National Product (GNP). Bearing in 
mind the fact that power relations are a matter of psychology (that is, whether or not 
influence prevails), intangible resources of power ('soft' factors) such as political will 
and strong leadership play an important role in measuring power. 
Another explanation for why power resources are not necessarily converted into 
exercise of actual power is that "political power resources are much less fungible than 
41 Klaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and its Uses", in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager 
(eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen, 1977), p. 102 and p. 103. 
42 David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", International Organization 
34(4), 1980, p. 500 and p. 501 (emphasis in original). 
43 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Poi4er and Interdependence, second edition (London: 
HarperCollins, 1989) p. 18. 
44 Bald, «Power Analysis and World Politics", p. 164. 
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economic power resources". 45 For example, the fungibility of money is very high. Money 
not only functions as a medium of exchange but also money has value in itself. With 
money, a state can build stronger armed forces for itself, and/or establish influence in 
other states through giving aid or other forms of economic ties. In contrast, A's capacity 
for nuclear deterrence cannot be converted into getting one of her citizens elected as UN 
Secretary-General. Nonetheless, elements such as money, time, information and a 
reputation for making credible threats or promises, 46 generally rank high among political 
power resources. 
In short, whether A's coercion toward B over doing X is effective should be 
considered from various perspectives; A's will, B's value, vulnerability, the alternatives 
that are available, and the degree of fungibility of political power resources. However, 
power relations in the real world are not so simple. For example, A may be stronger than 
B in area Z while weaker in area P. In this case B can link Z and P in order to counter 
A's threat. 
When realists say that states `struggle for power', is power a means or an end`? In 
the sense that power refers to a state's ability to control or modify others' behaviour in 
order to pursue its own ends, it is a means. However, when power is considered as a 
currency which can purchase a state's security and survival, it becomes an end in itself. 
47 
as Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power", p. 502. "The term "fungibilit}" refers to the idea of movable 
goods that can be freely placed and replaced by others of the same class". See Guzzini, "Structural 
Power", p. 453, footnote 28. 
46 Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", p. 166. 
47 Couloumbis and Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations, p. 79. 
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(2) Forms of power 
Power takes many forms such as economic, diplomatic, ideological and cultural. as 
well as military. Among them, military and economic power are considered as major 
forms of power because influence on or coercion of others are more effective with those 
two power resources than with other resources. These two forms of power are examined 
next. 
i. Military power 
Among the various forms of power, military power has traditionally been 
considered as the most important, because, until the end of World War Two, "war was 
understood to be legitimate because it offered the only way of resolving conflict and 
responding to demands for change". 48 
Military power can be defined as "the capacity to use violence for the protection, 
enforcement or extension of authority", 49 and is the strongest instrument of coercion. 
Although military strength is a major component of military power, military potential 
(capacity to expand or improve military strength) and military reputation are also 
important, 5° because those elements influence the calculations of the coerced party's 
decision-making. A "paper tiger" cannot apply coercion. In order to strengthen military 
power, an economic capacity large enough to support it is indispensable. Even more 
important may be social cohesion which supports the government's decision to use force, 
as well as military readiness and operational capability based on the high morale of 
personnel and on their education and training. Since modern sophisticated weapons 
systems require technical expertise to operate, education and training are particularly 
important. While weapons can be purchased, absorption of high technology cannot. 
48 Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics", pp. 21-22. 
49 Howard, "Military Power and International Order", p. 46. 
50 Klaus Knorr, Poi r and Wealth, pp. 14-15. 
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Moreover, it takes time. Thus, mere acquisition of modem weapons systems does not 
constitute military strength. 
However, the situation in which military force is used is accompanied by 
uncertainty, even if a state's (A's) military strength is greater than that of its enemy (B). 
For example, although the United States had preponderant military power vis-a-vis 
North Vietnam, the former could not win the war. Thus, B's compliance with A's 
demand without A's use of force is considered more desirable, and successful deterrence 
is better than victory in war. In this sense, "military power is most useful when it is not 
being used", and "war may be regarded as a failure of military power". " 
Then, to what extent can military power play a significant role`? The traditional way 
of thinking that military power is a basic need of states has met a number of criticisms. 
First of all, the world after World War Two reached a consensus that waging war as a 
means of pursuit of a state's national goal is no longer legitimate. Secondly, it is 
generally believed that territorial conquest for economic reasons has become obsolete, 52 
because expansion of territory is no longer directly connected with an increase in national 
wealth. Thirdly, the destructive power of modern weapons has been greatly increased 
(particularly because of the advent of nuclear weapons). Thus, use of force, which is too 
costly for all parties involved, should be less frequent. In addition, the usefulness of 
military power is overestimated, because most states usually resolve conflicts without 
using force. S3 Moreover, there are many restrictions on the use of force. For example, 
political determination must be firm enough; there must be public support; scope must be 
considered - use of force is not an appropriate way to resolve economic conflicts such as 
trade imbalance, or ideological conflicts; and the government must take into account the 
51 Garnett, "Introduction", p. 28 and p. 29. 
52 Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 116. 
53 Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", P. 181. 
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economics of using force (that is, the impact on its own economy in terms of the cost of 
war per se, the cost of a shift in economic structure, the burden on human resources. and 
so forth). Lastly, victory is not guaranteed, as America's experience in the Vietnam War 
showed. 
If a state with greater military strength can lose a war, it is still less likely that one 
with weak military forces can protect itself. A militarily weak state may happen to win. 
but there is a higher possibility that it will lose. As the case of Kuwait demonstrated, a 
less prepared state may suffer from the aggression of a militarily ambitious state. Kuwait 
was lucky because the US-led UN forces intervened for her. If it had not been for such 
an intervention, Kuwait could have been absorbed by Iraq. It is true that military power 
is not almighty. However, only military power immediately enables a state to defend 
herself to resist military aggression by other states. Moreover, military power is expected 
to deter such aggression. Furthermore, even if states resolve conflicts without resorting 
to force, the overall power relations between the conflicting parties reflect, to some 
extent, military power relations. In general, the party backed by stronger military power 
seems to enjoy a better bargaining position. Although the usefulness of military power is 
declining, especially in resolving political and economic disputes, the raison d'etre of 
military power is to ensure a state's survival by deterring other states from attacking, or 
at least by resisting such aggression. In this sense military power is the `last resort' on 
which states can depend, even if it is often ineffective. 
ü. Economic power 
The exercise of national economic power refers to the case where "wealth or 
economic policy is used deliberately to modify the behaviour or capabilities of other 
states". 54 It consists of economic strength, the will to use it, the skill of applying this 
54 Knorr, Poiwr and Wealth, p. 79 (emphasis in original). 
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strength and other states' anticipation of the exercise of economic power. ss Just as 
military strength is not equivalent to usable military power, economic strength is not the 
same as usable economic power. 
The traditional source of economic strength was gold, because gold can be 
converted, figuratively, into almost everything from food and raw materials to factories. 
A state with a considerable amount of gold enjoyed status as a great power. However-. 
economic strength based on accumulating gold had limitations, as was demonstrated by 
the case of Belgium and France during World War Two; when their gold was captured 
by the Germans, they lost their primary source of economic strength. Besides, it is 
generally considered that reserves of natural resources contribute to economic strength. 
If they are mineral resources, metals, and oil and natural gas, they certainly do. 
Particularly since World War Two, the productivity in terms of scale of economic 
activity of a nation has been considered to represent its economic strength. Productivity 
is generally judged from the GNP. However, the GNP of a nation with a large population 
tends to show a high figure, regardless of the stage of its economic development. Thus, 
income par capita is regarded as a more accurate reflection of productivity in a 
qualitative sense. 56 In addition, saving and growth rates are also important. Producing 
something valuable always requires a considerable investment. If a state cannot attract 
foreign investment, it must depend on domestic savings. And a high savings rate also 
demonstrates that the state's political situation is reasonably stable. Where a state is 
politically unstable, citizens do not trust their currency and attempt to convert their 
money into other stronger and more stable currencies, such as the US dollar and 
Deutschemark, and/or gold and jewels, as shown in the case of Russia today. Growth 
ss Ibid., p. 82. 
s6 Charles P. Kindleberger, Poiwr and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics 
of International Economics (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 59. 
I-) 
Chapter 1: International Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
rate also counts. It is natural to assume that countries with expanding economies are 
rising economic powers (e. g. China), while those with stagnant or shrinking economies 
are declining economic powers (e. g. Japan). 
Economic strength plays several roles. Domestically, it strengthens the regime's 
legitimacy. Generally non-democracies depend for their legitimacy on economic 
performance. As long as high economic performance keeps upgrading its citizens' 
standard of living, the regime can enjoy popular support, at least superficially. Economic 
strength also serves as a basis for military strength. In this respect, productivity refers to 
the capacity to produce armaments. This capacity should include not only enlarging 
armaments production but also shifting economic structure from the production of civil 
goods to munitions when necessary. 
Economic power may also be used in a similar way to military power. It can be 
coercive, and damage or weaken another country's economic bases' However, it is not 
always used for this purpose. Reasons for exercising economic power are : 1) the 
extraction of economic gain; 2) the achievement of a degree of control over other states; 
3) promotion of national military strength; 4) promotion of economic bases of military 
strength and economic power; 5) promotion of the capabilities of friendly and allied 
countries; 6) weakening the capabilities of opponent states; and 7) symbolising 
displeasure and inflicting punishment. 58 
Just as the exercise of military power is increasingly costly, so too 
is the exercise of 
economic power. The reasons are, first of all, a state's coercion of others may 
have 
negative consequences for its own economy. For example, 
The Kennedy administration imposed an embargo on Cuba after 
it embraced 
communism and the Soviet Union, the Carter administration a grain embargo on 
57 Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 79. 
58 For details, see ibid., pp. 129-13 3. 
ýý 
Chapter 1: International Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
the Soviet Union after it invaded Afghanistan, the Reagan administration an 
embargo on machine tools and earthmoving equipment to West Europe and the 
Soviet Union when the Europeans and Soviets agreed to build a gas pipeline 
across the continent, and the Bush administration an embargo on trade with 
Panama to force out dictator Manuel Noriega. In all of these examples, the 
United States suffered more because American business lost out to their foreign 
rivals as the targeted country simply switched suppliers and markets. 59 
Secondly, collective economic sanctions have often proved to be ineffective. One 
reason is that some countries will not agree to such measures, because of the economic 
and political costs that may be incurred if the target state is a major trading partner. 
Another is that "the authorities in free-enterprise countries may find it difficult to stop 
illicit trading". Such measures may also function to increase the target state's political 
cohesion. 60 
Lastly, economic and/or military aid sometimes involves a difficult decision in 
relation to other strategies. When Pakistan accelerated a nuclear weapons programme 
just after India's `peaceful nuclear explosion' in 1974, the US rapidly reduced its military 
and economic aid to Pakistan. However, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 
1979, the US had to resume aid to Pakistan, since the US needed to maintain a strategic 
balance in Southwest Asia. 
Like military power, economic power is not a panacea. The exercise of economic 
power is not immune from costs or negative impacts. However, because military force is 
not easily employed and the exercise of military power may be an inappropriate 
instrument, states need to know how to exercise economic power effectively. 
Traditionally, military great powers were always economic great powers as well. 
Examples are the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and the United States 
in the 
twentieth century. However, the era after World War Two witnessed the separate 
59 Nester, International Relations, pp. 111-112. 
60 Knorr, Poor and Wealth, p. 157. 
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emergence of states with military power and those with economic po-vver. While the 
former Soviet Union was regarded as a militarily great power, it was not considered as a 
great economic power. Japan, on the other hand, is widely regarded as an economic 
giant rather than as a military power, despite its huge military expenditure and access to 
sophisticated military technology. The implication of these examples is that economic 
strength can easily serve to enhance military strength, while the converse is quite difficult 
to achieve. 
(3) Balance of power 
How, then, have states used power for their survival? As mentioned earlier, states 
have to seek survival in a self-help system. They use whatever means they can to secure 
greater relative gains and greater power, and try to attain a higher rank in the 
international system. However, what seems to be necessary to secure everybody's 
survival is to prevent a potential hegemon from emerging. When a state accumulates 
power rapidly, other states form an alliance to counter-balance it. The situation in which 
several states have rough parity in terms of military power is considered desirable not 
only for individual states' survival but also for maintaining the state system itself. This is 
the basic idea of balance of power which states have traditionally practised since the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
What is problematic about balance of power is that `balance' can have several 
meanings. The basic idea is to create counter-balance or equilibrium. However, literature 
about the Concert of Europe before World War One usually focuses on the role of the 
United Kingdom as a balancer, which tried to create an equilibrium between two blocs. 
Thus, `balance' in this case refers to `balancer'. In addition, the fact that Britain at that 
time enjoyed hegemonic status led the interpretation that `balance' also implies 
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exercising the role of hegemon, contrary to the original meaning of preventing the 
emergence of a hegemon. `Balance' in this dissertation refers to equilibrium. 61 
If state (A) wants to ensure its survival, it appears beneficial to side with emerging 
power (B). But other states (C, D, E... ) usually choose to create a balance against B. 
rather than `bandwagoning' with it. Why is this? If A and C support B politically. 
economically and militarily, the latter's power would grow even more to the point where 
B could attack and defeat A and C. Considering the fact that the ultimate goal of states is 
survival, for B to be too strong is not in A's or C's interest, because B, today's friend, 
could become tomorrow's enemy. As Waltz put it, "Nobody wants anyone else to 
win". 62 From a realist viewpoint, it is natural for rational states seeking survival to form a 
counter-balance. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the world in the post-Cold War era is one 
with a sole superpower, the United States, and some major powers. Some identify this 
power structure as unipolar, others as multipolar. 63 If the unipolar system is defined as 
"one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are 
formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition 
against it", 64 the structure of the state system is multipolar when "more than two great 
powers exist, and when a rough parity exists in the domain, scope, and range of their 
might", 65 and `great powers' refers to countries that "score all of the following items: 
61 For details of the various meanings of `balance', see Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: 
Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda? ", World Politics 5(4), 1953, pp. 442-477. For details of the 
various forms of balance of power, see Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 101-106. 
62 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 
63 Huntington distinguishes a system with a predominant power with some great powers and that 
without them: a system with "one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers" 
is unipolar, while "one superpower and several major powers" is defined as uni-multipolar. See 
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", Foreign Affairs 78(2), 1999, pp. 35-36. 
64 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", p. 5, footnote 2. 
65 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 
Twenty-first Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 16. 
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size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability. military 
strength, political stability and competence' , 
66 the post-Cold War world may be 
described as unipolar, because "only the United States possesses imposing strength in all 
categories of great power capability". 67 
Some analysts argue that current unipolarity will remain for a generation or more. 68 
because 1) other powers that are beneficiaries of US policies in economic, political. 
technological and military terms cannot emerge as real challengers and 2) the current 
system under US leadership is both peace-prone and durable. 69 However, a unipolar 
system embraces mechanisms that allow other great powers to emerge as a challenger in 
the future. According to Layne, a challenger will emerge as a consequence of uneven 
growth among states and of international anarchy. 70 As a state's economy grows rapidly, 
it tends to find greater political and economic interests in the international system, which 
in turn increases the state's commitment (not only political, diplomatic and economic, 
but also possibly military) to the system. This is also a reflection of the state's greater 
66 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 131 (emphasis in original). 
61 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise", International 
Security 17(4), 1993, p. 5. For the literature that regards the post-Cold War era as `unipolar', though 
temporarily, see ibid., pp. 5-51; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", Foreign Affairs 
70(1), 1990/91, pp. 23-33; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", International 
Security 24(1), 1999, pp. 5-41; G. John Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right", National Interest 63, 
2001, pp. 17-24 ; and William Pfaff, "The Question of Hegemony", Foreign Affairs 80(1), 2001, 
pp. 221-232. For literature that supports the idea of multipolarity in Asia, see Paul Dibb, "Towards a 
New Balance of Power in Asia", Adelphi Paper 295,1995; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for 
Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia", International Security 18(3), 1993/94, pp. 5-33, 
that in Europe, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold 
War", International Security 15(1), 1990, pp. 5-56. 
68 For example, Krauthanner thinks it will remain for a generation or so, while Wohlforth believes that 
it will last as long as the period of bipolarity under the Cold War, given that "Washington plays its 
cards right". See Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", p. 24; and Wohlforth, "The Stability of a 
Unipolar World", p. 8. 
69 Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", pp. 7-8. 
70 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", p. 9. 
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ambition to seek a `rightful' status in the international system. " As Gilpin puts it. the 
behavioural pattern of a rising power would be as follows: 
The realist law of uneven growth implies that as the power of a group or state 
increases, that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over 
its environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its 
political, economic, and territorial control; it will try to change the international 
system in accordance with its particular set of interests. 72 
In the contemporary context, China's actions in the Spratlys are seen as an attempt 
to increase her territorial control, and her bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games can be 
regarded as an attempt to heighten her prestige and status in international community. It 
is perhaps needless to point out that China's economy has been growing at a faster rate 
than other major powers' and regional states' since the 1980s. All these factors, 
combined with China's dissatisfaction with the status quo which was created during the 
Cold War, implies that China has the potential to become a challenger in the long run. 
At the same time, a rising power tends to import the hegemon's political and 
administrative system in order to become as powerful as the hegemon. This is what 
Waltz calls "a tendency toward sameness". 73 For example, Austria and England copied 
the French model of a centralised administrative system which enabled the government to 
mobilise all domestic resources (not only economy but also manpower) in the late 
seventeenth century in order to acquire sufficient power to compete with the then 
hegemon, France. 74 As a result, the gap between a rising power and a hegemonic power 
narrows and power will eventually be re-distributed. Although China does not have any 
" Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
72 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
pp. 94-95. 
73 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 127. 
74 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", pp. 17-18. 
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intention to introduce an American-style democratic political system, it has imported 
Western economic and military systems since the 1980s. 
Under these conditions, a potential challenger generally chooses to form an alliance 
with other great powers, rather than bandwagoning to the strongest state, in order to 
counter the latter, because a single preponderant power might become a threat. potential 
or real, to them. Thus, however benign a hegemon might be, the very existence of the 
predominant power alarms other states. If, as Wohlforth pointed out, "all major regional 
powers do share one item on their political agenda: how to deal with U. S. power", 75 this 
is the very evidence that the United States is viewed as a threat. For example, China has 
repeatedly criticised the United States for its hegemonism and Cold War mentality, which 
is supposedly a major threat to peace, not only for China but also globally. 76 As Layne 
put it, "other states react to the threat of hegemony, not to the hegemon's identity". " In 
the realist view, strategic partnership between China and Russia is a natural outcome of 
the post-Cold War US hegemony. 
(4) Influence of power on states' behaviour 
Since the international system is anarchic and competitive, states seek power in 
order to ensure their survival and maximise their relative gains. States make efforts to 
develop their economy and technology and strengthen military capabilities. These efforts 
surely provide states with greater power in absolute terms. Greater power allows a state 
a wider range of policy options. However, whether these efforts are sufficient to ensure 
75 Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", p. 36 (emphasis in original). He uses this sentence to 
explain that other great powers' influence would be limited in the region. For example, China' 
behaviour may matter in Asia and US Asia policy, but will not matter in, say, US European policy. 
Then he concludes that "Until these states are capable of producing a counterpoise to the United 
States, the system is unipolar". Ibid. See also Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right"; and Pfaff, "The 
Question of Hegemony". 
76 See for example, Infromation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's 
National Defence", July 1998 available at http: //www. fas. organisation/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ 
cnd9807/index. html. 
77 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", p. 35. 
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their survival is an another question, because power must be measured in relative terms. 
If a state's power is smaller than that of its adversary (adversaries), it needs a third party 
(parties) to side with it in order to provide a counter-balance against the adversary 
(adversaries). 
The `soft' dimensions of power (such as political will and leadership) are also 
important, because power -a matter of whether to influence or be influenced - is 
essentially a psychological phenomenon. Of course, that psychological toughness 
requires the backing of `hard' power. Without it, a state cannot make a credible threat 
against an adversary, nor can it effectively resist an adversary's threat. Thus, the degree 
of power a state has can determine its behaviour vis-a-vis the target state. 
The prevailing balance of power or distribution of power also influence states' 
behaviour. For example, during the Cold War interaction between the members of the 
two blocs was highly restricted. As a result of Moscow's arms race with Washington, its 
economy had exhausted and the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. This caused a 
drastic change in security environment not only for the United States but also European 
countries and China. Subsequently Washington redefined its national interests and 
objectives and reviewed its military strategy and foreign policy. While it came to focus 
on threats from rogue states and ethnic conflicts in the Third World, it also shifted its 
attention from Europe to Asia, where China was perceived as the United States' 
potential future adversary. China also reviewed its national objectives and military 
strategy, which will be examined in Chapter 2. Even Japan, where discussion of security 
issue had been taboo for fifty years, was not free from the shift in the regional military 
balance of power. North Korea's launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan in August 
1998 and its suspected intrusion of Japan's territorial waters in March 1999 significantly 
heightened the sense of insecurity among Japanese and helped accelerate the passage of 
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defence bills in the Lower House in the next month (April 1999) which enhanced its role 
under the US-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty. Since a change in balance of power or 
distribution of power could directly influence states' survival and security, it must be 
concluded that the impact of these elements on states' behaviour is great. 
2) Economic interdependence 
(1) Definition of interdependence 
Keohane and Nye define interdependence as `mutual dependence', which involves 
reciprocally costly effects of transactions. 78 However, the definition of interdependence is 
under debate. According to Rosecrance, it entails the following notions: 1) a relationship 
in which one state's changing position influences the other; and 2) the existence of 
increasing "sensitivity" over external economic developments. 79 These points, however. 
do not tell us about the cost of breaking relations. Baldwin suggests three possibilities for 
the notion of interdependence: 1) it is interchangeable with the word interaction; 2) it 
refers to interactions which have negative effects on both sides if one party withdraws 
from interdependent relations; and 3) it implies relationships that are costly for the 
parties to break. 8° Although Keohane and Nye's definition falls in the second category, 
as Baldwin points out, this does not necessarily imply symmetrical dependence. For 
example, trade is an interaction of this kind, but Japan is much more dependent on Saudi 
Arabia's oil than the latter is on the former's industrial exports. In Keohane and Nye's 
analogy, Japan is more "sensitive" and "vulnerable"8' in relations with Saudi Arabia. 
78 Keohane and Nye, Poiwr and Interdependence, pp. 8-9 (emphasis in original). 
79 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality? ", World Politics 26(1), 
1973, p. 2. 
80 Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", pp. 175-177. 
81 "Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework - how quickly do changes 
in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects'? ". while 'ihc 
vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on their relative availability and costliness of the 
alternatives that various actors face". See Keohane and Nye, Porter and Interdependence, p. 12 and 
p. 13. For example, if OPEC quadrupled the oil price as it did in 1973, Japan would have to find an 
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Breaking this relationship would be enormously damaging to Japan. but Saudi Arabia 
also would have to accept some cost from losing Japan, a constant and relatively 
important client. Thus, the definition of interdependence fits better into Baldwin .s third 
category. 
In Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye argue that interdependent 
relations do not necessarily lead to mutual benefit, nor do they automatically enhance 
cooperation among states, because the asymmetrically less sensitive and/or less 
vulnerable party has a "source of power" to influence the other. 82 If a state has a greater 
source of power, it does not need to make concessions to cooperate with other states. 
Just exercising power may be an easier way to achieve its goal(s). However, the source 
of power is often decreased during the process of `translating' it into the exercise of 
actual power, as discussed above. 
(2) Empirical studies 
The current `liberal peace' argument started in the late 1980s. The major 
characteristic of `liberal peace' research is an attempt to prove scientifically the positive 
relationship between liberalism and peace, by statistical means. At first, attention was 
primarily paid to the correlation between a state's domestic political system (democracy 
in particular) and peace. However, liberalism's assumption that democracy and the liberal 
economic system, which are expected to enhance each other, are inseparable brought 
scholars in the liberal school to focus on the correlation between economic 
interdependence (trade in particular) and peace in the early 1990s. 
Before this period there was, of course, a literature which focused on the 
relationship between economic factors and war/peace, and this did not stand on the 
alternative source of oil outside OPEC. This is a matter of sensitivity. However, if as a result Japan 
changed its energy policy from depending on oil to nuclear energy, this would be an issue of 
vulnerability. 
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ground of statistical analysis. For example, at very different times (1914 and 1956) 
Angell and Rosecrance strongly advocated the pacifying effect of trade. 83 
The basic model of study in this area using statistical methods was introduced by 
Polachek in 1980. In Polachek's study, the following conclusions were drawn: 1) 
although conflict affects trade and trade affects conflict, the degree of the latter effect is 
greater than the former; 2) when trade doubles between two countries, the net frequency 
of dyadic hostility reduced by approximately 15-19%; and 3) conflict is most sensitive to 
trade in strategic goods. 84 In 1982 Gasiorowski and Polachek tested the applicability of 
these results to political adversaries. They examined the trade-conflict relations between 
the United States and the Warsaw Pact countries in the period from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s. They found a negative correlation between trade and conflict, and that 
hostility declines to a greater extent in the party which benefits more from the trade, and 
concluded that "trade can be used as an instrument to alter another country's 
behavior". 85 
Studies that found a negative correlation among democracy, total bilateral trade 
and militarised conflict were conducted by Oneal et al. (1996) and Oneal and Russett 
(1997). 86 They examined 1950-1985 period, using the statistical method. In these 
82 Ibid., p. 9, p. 249, and p. 11. 
83 Angell, The Great Illusion; and Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State. 
84 Solomon William Polachek, "Conflict and Trade7', Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(l), 1980, pp. 63- 
67. Polachek made it clear that the period of study was ten years and 30 countries were the subject of 
this study. Reuveny and Kang concluded that minerals, iron and steel, fuels, basic manufactures, and 
control and scientific equipment can be identified as strategic goods. See Rafael Reuveny and Heejoon 
Kang, "Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter? ", Journal of Peace 
Research 35(5), 1998, p. 597. Baldwin defines strategic goods as "anything that is needed to pursue a 
given strategy and that is relatively inefficient to produce at home7'. David Baldwin, Economic 
Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 214-215, cited in ibid., p. 586. 
85 Mark Gasiorowski and Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and 
Linkage in the Era of Detente! ', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26(4), 1982, p. 728. 
John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "The Liberal Peace: 
-85", Journal of Peace Research (1), Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950 
1996, pp. 11-28; and John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Rýght: 
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studies, militarised disputes were treated as a dependent variable, and the independent 
variables common to the two studies were democracy. economic interdependence (in 
terms of trade-to-GDP [gross domestic product] ratio), alliance. contiguity. military 
capability and economic growth. `Political change' in the 1996 study was replaced in the 
later one by `institutional constraints' and `non-violent norms'. The major outcomes 
were as follows: 1) other conditions being equal, economic interdependence reduces the 
likelihood of militarised conflict, and peace demonstrated stronger correlation with 
economic interdependence than alliance and economic growth did; 87 2) asymmetric 
interdependence does not necessarily increase a military conflict; 88 and 3) even trade 
dependency contributes to a reduction in conflict. 89 
In contrast, in a study that focused on the relations between total bilateral trade 
and militarised conflict in the period of 1870 to 1938, Barbieri concluded that economic 
interdependence does not necessarily lead to peace. Her study included such aspects as 
democracy, political and military factors such as alliance and capability, and economic 
factors such as degree of economic interdependence and whether relations were 
symmetrical or not. The major findings were: 1) "economically important trading 
partners are 1.4 times as likely to engage in disputes than are those dyads with limited 
economic importance"; 2) asymmetrical interdependence leads to disputes; 3) deepening 
of interdependence increases the likelihood of militarised disputes; however, 4) economic 
interdependence was not the decisive factor in the decision to go to war, though 
interdependence and conflict affect each other. 90 
Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985", International Studies Quarterly 41(2). 1997, 
pp. 267-294. 
87 Oneal et al., "The Liberal Peace", p. 22. 
88 Oneal et al., "The Classical Liberals Were Right", p. 283. 
89 Oneal et al., "The Liberal Peace" p. 21. 
90 Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence". 
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Barbieri's conclusion that interdependence does not necessarily bring peace though 
interdependence and conflict affect each other is supported by Reuvenv and Kan, 's 
study, which examined the relationship between bilateral trade in commodities and 
political conflict for the dyads of US-Soviet, US-China, Turkey-Greece, and Eg`pt-Israel 
between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. They argue that "the effect of an increase 
of trade on conflict is generally ambiguous", because 1) the importance of trade varies 
from country to country and from commodity to commodity, thus, it is assumed that 
trade-conflict relations also vary; 2) the relations between total trade and conflict are 
different from those between commodity-based trade and conflict; and 3) governments' 
attitudes toward trade and conflict are partly affected by the economic structure - for 
example, the role of government in trade tends to be greater in centrally planned 
economies and developing economies. " 
This final point is consistent with Pollins' study which examined the impact of 
political and economic factors on conflict. He studied two points using data on twenty- 
five countries for the period between 1955 and 1978.92 The first point was to examine 
the correlations among the degree of integration into the world economy, political 
conflicts and volume of trade by focusing particularly on six countries (the United States, 
the Soviet Union, West Germany, East Germany, Egypt and India) among the twenty- 
five countries selected. The second point was to examine the correlations between trade 
and political conflicts among allies. Regarding the first point, the states which were most 
integrated into the world economy, the US and West Germany, were less sensitive to 
91 Reuvcny and Kang, "Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation". Citation was drawn from 
p. 581. 
92 Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag? ", American Political Science Review 83(2). 
1989, pp. 465-480. The twenty-five states selected were the United States, West Germany, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia. 
Egypt, India, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South 
Africa, Turkey, the People's Republic of China, and Paldstan. 
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changes in the political environment than those which were less integrated, the Soviet 
Union, East Germany, Egypt and India. 93 That is, the United States and West Germany 
did not change their trade policies drastically even if political conflicts with trading 
partners emerged, while the other states' trade policies were deeply influenced by 
political relations with their trading partners. 
Until Reuveny and Kang's study, there was a strong tendency for most studies, 
examining the period after World War Two, to connect trade and peace. Reuveny and 
Kang denied this connection. Barbieri, who studied only the pre-World War Two period, 
also denied this connection. If economic interdependence may not be the decisive factor 
for peace or war, the explanation may be found in political/military factors. As mentioned 
above, the primary explanation for the absence of war among major powers after World 
War Two was the existence of nuclear weapons. Weede also identifies extended nuclear 
deterrence as the essential factor that contributed to peace during the Cold War. 94 
Regarding Pollin's second point under scruIny, the relationship between political 
conflicts among allies and trade, the political environment (cooperation or conflict) 
significantly influenced the volume of imports even among allies. This was also true for 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members that are 
highly developed and deeply integrated into the world economy. If trade volume was 
affected by the political environment among those states, this implies states' control of 
trade, to some degree, even in the countries with the most liberal economic system. In 
Polin' words, "trade does indeed follow the flag". " 
93 Ibid., p. 476. 
94 Erich Weede, "Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance", Journal of Conflict Resolution 27(2). 
1983, pp. 231-254; and "Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate 
Disputes, 1962-76", Journal of Peace Research 26(1), 1989, pp. 7-17. 
95 Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag? ", pp. 477-478. 
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However, it should not be forgotten that there is a mechanism to enhance trade 
among security allies. Gowa and Mansfield's study on the relations between alliance and 
trade in the period of 1905 and 1985 points out this factor. They argue that allies tend to 
establish preferential trading arrangements such as free trade areas, while "tariff games 
between allies differ systematically from those played between adversaries'-. 
96 
Thus, if 
increased trade leads to peace, as liberals claim, it can be attributed to a mechanism, a 
product of a political decision, which increases trade among allies. 
(3) Discussion 
The previous section introduced three types of literature which have used 
quantitative methods to assess the type of correlation between peace and economic 
interdependence, namely positive correlation, negative correlation, and no correlation. 
This section raises some questions about the usefulness of the quantitative approach and 
examines the significance of economic interdependence as a factor for maintaining peace. 
The first point that should be noted is that there are some problems with the logic 
of liberal peace. The first problem is a technical one associated with statistical methods. 
For example, trade has been used as a variable to assess economic interdependence. The 
question is, `is it enough? ' Since the movement of capital is very rapid and involves 
extremely large amounts, capital flow (not only investment but also speculation) also 
needs to be taken into account. 97 In fact, Barbieri draws attention to the absence of 
consensus about which phenomena should be included as aspects of economic 
Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade", American Political 
Science Review 87(2), 1993, pp. 412 and p. 409, respectively. 
97 According to a Bank for International Settlements (BIS) report published in October 1998, foreign 
exchange through trade constitutes less than 2 percent of the whole foreign exchange, leaving other 
98 percent through speculation. See Li Chan9jin, "World Economy at a Crossroad", Beijing Review, 
4-10 January 1999, p. 15. The power of the hedge fund is so great that it caused financial cn,, e-., in 
some countries and areas (Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and 1999 and Brazil in 
1998). Now that one country's financial crisis easily triggers similar events in other countries. and 
that spreading such a crisis to others cannot be controlled, capital movement seems more relevant to 
interdependence than trade. 
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interdependence, and points out that the measurement of economic interdependence 
poses a challenge. 98 Reuveny and Kang also point out the necessity of developing a more 
effective model which can determine correlation between trade and cooperation 
conflict. 99 
However, a more fundamental question is whether statistical analysis is an 
appropriate method to explain the phenomena in the political-economic area. Of course, 
it is beneficial to understand the trend, but there is no explanation about the meaning of 
the figures or numbers the authors give. For example, Oneal et al. show that. other 
conditions being equal, economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict from 
0.78 (baseline conditions) to 0.47.100 However, there is no explanation about what 0.47 
or 0.31 (= 0.78 - 0.47) means in the real world. Moreover, the meaning of 0.47 or 0.31 is 
assumed to be different from state to state, because each state's political environment 
(such as its relative power vis-a-vis the adversary, degree of conflict, the value of issue in 
question, and so forth) is different. Thus, as long as the reasoning or analysis based on 
the figures is missing, their studies are only statistics, not political science. Furthermore, 
the statistical method cannot handle whatever cannot be converted into numbers. Thus, 
authors can incorporate the elements of `alliance' and `military capabilities', but 
completely ignore the diplomatic process. Even during war, there are usually diplomatic 
negotiations behind the scenes. At some moments, they go forward, but at others they 
end in deadlock. There are usually also diplomatic negotiations and bargaining before a 
conflict becomes militarised. However, the statistical method cannot deal with such 
98 Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence", p. 36. See also Oneal et al., "The Classical Liberals Were 
Right", p. 275, footnote 1. 
99 Reuveny and Kang, "Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation", p. 581. 
goo Oneal et al., "The Classical Liberals Were Right", p. 279, Table 3. Annual Probabilities of 
Involvement in a Militarized Dispute, 1950-1985, Based on the Estimated Coefficients for Equations 
1 and 2 in Table 2. 
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factors. Consequently, an important influence on trade-conflict relations is omitted, and 
the outcome could be oversimplified as a result. 
A second problem of the liberal peace argument is the general tendency to ignore 
the fact that politics "determines the framework of economic activityv". '0' Liberals argue 
that the main cause of the absence of war among the major powers after World War Two 
is that they are democracies and have liberal economic systems. Yes, they are right. 
However, at the same time, they are all allies of the United States which was the rival of 
the Soviet Union under the situation called the Cold War. The United States' fear of the 
Soviet threat led to the conclusion that Western countries' trade with the Soviet bloc 
should be strictly controlled, because their goods and technologies could serve to 
strengthen the basis of the Soviet Union's military power. As a result, Washington 
encouraged active trade within the alliance system which it dominated, in order to 
compensate economic loss caused by the restriction of trade between alliances. The so- 
called liberal peace was largely made possible by the Cold War political/ military 
structure. In addition, a decision about whether or not to wage war must be made 
considering as many factors as possible. These include not only economic ties but also a 
state's relative power (military capability and logistics) vis-a-vis the adversary, timing, 
funding for war, calculation of costs and gains, domestic opinion, the significance of the 
issue in question, and the outcome of bargaining and negotiations. Economic 
interdependence is surely one of the important elements to be considered and can be 
expected to function as a constraint on states' behaviour, but it is not the decisive factor 
for a state when deciding whether or not to go to war. 
'o' Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations", International Organization 25, 
1971, p. 403. 
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3) Institutions 
(1) Definition and function of institutions 
According to Keohane, institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations" and comprise the following three forms: 1) formal intergovernmental or 
cross-national nongovernmental organisations; 2) international regimes; and 3) 
conventions. 102 They include, therefore, not only the World Bank, the United Nations. 
the GATT and WTO, but also the Roman Catholic Church, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Red Cross, and multinational 
corporations such as IBM, SONY and Toyota. Participants in institutions are assumed to 
be rational maximisers of self-interest. In order to simplify the discussion, `institutions' in 
this section mainly refers to international (intergovernmental) organisations, because they 
are an arena in which national interests conflict, but at the same time, where various 
kinds of cooperation are most easily observed. So the term `international institutions' is 
used here interchangeably with the term `international organisations'. 
The basic incentive for establishing international institutions seems to be the 
existence of problems that cannot be resolved by the effort of a single country, such as 
the fluctuation of exchange rates, transfers of capital, environmental issues (e. g. pollution 
of sea and air, the hole in ozone layers, global warming), international crime (for 
example, drug trafficking and smuggling), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and so forth. The more difficult it is to cooperate and the greater benefit each 
actor can expect from cooperation, the more useful institutions will be. 
"' Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Poiwr: Essays in International Relations 
Theory (Boulder: Wetview Press, 1989), pp. 3-4. Mearsheimer defines institutions as "a set of rules 
that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other". 
Sev 
Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", p. 8. 
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International institutions are a good tool for weaker states to strengthen their 
bargaining position vis-ä-vis the stronger states, because the rules and norms of 
established regimes give a stronger party less room for manoeuvring, and because 
regimes also provide valuable information for which the weaker parties would otherwise 
have to pay more. Under rule-based cooperation, every state can secure greater absolute 
gain. 
However, in the realist view, cooperation is difficult under the circumstances that 
each actor has an incentive to defect; that is, states are trapped in the so-called Prisoners' 
Dilemma, and states are concerned more about relative gains rather than increase of 
absolute gain. The simplest form of the Prisoners' Dilemma involves two players, with 
each actor having only two options; either cooperation (C) or defection (D). Neither 
actor has information about what the other player will do, and each actor's dominant 
strategy is assumed to be defection, regardless of the other actor's behaviour. The 
benefit of mutual cooperation is greater than that of mutual defection, but less than that 
of unilateral defection. More specifically, CC>(CD+DC)/2.103 Under these 
circumstances, "each state prefers mutual cooperation to mutual noncooperation 
(CC>DD), but also successful cheating to mutual cooperation (DC>CC) and mutual 
defection to victimization by another's cheating (DD>CD); overall, then, 
DC>CC>DD>CD". 104 
Since each actor tries to avoid being unilaterally exploited (CD), each decides to 
defect, resulting in the second worst outcome. As this game demonstrates, the "rational 
Robert Axelrod, 'The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists", American Political 
Science 
Review 75,1981, p. 306. 
104 Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", p. 493- See also Arthur A. Stein, "rhe 
Politics of 
Linkage', World Politics 33(l), 1980, pp. 62-81; Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchic World", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed. ), International Regimes (Ithaca: 
Corncll 
University Press, 1984), pp. 115-140; and Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemon - y: 
Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1984), pp. 67-69. 
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pursuit of self-interest leads to a solution that is not Pareto-optimal": los or even to a 
disaster. 106 Thus, achieving a Pareto-optimal solution requires a shift of players' top 
priority from DC to CC. If this was realised, the game changes from Prisoners' Dilemma 
to Stag Hunt (CC>DC>DD>CD). '°7 
Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma game contributes to a change in player's 
preference ordering. If Prisoners' Dilemma is a single shot game, the players will surely 
defect. However, under the repeated game, each player has chances of meeting 
retaliation from the other. This perception, or real retaliation, leads the players to amend 
their dominant strategy from defection to cooperation. Moreover, once the players 
recognise the benefit of cooperation, they may become willing to cooperate in the future. 
However, altering the dominant strategy is not easy, because there is no guarantee 
that the other player will cooperate. Even if the parties agree to cooperate, one player 
may cheat. Thus, conditions under which cooperation occurs more frequently are 
needed. Jervis points out that such conditions are: (1) anything that increases incentives 
to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC) and/ or decreasing the 
costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not (CD); (2) anything that 
decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the 
other (DC) and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation (DD), (3) anything that 
increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate. 
'" 
105 Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", International Organization 36(2), 1982, p. 358. Put simply, 
Pareto-optimal is the point at which all parties involved gain almost the same degree of satisfaction. 
106 Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: 
Strategies and 
Institutions", World Politics 3 8(l), 1985, p. 23 1. 
107 There are other types of ordering. If the players in Prisoners' Dilemma perceived 
DD, rather than 
CD, as the worst (DC>CC>CD>DD), this game is called Chicken. However, if the players are 
attached to defection and perceive DD as even better than CC (DC>DD>CC>CD), this is called 
Deadlock. 
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics 30(l), 1978, p. 171. 
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In order for these conditions to be established, it is necessary to consider the 
elements that influence the players' incentives: mutuality of interest; the shadow of the 
future and the number of players. '09 In general, the greater the conflict of mterests. the 
greater the incentive to defect. Thus, finding a common interest, even if its N'alue is 
asymmetrical, could foster the players' incentive to cooperate. The element of the future 
is also important. As mentioned earlier, if the game is a single shot, defection is the most 
rational strategy. However, if the game is repeated, one player's first defection will meet 
retaliation by the other. And if the benefit of defecting today is, or is perceived as, 
smaller than the cost caused by the other's retaliation tomorrow, the incentive to defect 
today is expected to be decreased. The key issues here are perception of the payoff and 
reciprocity. According to Axelrod's study, based on a computerised chess tournament, 
"the highest average score was attained by the simplest of A the strategies submitted"; 
that is, tit for tat. "° 
However, perception of the payoff will become unclear as the number of players 
increases, due to the problem of identification of defectors and the sanctioning problem. 
The sanctioning problem means that there is a lack of incentives and/or measures for 
punishing defectors. "' If the defector is not identified, or punished, then it is natural to 
assume that most players will choose to be 'free-riders' rather than 'policemen'. 
How, thený can cooperation be achieved or promoted'? One effective way is to 
employ a tit-for-tat strategy. Despite the problems mentioned above, it seems valid 
where the number of the players is limited. The question is, what should the first move 
be, when the other player has not made a move? Axelrod advises cooperation first. 
109 Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", pp. 228-238. 
... Axelrod, '7he Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists", p. 309. See also Axelrod and Keohane, 
"Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", p. 244; and Robert Axelrod, The Eivlution of Cooperatioiz 
(London: Penguin, 1990). 
Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", pp. 23-5-236. 
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Player A's cooperation may lead to player B's cooperation. If B defects this time. .4 can 
retaliate against B the next time, regardless of B's action. Repeated play NviU graduaUx, 
converge the players towards cooperation. However, there are pitfalls in the tit-for-tat 
strategy. First of all, tit-for-tat would result in an "unending echo of alternating 
defection". And it could also lead the players to -deadlock". "' For example, raisIng tariff 
levels in one country may result in other countries following suit, although a lower level 
of tariff would better suit their real income; or devaluation of currency in one country 
could trigger competitive devaluation among other states, although the benefit of 
devaluation is not necessarily guaranteed to exceed the costs. Despite those pitfalls, of the 
tit-for-tat strategy, Axelrod suggests that a "better strategy might be to return only nine- 
tenths of a tit for a tat. This would help dampen the echoing of conffict and still provide 
an incentive to the other player not to try any gratuitous defections" . 
113 
Another way to foster cooperation is to establish regimes. Although regimes "do 
not substitute for reciprocity", they are expected to "reinforce and institutionalize it". "' 
By providing information about actors' compliance and regulating a range of actors' 
behaviour, it is possible to increase the cost of defection, liberal institutionalists argue. 
(2) Motivations to form institutions 
Traditionally, the primary reason for regime formation was explained by hegemonic 
stability theory, especially since the 1970s when the relative decline of the US poxver 
began to be widely recognised. The core logic of the hegemonic stability theory is as 
fbHows. A hegemon, which has outstanding military and economic power, creates an 
international order. In the case of the United States, she formed an alliance system with 
the purpose of containing the Soviet bloc, and also established the liberal economic order 
112 Ibid., p. 245. 
"' Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, p. 13 8. 
114 Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", p. 250. 
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caffled the Bretton Woods system in which alhes and ffiends of the US were able to 
deepen interdependence. These military and economic orders sen, ed as public goods"5 
which necessitated US tolerance of an excessive burden, in terms of the economic. and 
political costs of allowing other members, Japan in particular, to 'free-nde'. Thus. when 
the hegemon declined, a change of regime was also inevitable. This theory apparently 
supports the idea that states influence regimes, not vice versa. 
Keohane criticised this theory, which he calls the 'supply side' argument, pointing 
out that the 'demand side' element is ignored. Then, how is the 'demand' created" 
According to Keohane, certain conditions must prevail: 1) a common interest in a 
particular issue area among actors; 2) if an ad hoc agreement is concluded, everybody 
can benefit from it; however, 3) the transaction cost is high and the information that each 
actor has is imperfect, especially on an ad hoc basis. In other words, 
... where the demand for agreements is positive at some level of feasible cost, 
and the supply of agreements is not infinitely elastic and free, there may be a 
demand for international regimes if they actually make possible agreements 
yielding net benefit that would not be possible on an ad hoc basis. "' 
Conversely, where everybody knows that everyone else obeys the agreement, the 
transaction cost is almost zero and each actor has access to perfect information, there is 
no need to form a regime. Thus, an effective regime requires a lack of at least one 
element among reliability, null transaction cost and perfect information. 117 This implies 
that the major roles of regime are enhancing compliance, decreasing transaction costs 
Public goods are goods that should be offered to all members regardless of whether or not the 
members use them and whether or not the users have paid for them. Take public roads, for example. 
Once the roads are built, they must be offered even to those who do not use them and those who do 
not pay tax but still use them (free riders). Such goods In international arena are usuall-v proVIded b,. 
the hegemon. 
Robert 0. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed. ). 
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 149-153. Citation was drawn fi7oin 
p. 153 (emphasis in original). 
117 Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
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and/or providing necessary information to their members. Although Keohane provides no 
specific example, the UNCLOS, the Convention on International Trade mi Endangered 
Species, and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling may be classed 
as 'demand side' regimes. 
Taking into account the facts that even the United States can no longer donunate 
or control many issue areas and that the number of problems which cross borders has 
been increasing, 'demand side' regimes will increase in the future. However, regardless 
of the type of regime, regimes must Eve up to their members' expectation of benefit. If a 
regime fails to provide adequate benefit, its dechne is inevitable. 
(3) How institutions influence states' behaviour 
Institution theory assumes that institutions have a significant impact on states' 
behaviour. Their influence can roughly be divided into two categories: making states 
more cooperative, an constraining them by rules. This section examines whether 
institutions satisfy such elements that are expected to promote cooperation in the fight of 
repeated play, perception of the payoff, the free rider problem and distributional problem. 
As mentioned above, the repeated game is expected to lead players gradually to 
converge towards cooperation because one player's defection is strongly expected to 
meet another's retaliation. In this regard, institutions are arenas of repeated play thereby 
promoting cooperation, in the economic sphere in particular. Regarding the perception of 
payoff, institutions must guarantee each member that nobody wiH receive the payoff of 
CD (being unilaterally exploited). Thus, whether institutions can lead states to be 
cooperative depends on whether they can prevent cheating by some members and, or 
whether they can effectively punish the defectors; in other words, whether institutions 
have autonomous rights and adequate measures for monitoring, verification, sanction and 
enforcement. Since one of the major functions of institutions is to provide information. 
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monitoring and verification may be, at least partly, satisfied. HoweN'er, many institutions 
lack enforcement measures, which results in allowing some members' deviant behaviour. 
This problem will be discussed later. The free-rider problem also needs to be resolved. 
On the one hand, if an international organisation involves many participants. it can be 
seen as a successful institution, because those members are willing to be bound by the 
rules of the institution. However, it seems to be true that the more players participate, 
the more difficult it is to identify free-riders. Since this problem is also connected xvith 
the sanction problem, the role institutions can play in this respect could be limited, 
depending on issue areas. In the case of the NPT, violation can be detected relatiVely 
easily because its monitoring measure (inspection) is strict and it is relatively successful 
in enforcement. Nonetheless, the NPT could not prevent the Iraqi case. "' Thus, 
institutions with less strict monitoring and enforcement measures have to tolerate, to a 
certain degree, the free-rider problem. 
Finally, distributional problems need to be overcome. One of the major 
disagreements between realists and liberals about cooperation is how to deal with the 
problem of relative gain. Liberals assert that greater absolute gain can motivate states to 
cooperate, while realists argue that concern about who gains more IS a big obstacle for 
cooperation. Regarding distributional conflict, liberalism is confident, arguing that 
institutions can help to settle distribution conflict and assure states that '. ý. gains are evenly 
118 The parties of the NPT must make an agreement with IAEA which supplies information and 
necessary materials to help its member states' peaceful nuclear development. But in exchange, 
member states have to accept IAEA's regular inspections, because even a small volume of critical 
materials (such as plutonium and enriched uranium) could be enough for making a nuclear boinb. 
Iraq, the party of the NPT, has enjoyed the benefit of nuclear development, while cheating ovcr the 
materials and rejecting IAEA's inspections. Even before the Gulf War, Iraq's potential to complete 
nuclear bombs was estimated as 'within reach'. However, a lack of critical information about Iraq's 
nuclear development caused a wide divergence about how close it was to nuclear bombs; from 'one to 
three weeks' to 'at least six months and probably years' to 'eight months'. See Paul Leventhal, 
"Present Assessments Understate Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Potential" (For Immediate Releasc, -Nuclear 
Control Institute, 30 November 1990), availble at http: //www. nci. org/t/tII3090. htm: and Edxin S. 
Lyman, "Iraq: How Close to a Nuclear Weapon? " (Nuclear Control Institute, 30 November 1995), 
available at http: //www. nci. org/i/ ibI 13095. htm. 
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divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures 
and capacities of alliance members". 119 
What about the function of constraining states' behaviour" This constraint can be 
divided into two categories: rule binding and cost of withdrawal. Regarding the fon-ner 
point, it seems to be true that 
... 
institutions are simultaneously causes and effects; ... states choose and design institutions. States do so because they face certain problems that can be 
resolved through institutional mechanisms. They choose institutions because of 
their intended effects. Once constructed, institutions will constrain and shape 
behaviour, even as they are constantly challenged and reformed by their 
member states. 120 
However, the question is, is it rules per se that constrain states' behaviour'? 
Liberals surely answer 'yes', but from a realist point of view, the answer is 'no'. What 
allows states to respect rules and obligations is their political will to observe the rules 
and obligations. As the 1998 Iraqi rejection of UN anns inspection shows, if there is no 
political will to obey the rules, rules no longer have binding power. On the other hand, if 
the political will is to obey the rules, even non-member states may act as if they were 
members of the given regime. For example, China and France respected the NPT rules 
even before acceding to the NPT, and most other non-member states, such as Brazil and 
Argentina, also followed suit. In this sense, institutions cannot always constrain states' 
political will. 
Moreover, once a state becomes a member of a certain organisation, it is 
sometimes quite difficult to withdraw from that organisation, even if it allows members 
to withdraw with advance notice. For example, North Korea's hint in the early 1990s 
that it would withdraw from the NPT triggered concerted international pressure for it not 
Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", International 
Security 20(l), 1995, pp. 45-46. 
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to do so. It seems to be perceived to be particularly costly if a state withdraws ftom 
regimes M the security sphere. This is probably because such regimes are more directlý- 
relevant to other states' survival than economic regimes. Thus, violation of the rules 
and/or withdrawal from the security regime relatively easily trigger other states' 
economic sanctions, even outside the regime. If the state cancels the intention of 
withdrawal, it may be a result of outside pressure and its calculations about the political 
and economic costs of withdrawal, rather than respect for rules. Again, there is a limit to 
the influence of institutions on states' behaviour. 
(4) Discussion 
Liberals' argument that institutions are so significant that they can alter states' 
behaviour meets criticisms by realists who regard institutions as "basically a reflection of 
the distribution of power in the world"; thus, "institutions have minimal Influence on 
state behaviour". 121 
The first point indicates some limitations on the effectiveness of regimes. First of 
all, a regime cannot do anything to a state that is not a member. For example, although 
the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 had a great impact on the NPT 
regime, economic sanctions against them had to be conducted outside the regime 
because they were not members of it. Second, "[r]ules of international regimes are 
frequently changed, bent, or broken to meet the exigencies of the moment. They are 
rarely enforced automatically, and they are not self-executing". 122 As a result, "in most 
international regimes a certain degree of unorthodox behaviour is tolerated and not taken 
Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions", p. 743 
(emphasis in original). 
121 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International institutions", p. 7. 
I ", Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", p. 147. 
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as a chaUenge to the regime' 1.123 This imphes that the actor whose behaviour Ls 
unorthodox may gain more than others. Combined with the sanctioning problem, deviant 
behaviour by member states could undermine the very basis of the regime. 
Second, which states participate in a certain regime is sometimes critical. For 
example, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
South Pacific, and Southeast Asia are meaningless without the ratification of the nuclear 
weapon states. However, the United States, in particular, has been indifferent towards 
NWFZs, out of fear of losing its freedom of military action. For the same reason, the US 
is opposed to the UNCLOS. 
Thirdly, the rules tend to be more favourable to core members of the organisation 
and once the organisation is created, it cannot be reformed easfly. The former point 
seems to be more true in the case of 'supply side' regimes, although manipulation of this 
kdnd has been increasingly difficult with increasing numbers of participants and 
transborder problems, and diversity of interest among participants. Nonetheless, the 
typical example of this category is the United Nations. Despite the voices arguing that 
the UN should be reformed to make it more efficient and to reflect the current 
distribution of power, it is quite inelastic. The status quo of 1945 has been maintained for 
over fifty years, and while Germany and Japan had to increase their donation to the UN 
as their economies developed, they are still identified as 'enemies' in the UN charter. 
In addition, institutions are not always beneficial to their members. Nye and 
Keohane point out that if institutions provide states with something the latter need, such 
as goods, service, information or managerial skills, states become dependent on the 
institutions and that this dependence "is translated into policy most directly when certam 
123 Donald J. Puchala and Rayinond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductivc 
Analysis", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed. ), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell UnjvcTsity Press, 
1984), p. 89. 
60 
Chapter I: International Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
CoStl,,... 
124 policies which a govermuent might otherwise follow become prohibitivel. ', For 
example, if a state is integrated into the world economy. policy coordination with other 
states is inevitable; and if a state depends heavily for its capital flow and managerial skills 
on mternational economic organisations, it will refrain from adopting overly nationalist 
or socialist economic policies. Moreover, it is also true that too much dependence on 
institutions can result in 'spoiling' the recipient countries. For example. it is well known 
that financial and material assistance in agriculture to developing countries sometimes 
deprives them of the incentive for self-help. Or even if the method offered is not suitable 
for the state, the latter often adopts the method, for fear of losing assistance if it opposes 
it. 
Besides, institutions cannot necessarily provide adequate measures for verification, 
enforcement and sanction. This is related to the problem of acceptable levels of 
compliance. If states have to accept rules which are thoroughly listed, states may not 
participate in the organisation. On the other hand, detailed rules sometimes cause states 
to take the view that doing anything that is not fisted in the regulation is acceptable. 
Thus, treaty texts tend to be ambiguous, allowing all parties to interpret them in a way 
that is favourable for them, thus allowing them to take deviant action. 
Another problem in compliance involves the capabilities of a party that has 
accepted the rules. It is widely known that when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 199 1, 
most of the successor states could not carry out the obligations the Soviet Union had 
accepted under the START because of their lack of knowledge, skills and materials. 
The severest criticism from realists involves relative gain. Grieco criticises liberals 
for considering only absolute gain and not concerning themselves with relative gain, 
because liberals regard states as completely independent actors. Liberals' view that the 
12-4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert 0. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An 
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greatest impediment to cooperation is cheating is mistaken: since states are positional. 
how to maintain their current position, or go to a higher rank in the miternational svstern 
is an important concern, as well as a primary concern of sun7ival. The real problem Nvith 
anarchy is not the lack of 4ýa central agency to enforce promises" as liberals claim. but 
that "there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the 
threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them" . 
125 This is why states not only maximise 
ni, aDSOlute gain but also pursue their own greater relative gain and prevent others from 
securing greater relative gain. Concern about others cheating alone does not consti itute 
an obstacle to cooperation. Concern about relative gain must be included. 
The second critical challenge by the realists to liberal institutionalism's perceptions 
toward cooperation involves consideration of the difference between the economic 
sphere and the security sphere. As Jervis points out, competition in security issues 
generally tends to be greater than that in the economic area; the stakes are higher in the 
former than in the latter, and monitoring, measuring and verification of others' defection 
is more difficult in the security area than in the economic area. "' These views are also 
shared by some liberal institutionalists such as Axelrod and Keohane. 
In economic relations, actors have to expect that their relationships will 
continue over an indefinite period of time; that is, the games they play with each 
other will be iterated. Typically, neither side in an economic interaction can 
elimina e the other, or change the nature of the game decisively in a single 
move. In security affairs, by contrast, the possibility of a successful preemptive 
war can sometimes be a tempting occasion for the rational timing of surprise. 
Another way to put this is that, in the international political economy, retaliation 
for defection will almost always be possible; therefore a rational player, 
considering defection, has to consider its probability and its potential 
consequences. In security affairs, it may be possible to limit or destroy the 
opponent's capacity for effective retaliation. 127 
Introduction", International Organization 25,1971, p. 339. 
Grieco, ''Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation". Quotations are at p. 497 and pp. 497-498. 
respectively (emphasis in original). 
126 jerViS 
," Secunity Regimes", pp. 358-359. 
12' Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", pp. 232-233. 
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In addition, the negative side of regimes appears to be neglected. It is true that 
regimes make cooperation easier to some extent, once they are formed. Hmvever. 
formation of regimes is, in many cases, initiated by a single 'hegemon' or by a group of 
great powers, and a regime's norms and rules may tend to be more favourable to these 
core countries than to other members. The regime for non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons provides a typical example. While nuclear weapons states are obliged to make 
efforts at arms reduction, non-nuclear weapons states are obliged to give up the vital 
security option of 'going nuclear' and to accept inspections from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their nuclear activities. Have 'weaker' non-nuclear 
states obtained greater bargaining power byjoining this regime? All they could do xvas to 
call collectively for progress in nuclear weapons states' obligations, and to threaten to 
withdraw from the regime if the progress towards arms reduction does not meet their 
expectations. In addition, core members of a regime often determine agenda setting. For 
example, since 1993 Taiwan has been asking the United Nations to discuss the question 
of Taiwan's re-entry to the UN as a sovereign state. However, the People's Republic of 
China, which can veto whatever it regards as against its national interests because it is a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, has blocked this issue from being 
discussed in the General Assembly. 
Furthermore, states' actual practices often run counter to liberal institutionalism's 
assumption that regimes can resolve problems caused by conflict of interests among 
members. For example, the United States frequently threatens to treat its trading 
partners, who enjoy trade surplus with the US, in accordance with its domestic law, the 
so-called article 'super 301', outside the GATT system which the United States 
originally took the initiative to form, because the US can exercise power more effectiN, -ely 
and coercively on a bilateral basis than in a regime. If Keohane and Nye are right. the US 
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would not attempt to resolve its trade problems outside the regime. Thus. emphasLsing 
the usefulness of regimes, or institutions, may result in neglecting the fact that power 
politics is conducted behind the scenes. 
Finally, institution theory ignores the factor of the pohtical xvill of states. 
Participating in a certain organisation is a political decision. Motivations for entry maý 
vary. A state may agree to join a regime because of the pressure from others., as in the 
case of Japan's acquiescence in banning the ivory trade, 128 or a state may join a regime 
because non-membership sometimes results in it being labelled a rogue state. The typical 
example of this is the NPT. India and Pakistan refused to accede to the NPT, despite the 
international pressure to join. They had been seen, therefore, as ambitious to develop 
nuclear weapons, and indeed they finally exploded nuclear devices in May 1998. On the 
other hand, if states which are members of a regime decide to cheat, they will surely do 
so and reject enforcement, hiding behind their sovereign status. Examples are North 
W- 
K. orea and Iraq in the NPT regime. 
In swn, institutions are expected to give states an incentive to cooperate, and they 
impose constraints on states' behaviour. States benefit from institutions by obtaining 
valuable information at a reasonable cost and by becoming more certain about other 
states' future behaviour. However, monitoring and verification of cheating are largely 
inadequate, and the effectiveness of sanction and enforcement is even less. Moreover, 
how to resolve distributional conflict remains a challenge. Nor does the rule-binding 
function appear to be so strong as was expected. What really matters is the states' 
political will, rather than rules themselves. A closer examination of liberal confidence 
I'll, about the significance of institutions does not necessarily support its theoretical 
assumptions. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined three major schools of thought in International Relations 
theory: realism, commercial liberalism, and liberal institutionalism. These schools assume 
that power, economic interdependence and international institutions respectively can 
influence states' behaviour. 
Realism asserts that states have to ensure their survival in an anarchic intemationaJ 
system. In order to achieve this, states seek power. Since power is essentlaUy the ability 
to influence others' behaviour, the more power which a state gains, the easier it is for 
that state to pursue its national interests. Although the costs of resolution by military 
power of political and economic disputes are enormously high, both politicaHy and 
economically, the primary task of military power is to deter potential adversaries from 
attacking, and, if such an aggression does occur, to defend and survive. In this sense, 
n-fflitary power functions as a 'last resort'. Under these conditions, relative gain (who 
gets more) is crucial for states. Thus, concern over relative gain makes it difficult for 
states to cooperate. Using the analogy of the Prisoners' Dilemma Game, each player who 
worries about being unilaterally exploited by another party, will choose to defect, thereby 
resulting in the second worst payoff. However, "nations do generally observe laws and 
9 129 obligations' . Although realists are correct when arguing 
that states' concerns about 
relative gains and survival are the most influential factors for states' behaviour. a theory 
explaining why states still choose a cooperative approach needs to be developed. 
In this respect, liberals in general are more enthusiastic about developing a 
theoretical explanation for cooperation. However, whether or not this explanation is 
satisfactory is another question. Regarding commercial liberalism, its great efforts to 
128 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "on Compliance7', International OrganLation 47(2), 
1993, p. 200. 
129 Louis Henkin, HowNations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968). p. 
4-5. 
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prove scientifically the correlation between economic interdependence and peace. using a 
statistical approach, leave unanswered essential questions as to xhat econormc 
interdependence is and why an increase in economic interdependence affects states* 
behaviour, be it aggressive or cooperative. In addition, although Keohane and Nye 
mention that the less dependent party can exercise power easily, they do not refer to the 
possibi. 1ity of the reverse case, that is, even a more dependent party can exploit the 
relationship. The greatest weak point in the 'economic interdependence-peace' argument 
is that it lacks consideration of the political and military structure in which economic 
interdependence was made possible. When states believe that their national interest 
(particularly their survival and/or protection of their territory) is at risk, they may be 
willing to resort to force, regardless of economic relations. The decision whether or not 
to go to war is not a matter of probability, but of political will. 
Liberal institutionalism has the same problem as commercial liberalism In the sense 
that it ignores Political factors. Many international institutions, most of which were 
created just after World War Two on the initiative of the United States, reflect 
distribution of power, as realists assert. This applies from regime formation, through 
establishing rules, to operation of the regime. Institutions are also far from perfect, 
particularly in respect of enforcement and sanction. This weakness can be attributed to 
institutions' weaker position vis-a-vis sovereignty. Although states' behaviour and 
institutions constrain each other, it is only possible because states agree to be bound by 
the rules. Thus, it seems that states' behaviour is not influenced by institutions to the 
extent expected by liberal institutionalists. Institutions are not immune from pmver 
politics. 
In sum, although none of the schools has a perfect explanation for states" 
behaviour, realism seems to be more convincing. As was seen during the Cold War. 
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superpower rivalry created two blocs between which trade was restricted. Another 
example is that a debate over whether or not to grant Most-Favoured-Nation (NEFN) 
status to China originated in the fact that China's political ideology and system did not 
satisfy the prerequisite (free emigration) for obtaining permanent MFN status from the 
United States. Further evidence is that Moscow has refrained from seffing its most 
advanced weapons to Beijing since the latter started importing Russian weapons since 
the early 1990s despite the fact that their relations have come close enough to become 
4strategic partners' since 1997. All these cases show that political and security concerns 
are placed higher than consideration of trading relations. Thus, the realists' argument 
that political and military relations largely determine the extent of trade better explains 
states' behaviour than arguments by advocates of commercial liberalism. Arguments by 
liberal institutionalists are not convincing either, because states tend to influence 
institutions more than vice versa. States' behaviour is generally based more on realist 
thinking than liberal thinking. A major change in the balance of power and security 
environment generally leads to an overall review of a state's national interests, objectives 
and goals while a change in economic relations and institutions may alter a part of 
economic policies and foreign policies. Since economic and foreign policies are adjusted 
in accordance with a state's national objectives and goals, the impact on the latter is 
greater than the former. Thus, it is concluded that the impact of the balance of power 
factor is greater than that of economic interdependence and international institutions. 
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International Factors Affecting China's Behaviour 
Introduction 
Chapter I introduced a debate between reahsm. and liberalism (commercial 
liberalism and liberal institutionalism) over what influences states' behaviour. Realists 
argue that a state's seeking for survival in an anarchic international system is influenced 
by power relations vis-a-vis other states. Supporters of commercial liberalism not only 
assert that economic interdependence has the effect of making states more peaceful, but 
have also tried to prove the positive correlation between economic factors and peace 
based on statistical methods. Liberal institutionalists argue that rules and norms 
established in institutions will restrict states' behaviour, thereby making the latter less 
selfish. It was pointed out, however, that even the more dependent party can sometimes 
use interdependent relations as a power resource and that rules and noms in institutions 
are usually a product of power politics among member states; that is, stronger countries' 
values tend to be reflected in fonning rules and non-ns. Thus, neither commercial 
liberalism nor liberal institutionalism can be free from power relations among the states 
concerned. 
This chapter applies this debate to China in order to examine which factor among 
balance of power, economic interdependence and international institutions is better able 
to explain Chinas international behaviour. It demonstrates that China's dependency on 
the US market worked as a constraint on China's pursuit of obtaining NIFN status 
from 
Washington. However, Beijing has also learnt that it can use the interests of US-oxvned 
multinational corporations as a tool to exert pressure on the US government's policy- 
making in its favour. In this sense, economic interdependence has worked as 
both a 
constraint and a power resource for Beijing. It also shows that not only 
is China skilful in 
maximising its benefits while minimising the costs (for example, various obligations 
to 
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achieve the goals set by the institutions), but also that it has engaged in power politics 
whenever it had a chance to do so. Thus, it argues that China's obser\-ed international 
behaviour supports a realist position. 
1. The balance of power 
The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) history can be divided into txvo 
periods: one inward-looking during the Mao era, and one outgoing after the introduction 
of the open-door policy of 1979. Despite this difference, the Beijing goverment's 
international behaviour has primarily been based on assessments of China's geopolitical 
setting vis-a-vis the superpowers. When deahng with its Southeast Asian neighbours, 
China applied a patron-client formula (that is, which of the superpowers is the patron for 
a particular state) until the late 1980s. 
Just after the PRC was established in October 1949, the Beijing government 
decided to join the Soviet bloc. One of the main reasons for this was that mainland China 
and the Soviet Union had a common political goal, namely building a socialist country. 
Besides ideological difference between Beijing and Washington, the former had an 
important reason to antagonise the latter due to Washington's political support for 
Kuomintang (KMT), which had retreated to Taiwan, as a legitimate government 
representing China. As a result, the mainland's international behaviour was largely based 
on the geopolitical structure of a Beijing-Moscow axis versus Washington under the 
Cold War structure. Thus, United States' wars with North Korea and North Vietnam 
were perceived by Mao as serious security threats to China, although these wars were 
fought beyond Chinese borders. This perception led Mao to support Pyongyang (in 
195 0) and Hanoi (1964-65). 
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The fact that China's relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated seriously 
following Khurshchev's criticism of Stalin in 1956 and of China's Great Leap Fonvard 
(1958-1960), finally surfaced in 1960. Around this time, Beijing started to criticise 
Moscow explicitly. However, the conflict between them was ideological. and was not 
perceived by Mao as a security threat. Thus, the United States remained China's primary 
security threat. After the split with Moscow, the Beijing government began to seek a 
position as leader of the Third World. China started to donate aid to nations which 
Beijing believed were struggling for revolution, among the seventeen states which had 
recognised the PRC between mid-1960 and the end of 1964. ' Eventually, two events led 
to a breakdown in relations between Beijing and Moscow: the Soviets' invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (1968) and the subsequent Brezhnev Doctrine of 'limited sovereignty', 
and the Sino-Soviet border war (1969). The last event led to the Soviet Union replacing 
the United States as Beijing's primary perceived military threat, though Washington was 
still perceived as a threat. Consequently, the Chinese leaders had to face two military 
threats. 
What was lucky for the PRC was that Washington, which had been seeking to 
withdraw from Vietnam, took the initiative for rapprochement with Beijing. This was 
realised by US President Nixon's surprise visit to China in 197 1. The improved relations 
with the United States benefited China in the security sphere in two ways. One was that 
China could remove the threats from the US, particularly in Indo-China. The other was 
that Beijing could form a united front with Washington to encounter, or at least deter. 
the Soviet military threat. This not only improved China's security environment but also 
gave Beijing a strategic importance for both the United States and the Soviet Union. and 
made it one pole of a strategic triangle. 
' Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography, Revised and expanded edition (Stanford: Stanford Uni%mrsitý' Prc-,,, -,, 
70 
'19 
Chapter 2: International Factors Affecting China's Behaviour 
In addition, Beijing's take-over of China's permanent LIN" Secuntý- Council seat 
from Taiwan in 1971 enabled China to Join vanous international institutions. What Nvas 
important for Beijing was that it obtained not only 'Perm Five' status but also veto 
power over UN General Assembly resolutions. This veto power allowed China's position 
on a particular issue to influence decision-making in the United Nations, enabling It to 
use diplomacy at the UN to conduct power politics vis-a-vis its adversaries. China's 
blocking of Taiwan's bid to re-assume UN membership since 1993 is an example. 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 removed the long-standing Soviet threat. 
However, it also stripped Beijing of its strategic importance vis-a'-vis the superpowers. 
Although the United States had been an important trading partner and a source of 
technology transfer, Washington's taking the initiative to impose economic sanctions 
after the Tianarimen Square massacre in 1989 and its efforts to spread hberal democracy 
throughout the world was an interventionist policy in Chinese eyes, particularly in such 
areas as human rights, democracy and political and economic reform. EventuaUy China 
came to view the United States, the sole superpower, as a threat again during the 1990s. 
The American threat led China to turn to Russia, in an attempt to create a counter- 
balance against the United States. Russia also felt the American threat' and was seeking 
a chance to transform the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity, with 
Russia constituting one pole. In 1997, Beijing and Moscow declared their relationship as 
one between 'strategic partners'. This is a typical example that a unipolar world is not 
welcomed by other major powers. The very existence of a dominant power, regardless of 
1999), p. 316. 
2 Like China, Russia had mixed feelings towards the United States. Economically, it had to depend for 
its economic development on US and Western European states. However, NATO expanded eastward, 
which Russia strongly opposed. In addition, NATO's bombardment against Serbia was conducted 
against Russia's will in 1999. Moreover, Washington has been pursuing the TMD project, which 
requires the abandonment of the ABM Treaty between Moscow and Washington in 1972 and which 
Moscow (and BeiJig) has also strongly opposed. What fl7ustrated Russia was that it was no longer as 
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its nature (benign or not), inevitably leads other great powers to form a balance. in an 
attempt to transform unipolarity into multipolatity. 
Regarding its Southeast Asian neighbours, during the Cold War China applied a 
patron-chent formula. In general, when Beijing regarded Washington as the pnimary 
enemy, the Chinese leaders also viewed the United States' allies and ffiends in the region 
as adversaries. This was partly due to Beijing's sense of encirclement, strengthened by 
the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954', foHo-wing 
US bilateral treaties with Japan and the Philippines in 195 1. Conversely, when Beijing's 
relations with Washington improved, the former's relations with US allies and ffiends 
also improved accordingly. In the case of the Cambodian conflict, which started xvith 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979, China formed a diplomatic united front against 
Vietnam with the ASEAN states and the United States. Although Beijing's relations with 
Hanoi had been in decline since Vietnam's reunification in 1975,4 and Vietnam's 
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, which Beijing had supported, upset China, the 
fact that Vietnam was a close ally of the Soviet Union also increased Beijing's hatred 
towards Hanoi. 
If China had maintained its adherence to applying the patron-client formula to the 
ASEAN states after the Cold War, Beijing's relations with them would have deteriorated 
politically influential as it used to be. Nor could it make a credible threat, in the cases of NATO 
expansion and NATO's Kosovo operations. 
SEATO is a military structure which consists of Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand and the United States. However, it did not fimction as had been expected to do, 
nor was it successful in attracting other Asian members who began to form 'non-alignment'. It was 
disbanded in June 1977. However, since it was not revoked, the Phl*lippm*es and Thailand remain 
signatories. See Nfichael Yahuda, The Intemational Politics of the Asia-Pacific-, 1945-1995 (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 50-5 1. 
Sino-Vietnam relations rapidly deteriorated after Vietnam reunified in 1975. The major reason is 
considered as change in Vietnam's position towards China's claim over the South China Sea. Before 
the 1974 Paracel battle, which was fought between South Vietnam and China, North Vietnam 
supported China's claim. However, not only Vietnam claimed its sovereignty over. the whole South 
China Sea reversing its previous position, but also made efforts to seize as many islands, rcet's, and 
other features in the Spratlys as possible. For the detail, see Chapter 5. 
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in accordance with its relations with Washington for several reasons. First of all. the 
value of ASEAN as an ally to counter Vietnam -was diminished with the resolution of the 
Cambodian conflict. Second, this resolution led to improved relations between Beijing 
and Hanoi. In addition, China's relations with the United States Nvere unstable, tending 
gradually towards antagonism. Nevertheless, none of the ASEAN states' relations NvIth 
China had significantly deteriorated. China even agreed with Vietnam and the 
Philippines, which have explicit territorial disputes with Beijing, not to alloxv the disputes 
to have a negative impact on overall relations. This is evidence that China abandoned the 
patron-client formula in relation to Southeast Asian states in the post-Cold War era. 
China had reasons to maintain good relations with Southeast Asian states after 
the end of the Cold War. First of all, the PRC needs a peaceful envirom-nent M which it 
can concentrate on economic development. Second, Southeast Asian states ha\, e 
increasingly been important as China's trading partners. Although the volume of trade 
between China and the ASEAN states is still small (less than 10% of China's total trade), 
interdependence between them has accelerated through most ASEAN states' investment 
in China since the 1990s, though the amount is small. Thirdly, Beijing and some ASEAN 
governments (for example, Singapore and Malaysia) share a common position on such 
issues as human rights and democracy. In addition, ASEAN has attempted to form a 
more cooperative economic entity in East Asia composed of the 10 ASEAN members 
and three others (China, Japan and South Korea), excluding the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand. While China fears that this attempt might lead to a creation of a 
Japanese-dominated 'Yen bloc', China knows that its opposition to such a development 
will be respected in the region, particularly by Japan. Rather, Beijing sees the ASEAN 
initiative as serving China's desire to undermine US domination in the economic sphere. 
The last, but the most important, point concerning ASEAN's value to China is that 
_, 
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ASEAN has not been able to establish a coherent China policy, due to the varying 
attitudes of its members towards China. This means that Beijing xvifl have more 
opportunities to exploit ASEAN disarray over the Spratlys. In addition, it is likely that 
ASEAN would stay neutral if serious political confrontation, let alone military 
confrontation, arose between Beijing and Washington, as seen in the case of EP-3 *spy 
plane' incident in April 200 1. This means that China may be able to undermine the 
United States' efforts to resolve the confrontation in its favour, because US military 
actions may require access to facilities in the Asian states (ports, airports, military bases 
and hospitals) and cooperation (such as replenishment of fuel and repair of aircraft and 
ships). 
However, the ASEAN states' importance to China has not restrained the latter 
from being aggressive vis-a-vis the former in the South China Sea. For example, China 
constructed 'fishermen's shelters' on Mischief Reef (claimed by the PhilippMes) in 1995 
and resumed construction in 1998/99. This can be seen as a typical example of Beijing's 
conducting power politics based on geopolitical calculations. The Philippines is one of 
the weakest military powers among the ASEAN states. In addition, US forces withdrew 
from Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992. Thus, China calculates that the Philippines' 
protests will not go beyond the diplomatic sphere, and that the United States will not 
intervene on behalf of the Philippines. Beijing miscalculated to some extent that ASEAN 
formed a united diplomatic front against China after the first M[ischief Reef incident, and 
.r 
forced China to agree to discuss the Spratly disputes at various ASEAN-China Meetings 
during 1995. This compromise by Beijing demonstrated that ASEAN solidarity has a 
diplomatic weight which China could not afford to i nore. Conversely, if the ASEAN r' 
states are in disarray, there is room for China to conduct power politics without facing a 
serious protest. The PRC's reswnption of the structure in Mischief Reef in 1998/99 is an 
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example. By that time, most of the ASEAN states were preoccupied with the 
consequences of the financial crisis of 1997-98, and they were grateful to China for 
refraining from devaluing its currency. In these circumstances, ASEAN was unwilling to 
form a diplomatic front which might upset Beijing. The Chinese leaders knew ASEAN-s 
psyche. These cases demonstrate that China's international behaviour is essentiaHy based 
on balance-of-power calculations. 
2. Economic interdependence 
The previous section examined the extent to which China's international 
behaviour is affected by balance-of-power considerations, and showed that these have 
been influential. However, under the conditions that economic interdependence has been 
deepening and that states participate in various international institutions, states are also 
clearly affected by economic relations and institutions' rules and norms. This section 
examines how economic interdependence influences China's international behaviour. It 
demonstrates that economic interdependence works both as a constraint and as a power 
resource for China. 
1) China's attitude towards interdependence 
The experience of a 'century of humiliation' seems to have exerted crucial 
influence on Chinese perceptions of the concept of 'interdependence'. In the process of 
being semi-colonised by major powers such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal 
and Japan, China learnt some bitter lessons. First of all, cultural superiority and higher 
morality do not serve as a significant force to defend the motherland in the face of a 
superior military force. Second, economic backwardness led to military weakness, which 
allowed foreigners to exploit China. Thus, it is very important, in e1jing's view. to 
achieve economic and military strength capable of defending China's core values such as 
,ý 
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sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and self-reliance. The corollary of this 
idea is that dependence and/or interdependence, as an opposite concept to independence. 
implies foreign political, economic and cultural interference, which makes Chinese 
leaders nervous. ' 
However, the pursuit of the two objectives (to strengthen national poxN, er both 
militarily and economically while maintaining self-reliance) generated a dilemma, because 
if China focused on self-reliance, rapid economic growth would be difficult to achieve. 
but if China gave priority to economic development through contact with the outside 
world, foreign political and cultural influence as well as economic influence were more or 
less inevitable. In fact, China swung between the two extremes. Until the deterioration In 
relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, China depended for its trade and 
economic, technological and military assistance on the Soviet Union. After the divorce 
from the Soviet Union, China pursued self-reliance. This finiher worsened the economic 
situation, causing hundreds of thousands to starve to death. In addition, the Cultural 
Revolution and its aftermath between 1966-76, when the mainland was largely isolated 
from international society, brought the country to an economic and social disaster. The 
Maoist era proved that self-reliance did not work as expected. After reviewing Mao's 
policy, Deng pursued another course, introducing the 'open door policy'. Although he 
acknowledged the nuisance of 'the flies and insects' which refers to the capitalist and 
Western influence, economic interdependence was encouraged. Deng was not without 
critics, however, because his rivals asserted that "Deng's policies would make China 'a 
market where imperialist countries dump their goods, a raw material base, a repair and 
assembly workshop, and an investment center', placing China in a position of permanent 
5 Nfichael Yahuda, "How Much China Learned about Interdependence? ", in David S. G. Goodinan and 
Gerald Segal (eds. ), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 8. 
76 
19 
Chapter 2: International Factors Affecting China*-s Behaviour 
backwardness and dependency on the West". 6 Deng's initial encouragement of deePenin.,,, 
economic interdependence was toned down after the campaign against 'spiritual 
pollution' and 'bourgeois liberalisation' in the early 1980s. The OECD states' economic 
sanctions caused by the Tiananmen massacre led the Chinese leaders to provoke anti- 
Western sentiment and indoctrinate their citizens about the threat of 'peaceful evolution". 
These actions were not only responses to the sanctions but also a necessary measure for 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime to stay in power because communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe had been coUapsing. 
This anti-Western nationalism did not cause Beijing to resume a self-reliant 
policy, however, because China was by the 1990s too integrated into the world economy 
in terms of trade, investment and loans, and too used to the taste of wealth, to go back to 
isolation. Deng's southern trip in 1992' reconfirmed that the open-door policy would not 
be reversed. Thus, all China could do was to keep its door open to the outside world 
while attempting to minimi e the political implications of domestic reform (namely, any 
loss of power by the CCP resulting from the political reform which could be the 
consequence of financial and legal reforms). Even when it was clear that interdependence 
was not only beneficial but also no longer avoidable, some Chinese decision-makers 
continued to hold the idea that deepening interdependence would place China in a 
vulnerable and compromising position. Evidence of this was seen in the domestic 
criticism of Premier Zhu Rongji, who in April 1999 returned to China without being able 
Andrew J. Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for 
Security (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 16 1. 
Deng went to southern China to examine the extent to which the region had developed by the open- 
door policy. This trip contributed to suppressing the conservatives, thereby giving the reforimsts an 
opportunity to proceed the policy fiu-ther. 
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to secure American support for China's entry to WTO, despite offering major 
concessions which his critics described as 'the give-away of the centurý`. ' 
In sum, as long as the Communist regime depends for its legitimacy on high 
economic performance, China does not have any better alternative than maintaining an 
open door policy. Thus, the issue here is how to achieve rapid economic gro,, N-th while 
controlling political reform and securing the CCP's rule. In order to achieve these 
objectives, China needs to be careful to secure the greatest gain from economic 
interdependence (trade, loans, and foreign direct investment [FDID. while avoiding. as 
much as possible, being bound by obligations deriving from international agreements 
which might stimulate major political reform at home. In other words, China has pursued 
what Samuel Kim calls the 'maxi/mini principle'. ' 
2) The degree of China's interdependence 
To what extent, then, is China interdependent'? Her economy has been graduaUy 
integrated into the world economy. In 1980, its ranking in world trade was 26th and its 
share of world export was 0.9%. These figures shifted to 17th and 1.4% in 1985,15th 
and 1.8% in 1990,1 Ith and 2.9% in 1996 and 9th and 3.4% in 1999. 'o 
8 Tom Plate, "Beijing's Reform Movement in Peril", Los Angeles Times, 12 May 1999, available at 
http: //taiwansecuirty. org/News/LAT-990512. htm. China's concessions included "opening the 
telecoms industry to foreign ownership, allowing foreign banks to conduct business in renminbi by 
2005, and lowering tariffs on key imports such as cars. Zhu also offered to eliminate all import tariffs 
on information-technology products by 2005 and allow foreign insurers to gradually enter health, 
pension and other forms of insurance business - areas that represent almost 85% of total insurance 
premiums in Chinaý'. However, some of the key offers "including allowing foreigners to hold majority 
stakes in companies In the telecoms, banking and insurance industries" were withdrawn even before 
the NATO's May 7 bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Trish Saywell, "Shades of Grey", Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 20 May 1999, available at http: //www. feer. com/Restricted/ index-bl. html. 
Samuel S. Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World Order, Center of Intematlional Studies, 
World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 21 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
p. 25. 
10 For 1980,1985ý 1990 and 1996 figures, see 'China's Export Share and Ranking in World Total 
Exports, 1980-1996', in The Editorial Board of the Almanac of China's Foreign Econoin1c Relations 
and Trade, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1997198 (Beijing: China 
National Economy Publishing House Economic Information and Agency, 1997), p. 456. For 1999 
figures, see "China Keeps Climbing Export/Import Ladder", Asia Times, 11 April 2001, available at 
http: //www. atimes. com/ chma/CD I1 Ad03. html. 
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The degree of economic interdependence. or openness, is usuaUN- measured by 
the ratio of imports plus exports to gross national product (foreign trade ratio). China*s 
openness rose from 17 percent in 1979 to 38 percent in 1994,40.2 percent in 1995 and 
43.9 percent in 2000.11 For comparison, the United States' foreign trade ratio was 19.4 
percent in 1995,19.6 percent in 1996, and 20.3 percent in 1997 while Japan's openness 
was 14.5 percent in 1994,15.3 percent in 1995 and 16.7 percent in 1996.12 Thus, China 
appears more dependent on trade than the United States and Japan do. 
However, measuring China's openness in terms of the dollar is not easy because 
of the fact that the official exchange rates tend to "understate the purchasing power of 
the domestic currencY". " After adjustment to take account of purchasing power, China's 
openness at the end of the 1980s was estimated at around 10 percent. 14 Comparing 
China's openness in terms of purchasing power with that of the United States and Japan, 
China does not necessarily depend more on trade than the US and Japan do. 
Developed countries (Japan, the United States and members of the European 
Union, or EU) have played significant roles as China's trading partners since the 
introduction of the open-door policy. Although low figures for developed countries) 
share of trade with China at the beginning of the 1990s are considered to be a reflection 
of the impact of the Tianarimen Square massacre, these states' shares gradually 
For 1979 and 1994 figures, see Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 175. For 
1995 and 2000 figures, see "China's Foreign Trade Keeps Growmg", People's Daily, 4 March 2001, 
available at http: //www. english. peopledaily. com. cn/20010304/eng2OOlO3O4-64005. html. 
12 This author's calculation from the following sources: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (New 
York, 2000), Table 23 Expenditure on gross domestic product at current Prices, p. 187 and p-191; 
Table 25 Relationship between the principal national accounting aggregates, p. 208 and p. 212; Table 
74 Total imports and exports, p. 680 and p. 692; and Table 81 Exchange rates (national currency pf-T 
US dollar), period average, p. 814. 
Christopher Findley and Andrew Watson, "Economic Growth and Trade Dependency M China", in 
David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds. ), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 110. 
14 Ibid.; and Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 176. Lardy estimates that 
China's openness in 1990 was just over 9 percent. See Nichoas R. Lardy, China in the Morld 
Economy (Washington D. C.: Institute for International Economies, 1994), p. 18. 
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recovered by 1993, when they amounted to nearly half of China's total trade (Table 2- 
By the late 1990s, however, China traded more with East Asian states and economies 
than the developed countries. In 1997, China's trade with Japan (I 8.7, o), ASEAN 
(7.7%), South Korea (7.4%), and Hong Kong (15.6%) totaUed 49.4%, surpassing that 
with the developed countries (47.8%). Although the Asian economic crisis caused a 
decline in the mainland's trade with East Asian states, Asia remained an important 
market. According to China Daily, "Asia continued to be China's largest export market 
in 1999, ... totaling US$102.6 billion ... Japan was China's top trade partner. Receipts 
from bilateral trade grew by 14.2 percent to US$66.2 billion. The United States and the 
Table 2-1 Major trading partners' share of total trade with PRC (exports and imports 
combined) (%) 
1988' 1989' 1990a 1991a 1992" 1993" 
us 9.7 11.0 10.2 10.5 10.5 14.1 
W. Europe 14.1 14.3 13.9 12.8 11.9 15.2 
Japan 18.6 17.0 14.4 14.9 15.2 20.0 
ASEAN 6.0 6.3 6.2 6.6 5.4 6.0 
Hong Kong 1 29.4 31.3 35.7 36.6 34.7 16.7 
S. Korea I na In 0.6 2.4 3.0 4.2 
US/Europe/J 42.4 42.3 38.5 38.2 37.6 49.3 
East Asia 54.0 54.3 56.9 60.5 58.3 46.9 
1994" 1995" 1996' 1997' 1998 b 1999C 
us 15.0 14.5 14.8 15.1 20.7 17.0 
W. Europe 15.1 15.0 14.4 14.0 15.3 15.4 
Japan 20.2 20.5 20.7 18.7 16.2 18.3 
ASEAN 6.1 7.3 7.3 7.7 5.9 na 
Hong Kong 17.7 15.7 14.6 15.6 na na 
S. Korea 4.9 6.0 6.9 7.4 na I na 
US/Europed 50.3 50.0 4 47.8 52.2 50.7 
East Asia 
1 
48.9 49.7 49.5 1 49.4 53.0 na 
' Calculated from the following source: The United Nations, Statistical Yearbook jor Asia ana Facipc 
1999 (New York: United Nations 2000), pp. 118-120 
b China-Britain Business Council, Doing business in China, p. 110 
c Calculated from the following source: Zhang Yan, "Exports, Imports Boomed Last Year", China Dail ,V 
14 January, 2000, available at http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/cndy/history/2000/0 I/d1 - Itra. I 14. html 
Note: Japan is counted twice, because Japan is both an east Asian nation and a developed country. 
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European Union followed Japan, with two-way trade volumes of USS61.5 bnon and 
US$55.7 bflhon. "l' China's exports soared in 2000 compared to those in 1999: 29 
percent growth with the United States, 34 percent growth with Japan, 29 percent growth 
with Hong Kong, 31 percent growth with Taiwan, 47 percent growth xvith ASEAN and 
34 percent growth with the EU. " Imports also grew by 38.7 percent 17 and China 
imported $41.5 billion worth of goods from Japan, a 22.9 percent increase compared 
with 1999. " Although Japan has been entrapped in the worst recession since World War 
Two, it was China's leading trade partner during the 1990s, except for 1998. Thus, 
Beijing is most interdependent with Japan in terms of trade. 
However, China's economy cannot be seen only in terms of trade. It IS also 
necessary to look at capital inflow (foreign direct investment and loans) which is the 
essential ingredient necessary if China is to continue boosting its exports. Regarding 
loans, China received a total of US$25 billion by mid 2000,19 and is the World Bank's 
biggest client. China has also been the single largest recipient of donor governments' 
official development assistance (ODA) since the early 1990s, far outstripping other big 
recipients such as India and Indonesia. " Regarding foreign investment, capital inflow 
from all sources in 1983 was US$l billion, which tripled to $3.5 billion in 1990 and grew 
rapidly to $45.3 billion in 1997, $45.4 billion in 1998, $39.5 billion in 1999 and $43-52 
15 Zhan Yan, "Exports, Imports Boomed Last Year", China Daily, 14 January 2000, available at 
http: //www. chinadally. com. cn/cndy/history/2000/01/dl-ltra. 114. html- 
"Country Economic Review: People's Republic of China", Asia Times, 23 December 2000, available at 
http: //www. atimes. com/reports/BL23AiOl. html. 
Ibid. 
"China's Imports Up Remarkably", China Web, 12 January 2001, available at http: //www. china%ý, eb. 
coin/english/cw-html/economy/latestnews/BJ16812. html. 
19Antoaneta Bezlova, "World Bank Upsets Its Biggest Customer", Asia Times, 21 July 2000, available at 
http: //www. atimes. com/china/BG2lAdO2. html. 
21 In 1995, China received US$3498.8 million in total while India received S1772.6 million and 
Indonesia received $1404.6 million. The figures for 1996 were S2599.2 million, S 1947.7 mullion and 
1134.0 million respectively, while those for 1997 were $2069.6 million, S 1696.2 million and S 840.4 
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billion f 21 or the first 10 months of 2000. China was the second largest recipient of FDI 
from 1993 to 1997, behind only the United States . 
22 Among developed countries Japan is 
the largest single source of investment in China . 
21 Judging from these figures. it can be 
concluded that 1) China's trade dependency is lower than that of the United States and 
Japan, and 2) the mainland depends most heavily on Japan for trade, foreign mvestment 
and bilateral loans, and on the United States for multilateral loans through international 
financial organisations, such as the World Bank and the INT where Washington Ls the 
dominant power. 
What should not be forgotten about economic interdependence is that countries 
are more connected with each other in the financial area than in trade. As the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated, the financial instability in Thailand rapidly 
spread to other regional states such as Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea, because 
there are virtually no borders in the financial sphere. Thus, commercial liberals' argument 
that trade is the major parameter to measure economic interdependence is not My 
supported. 
million respectively. See United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, Table 83 'Disbursements to individual 
recipients of bilateral and multilateral official development assistance', p. 838. 
Data for 1983 was drawn from Nicholas R. Lardy, "Is China a "Closed" Economy? ", Prepared 
Statement for a Public Hearing of the United States Trade Deficit Review Commission, 24 February 
2000, available at http: //www. brookings. edu/views/testimony/lardy/20000224. htm, for 1990-1999 
from Tay Hong Seng, "Slow Growth Seen in China FDI Despite Entry into WTO", Business Times, 
28 Sepember 2000, available at http: //business-times. asial. com. sg/4/news/nwrld09. html, and for 
2000 from "Investment Pledges Soar to US$43b", South China Morning Post, 15 November 2000, 
available at http: //www. scmp. com/News/Business/Article/FullText-asp-ArticleID- 
20001115005045096. asp, respectively. 
22 Lardy, "Is Chma a "Closed" Economy? " 
23 For example, capital inflow in China in 1996 amounted to USS54.8 billion (loans and FDI combined). 
Japan contributed $6.1 billion ($2.4 billion and $3.7 billion), the United States to S 5.0 billion (S 1.6 
billion and $3.4 billion), Germany $1.1 billion ($0.6 billion and SO. 5 billion), and the United 
Kingdom $1.4 billion ($0.1 billion and $1.3 billion), respectively. See The Editorial Board of the 
Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Almanac of China's Fol-eig7l Economic, 
Relations and Trade 1997198, 'Statement of China's utilized amount of foreign capital, 1996 by 
country (region)', pp. 686-689. 
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3) What has China learnt from economic interdependence: is it a constraint or a 
power resource? 
It is argued in the International Relations theory that asymmetncal 
interdependence serves as a source of power . 
24 This means that the less dependent party 
can more easily use interdependent relations as a lever to exert power vis-a-vis the more 
dependent party. If this is the case, it can be assumed that China, being more dependent 
on the developed countries in its economic development than vice versa, has constantly 
to make concessions. Indeed, China has made a series of concessions since introducing 
its open-door policy in 1978. However, this is not the whole story. China has also learnt 
that it can draw concessions from the developed countries in pursuing its own national 
interests, by taking advantage of their commercial interest in penetrating the potentiaUy 
huge Chinese market. 
This section examines the extent to which this formula (that the less dependent 
party is more likely to use interdependent relations as leverage in power politics) is 
correct, by focusing on two cases, namely the Tiananmen Square massacre and China's 
pursuit of NIFN status with the United States. These cases will illustrate several points. 
First, economic relations are not separable from political relations, which largely 
determine the nature and extent of economic relations. Second, Beijing has learnt much 
about interdependence in the senses that China recognised the necessity to adjust its 
policy and related laws in order to meet international standards, and that it was 
effectively able to gain political benefit from interdependence, although it is the more 
dependent party. It is concluded that interdependent relations can work both as 
constraint and as political leverage, and how they work depends largely on the relatn-e 
power relations between the parties. 
24 Robert 0. Keohane an Joseph S. Nye., Jr., Pomr and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (London: 
HarperCollins, 1989), p. 11. 
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(1) The impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre 
The Tiananmen Square massacre shocked the world. On 5 June 1989, the da,,,,, 
after the massacre, President Bush responded to China's use of force against unarmed 
demonstrators by announcing the United States' plan to take the following actions: 
suspension of all government-to-government military sales and commercial exports of 
military materials; suspension of exchange visits by U. S. and Chinese military personnel: 
extension of assistance to the Red Cross for its work in China; sympathetic revle\N- of 
requests by Chinese students studying in the United States to extend their stay; and a 
review of other U. S. -China programs and activities. " Most of the nations of the OECD 
followed suit. Sanctions included bans on the transfer of high technology, and on 
govermuental loans. The World Bank suspended loans because of the OECD nations' 
objections. 
Regarding China's exports, there seems to have been no negative impact, since 
their value expanded from $47.5 billion in 1988 to $52.5 billion in 1989, $62.1 billion in 
1990 and $71.7 Whon. in 1991 (Table 2-2). The amount of FDI in China grew more 
slowly during the sanction period (the latter half of 1989 and the first half of 1990); 
however, there was certainly no reduction in new FDI. The FDI figures from 1988 to 
1991 were $3739 million, $3773 million, $3755 million and $4666 million respectively. 
However, the response to the Tiananmen massacre varied from state to state. Investment 
from the United States, the strongest accuser, sharply dropped. As the fact that China's 
credit rating went down indicates, US investors refrained from investing in China, partly 
due to political instability and partly due to uncertainty about Beijing's will to maintain 
its 'open-door' policy. US investment, $645 million in 1989, plummeted to $366 nifflion 
25 John R. Faust and Judith F. Komberg, China in World Politics (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), pp. 140-141. 
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Table 2-2 China's exDort and the FDI 
Export 
_C$billion)' 
Actual FDI 
($million)b 
Japanese FDI 
($million) 
US FDI 
(Smillion)' 
1988 47.5 3739 276 384 
1989 52.5 3773 440 645 
1990 62.1 3755 457 366 
1991 71.7 4666 812 548 
Nicnoias K Lardy, 'The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment in Chma's Economic 
Transformation", China Quarterly 144,1995, p. 1076 Table 7 Chinese exports, 1978-94 (Original 
sources : State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongii i, ýianfian 1993 (Chinese Statistical year Book 1993) 
(Beijing : State Statistical Publishing House, 1993), p. 634; "Wo waimao jmchulou zaichuang pap" 
("China's foreign trade again achieves fine results"), Renmin ribao 14 January 1995, p. 1) b : Ibid., p. 1066 Table I Foreign direct investment in China, 1979-94 (Original sources : Nfinistry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, Zhonghua renmin gonghahuo duiwai jiingjimayibu xinwen 
gongbao (The Bulletin of Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relation of the People's Republic 
of China), No. 2 (25 April, 1994), p. 10; Xinhua News Service "Zhongguo qunian liyong waizi 337 -ý, i 
duo mieyuan" ("Last year China's utilized foreign direct investment exceeded USS33.7 billion"), 
Jinrong Shibao (Banking times), 26 January 1995, p. 1) 
c: Yabuki, Susumu, China's New Political Economy 
.- 
The Giant Awakes (Boulder : West"View Press, 
1995), p. 172 Table 16.2 Comparison of U. S. and Japanese direct investment in China (1979-1992) 
(Original source: Chinese Nfinistry of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade) 
in 1990, and recovered to $548 million in 1991. On the other hand Japan, which was 
China's largest single supplier of foreign capital inflow and was quite slow in responding 
to the massacre compared to other OECD members, showed no negative reaction; 
indeed, it increased its FDI from $276 miflion in 1988 to $440 million in 1989, $457 
miffion in 1990 and $812 million in 1991. Thus, the greatest impact occurred in the area 
of lo ans. 
Table 2-3 shows the impact of the Tiananmen massacre on China's borrowing. 
The World Bank, in which the United States is the predominant power, approved no new 
loans to China in 1990, and by 1991, one year after Japan lifted economic sanctions, its 
commitment had not recovered to the level of 1988. However, disbursement was not 
suspended, though the amount declined. Compared with the World Bank, the 
International Development Association's 26 (IDA's) treatment was benign; it did not 
The International Development Association is a sister organisation of the World Bank, and 11.14 
sometimes called the 'second World Bank'. It lends money mainly to the less developed states among 
the developing countries With looser conditions than the World Bank. 
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suspend commitment nor disbursement, though the amount of disbursement declined. 
Treatment by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in which Japan is a predominant 
power, was quite generous. Although the number of its new loans dramatically declined. 
the amount of disbursement saw a sharp rise. Neither Taiwan nor United States raised a 
strong objection to this. " 
Nonetheless, China's credit rating was damaged by the massacre. This rating is 
determined by banks, based on a debtor country's economic and political situation, 
scaling from zero (for nations with the greatest risk) to 100 (for nations with most 
Table 2-3 China's international horrowinu qnd crodit rnfino 
IBRD / IDA loans ($million)" ADB lending 
($million)b 
IBRD BDA 
com. dis. corn. dis. com. dis. 
1988 1054 640 553 557 282.9 2.71 
1989 833 515 604 486 39.7 52.03 
1990 0 590 591 495 50.0 55.44 
1991 602 978 668 599 496.3 172.72 
Japanese bilateral annual loans ($million)' Credit 
ratin 
Total ODA loans Grants Ex. credits 
1988 1144.11 519.9 154.7 469.5 63.3 
1989 1650.20 669.2 164.1 816.8 60.5 
1990 1705.90 538.5 201.3 966.1 51.3 
1991 872.10 423.7 194.1 254.4 53.1 
com. = commitment dis. = disbursement 
a: Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington D. C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), p. 51 Table 3.2 IBRD and IDA loans to China, 1981-93 
(Original sources: World Bank, Annual Report, various years; World Development Report 
1993, table 5.1) 
b: Ibid., p. 53 Table 3.3 Asian Development Bank's lending to China (Original sources: Asian 
Development Bank, Annual Report, various years) 
C: Ibid., p. 57 Table 3.5b Japan: annual bilateral disbursements, 1979-91 (Original sources: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Geographical Distribution qf 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various years) 
d: Erika Platte, "China's Foreign Debt", Pacific Affairs 66(4), 1993-94, p. 484 (Original 
sources: Compile from various issues of Institutional Investor (annual figures refer to the month 
of September)) 
27 Guocang Huan, "China's Foreign Economic Relations", Annals of the, 4merican Academ. v of Political 
and Social Science 519,1992, p. 18 1. 
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successful economic development and political stability). " As Table 2-3 demonstrates. 
China's rating dropped more than 10 points fi7om 63.3 in 1988 to 51.3 in 1990. This shift 
clearly shows bankers' concern about China's future economic reform policy after the 
political unrest. As a result, not only did China's commercial borrowing decline. but also 
most international banks either suspended loans to China's local authorities and 
enterpnses wit out the central goverrument's guarantee, or raised their interest rates. 29 
Regarding bilateral relations, Japan supported China well. At the G7 Houston 
summit in July 1990, it stated its intention of lifting its sanctions and resumed 
immediately its $5.2 billion loan to China. " Although the level of Japan's ODA to China 
dropped in 1990, the total amount of loans never fell, supplemented as they were by 
other elements including export credit (Table 2-3). The sharp increase in export credit 
partly compensated for Chinas loss in terms of loans, which it would otherwise have 
borrowed from the international lending organisations and commercial banks. The 
general decline in 1991 was caused by Japan's relatively high interest rates as a result of 
other OECD nations' entry into recession in the early 1990s. 
These figures imply that the massacre's economic impact on China was minimal. 
However, what seems more important is the political factor which brought this outcome-, 
namely, the need of both Beijing and Washington to mend their relations with each other. 
On the Chinese side, Beijing adopted a policy of counter-sanction towards the United 
States" and, at the same time., employed an 'independence from the US' policy. In order 
to demonstrate that Beijing was not totally isolated, it accelerated its efforts to 
28 Erika Platte, "China's Foreign Debt", Pacific Affairs 66(4), 1993-94, p. 487. 
29HUan 
, "Chma's Foreign Economic Relations", p. 185. 
'0 Ibid., p. 186. 
31 It included jamming several frequencies of the Voice of America (VOA), suspending the Fulbright 
exchange programme, shelving plans to receive Peace Corps volunteers, and reducing imports of 
American goods. 
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strengthen diplomatic ties with the Third World countries and hard-line Communist 
states such as North Korea, Rumania and Bulgaria, and it was also successful in 
establishing or resuming diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia. 
Singapore and Brunei) and Saudi Arabia. 
However, China soon found the limitations of this policy: 
The revolutions in Eastern Europe virtually eliminated the possibility of re- 
creating a global Communist bloc. The Soviet Union's continued 
rapprochement with the United States and mounting internal problems made it 
an unreliable partner for a renewed alignment with China. The Third World had 
little to contribute to China's drive for economic modernization. Finally, the 
developed Western countries, despite some differences of perspective, 
remained remarkably united on the issue of sanctions against China. " 
As a result, the more moderate idea that stable Sino-American relations are 
imperative in order to achieve 'comprehensive national power' began to gain support 
among Chinese leaders. 
By December 1989, China was willing to make concessions to normalise relations 
with the US, due to the failure of its independent foreign policy and increasing support 
within the foreign policy elite in Beijing for stable China-US relations. Concessions 
included releasing some political dissidents after the Tiananmen Square massacre, lifting 
martial law in Beijing and making special efforts to increase imports of American goods. 
On the US side, Washington sought direct talks with China, which the Bush 
government believed could be more influential than imposing sanctions without talking. 
President Bush sent secret diplomatic missions to Beijing in July and December 1989. 
" 
In return for Chinese concessions, the US promised to ease some of the economic 
sanctions such as the blocking of Export-Import Bank trade financing and World Bank 
Harry Harding, "China's American Dilemma", Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 519,1992, p. 19. 
" Faust and Komberg, China in World Politics, p. 141. 
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loans for China. 34 This explains why the World Bank's 4no new commitment' policy did 
not survive after 1990, while disbursement was not substantially influenced by the 
massacre (see Table 2-3). 
With respect to Japans cooperative attitude towards China, there were several 
motivations. First of all, Japan's 'sense of guilt' towards the Chinese made it refrain from 
criticising China as the Western countries did. Second, like other Asian states Japan was 
not so keen as the US and European states on the human rights issue. Third, the 
government judged that isolating China could be more dangerous, as it might trigger 
Chinese nationalism. Lastly, "Japan's involvement is incomparably greater than that of 
the United States or European countries. China's cumulative debts to Japan are said to 
total close to $40 billion. Given this close link, Japan simply cannot impose economic 
sanctions against China" . 
35 
The last point clearly shows the dilemma of interdependence. As mentioned 
earlier, China is in a weaker position in the sense that it must depend for its economic 
development on the developed countries. Thus, theoretically, China is the party which is 
expected unilaterally to offer concessions. However, as the commen above illustrates, as 
long as the developed countries invested in China, longer-lasting sanctions could have 
provoked Chinese counter-sanctions against enterprises investing there. This concern, 
felt in Japan in particular, led to the early lifting of sanctions. European countries 
16 foHowed suit and lifted sanctions in 1993. In this sense, interdependence worked as a 
power resource vis-a-vis Japan and European countries, even if China did not threaten to 
retaliate. Conversely, only the United States could tolerate the possible loss caused by 
34 Harding, "China's American Dilemma", p. 16. 
35 Dong Dong Zhang, "Negotiating for a Liberal Economic Regime: The Case of Japanese FDI in 
China", Pacijlc Review 11(l), 1998, p. 66. 
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the sanction/counter-sanction relations between the United States and China. because the 
United States had not had strong economic ties with China to the extent Japan had. The 
United States even politicised human rights by linking them to China's most favoured 
nation (MFN) status. Thus, if China's single largest source of foreign capital infloxv had 
been the United States, China would surely have suffered from a worse international 
economic environment. These factors imply that relations between China and Japan the 
EU are, psychologically, more symmetrically interdependent, but those between China 
and the United States are characterised by China's asymmetrical dependence on the 
latter. Therefore, Japan and the EU made concessions, while the US did not. 
However, closer examination of the interests of US multinational enterprises 
investing in China reveals that even the US goverment cannot afford to ignore 
interdependence. This is apparent in the cases of the US decision in 1994 to delink 
China's MFN status from the human rights issue and its granting permanent normal 
trading relations (PNTR)" status to China in 2000. These cases are examined in the next 
section. 
(2) China's NIFN status 
China was granted MIFN status for the first time in 1980, the year after the 
normalisation with the US. The reason why China's status is subject to 6renewal' every 
year is that the Jackson-Vinick Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, a US domestic law, 
prohibits the US government from granting NIFN status to communist countries that 
restrict free emigration. Thus, the US government needs some sort of assurance that 
those countries' restrictions will be gradually abandoned in the future, in order to 
36 For the literature which demonstrates how European China policy is dominated by economic interests. 
see Hanns W. Maull, "Reconciling China with International Order", Pacific Review 10(4), 1997, 
pp. 466-479. 
What is known as Most Favoured Nation (NTN) status under GATT/WTO is termed as Perinancnt 
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in US trade law. This thesis uses the term MFN. only, . order to 
avoid confusion. 
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Overcome this amendment . 
38 Consequently, if there is no assurance, the US goN-ernment 
must decide to withdraw MFN status. 
The US goverment renewed the MFN status of China in 1990 because of the 
Chinese concessions mentioned above. However, this issue arose again in 199 1, xvith a 
long list of US concerns about China, including Beijing's failure to make any meaningful 
effort in political reform, increasing US trade deficits with China and China's export of 
military technology to the Nfiddle East. '9 President Bush defended his decision to grant a 
renewal to China by stating that "if we withdrew MFN or imposed conditions that would 
make trade impossible, we would punish South China ... that very region where free- 
market reforms and the challenge to central authority are the strongest' . 
40 Equallýý 
important was the US need for China's support at that time in a vote at the UN Security 
Council over a resolution on use of force against Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait In 
August . 
41 
The Chinese leadership was, of course, disappointed about America's linking of 
the issue of China's NIFN status with internal affairs such as its human rights record and 
progress in making political reforms. Among Chinese officials and academic circles, there 
were concerns over and anger toward the US policy: it was argued that while China was 
forced to compromise endlessly, the United States took advantage of China's eagerness 
for NIEFN status and abused China's independence. 42 What frustrated the Chinese was the 
3 8 Tan Qingsham, The Making of US. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era 
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Ricnner Publishers, 1992), p. 60, cited in Faust and Komberg, China in World 
Politics, p. 14 1. 
3911arding, "China's Ainencan Dileinina", p. 17. 
40 Faust and Komberg, China in World Politics, p. 14 1. 
41 China abstained on Resolution 678 (to use force against Iraq). The Gulf War gave China a chance to 
deinonstrate itself as a responsible great power in the international society. By abstaining, 
China not 
only avoided exacerbating relations with Western countries but also avoided antagonising the 
Third 
World countries by siding with the West. 
42 Yi Xiaoxiong, "China's U. S. Policy Conundruin in the 1990s: Balancing Autonoiny and 
Interdependence! % Asian Survey 34(8), 1994, p. 677. 
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fact that China's overall modernisation largely depended on 'US assistance. financially. 
technologically and militarily. 
However, China urgently needed MTN status. Thus, Deng Xiaopmg once agam 
decided to compromise and '6sent a trade mission to the United States to boost its 
imports of American goods, promised to provide better protection for American 
intellectual property in China, pledged to tighten legislation to prevent unfair trade 
practices, and released two more dissidents who had been arrested in the aftermath of the 
9 43 Tiananimen crisis' . 
This secured China's retention of MFN status in 199 1. 
Despite some compromises from China, President Bill Clinton, who promised 
during the presidential campaign in 1992 to use China's dependence on the US market as 
a lever to improve Beijing's human rights record, applied further pressure in May 199.3. 
While he gave China a one-year extension, he also issued Executive Order 12850 which 
was a list of conditions that China should meet in order to extend MFN status. Those 
conditions were: complying with the Jackson-Vanick amendment; complying with the 
1992 US-China prison labour agreement; implementing the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights; accounting for all political prisoners; allowing visits to political prisoners 
by the Red Cross; protecting Tibet's cultural and religious heritage; ceasing the jamming 
of international broadcasts, enforcing copyright laws; Chinese nondiscriminatory trade 
jI- 
practices; and Chinese adherence to the NPT and the MTCR [Missile 
Technology 
Control Regime]. 44 China cnticised this Order as an infii-ngement of Chinese sovereignty 
and security. The US linkage policy, however, was finally terminated 
in 26 May 1994 
when President Clinton officially announced the delinking of 
human rights from the 
" Harding, "China's American Dilemma", p. 17. 
44 VladiffUr N. Prege1j, "Most-Favored-Nation Status of the PRC", CRS Isstie Brief IB92094.23 
Rily 
1993, p. CRS-2, cited m Faust and Kornberg, China in World Politics, p. 143. 
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renewal of MEN status for China. He gave as the reason for this de-linkage. that offerme 
NEFN status would lead to improved human rights in China. 
However, the real driving force behind this decision was more probably US 
economic interests in China, especially those of giant multinational enterprises domcr 
business there. For example, when the administration was in the process of decision- 
making about the extension of Beijing's NlEFN status, enterprises such as the Ford Motor 
Company, AT&T, IBM, Boeing and Kentucky Fried Chicken were in the process of 
negotiating big deals with China. 45 Since American business circles criticised the annual 
MIFN debate as creating uncertainty over their business in China, supporting reneNval of 
China's MFN status and demanding the delinkage of human rights from MFN status 
were also in their interest. This point was weR depicted by John Cranor, the president of 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, who announced a major investment in Shanghai on 27 May 
1994, the day after President Clinton's declaration of delinkage. Cranor said "By 
permanently delinking human rights and economic investment, President Clinton has 
removed uncertainty from our China business". " In addition, China at that time had 
planned infrastructure projects worth $560 billion to be implemented before the end of 
the century. 47 Thus, any hint by the Beijing goverment to those enterprises about 
negative influence on their business in China could easily have led to formation of a 
strong coalition of such enterprises to lobby for their own, and ultimately China's, 
interests. US multilateral corporations' vulnerability to Sino-US unstable relations was 
" For detail, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Confront iiith CIdna (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), pp. 106-107. 
46 Mark O'Neill, "KFC Announces $200 Million Investment in China", Reuters World Senlice, 28 Nliiy 
1994, cited in ibid., p. 107. 
47 Faust and Komberg, China in World Politics, p. 146. 
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48 also revealed in the case of the US EP-3 'spy plane' incident in April 2001 . In this 
regard, the Chinese leaders must have learnt the effectiveness of economic leverage M 
the sense of using US multinational corporations as a tool for pressing the US 
govemment. 
However, delinkage does not mean that China was automatically granted MFN 
status. The Chinese government must still survive a debate over granting MFN status to 
China in the US Congress every year, by showing improvement in human rights or 
concessions that appeal to Congress, in order to renew the status. What makes the 
matter particularly complicated is that Beijing's search for MFN status from the US and 
its bid for the WTO are closely connected. In order to become a member to the WTO, 
China must conclude agreements on its accession with all other members. Since the key 
principle of GATT/WTO is that parties grant each other unconditional NEFN status, 
becoming a WTO party is an easier way to obtain NEFN status than vice versa. However, 
Washington, along with the EU and some other parties, has not yet concluded 
agreements with China, due to some problems that remain to be solved. 49 
A major movement to end the annual tension between Beijing and Washington 
over the trade issue can be traced back to April 1999 when Premier Zhu visited the 
United States with a number of concessions, seeking US support for China's entry to the 
WTO. 'O After the deterioration in relations between the two countries caused by the 
48 Paul Blustein, "U. S. -China Flap Clouds Trade Issue: Spy Plane Standoff Womes U. S. FIrins", 
Washington Post, 5 April 2001, p. EOI, available at http: //www. washmgtonpost. com/wp-dyn/world/ 
issues/chinatensions/A40563-20OIApn14. html. 
49 The problems include whether China 'accede' the WTO or 'resume' the membership, and whethcr 
China joins the WTO as a developing country or a developed country. 
50 These concessions include: to lift geographic restriction on where foreign insurance companies can do 
business, to double the present number of passenger and cargo flights between the U. S. and China 
and to allow U. S. wheat and citrus exports to China. See Peter Harinsen and Einily Schwartz, "China 
Calls for U. S. Help on VV70 This Year", Asia Times, 12 May 1999, available at hItp: //N%-ww. 
atlines-conVchina/AE14AdO2. html. However, Zhu had to go back to China empty-handed. He was not 
only criticised by the conservatives for offering too many concessions but also lost his mflucnce in the 
government due to the Clinton administration's refusal to support China's bid for the WTO, thereby 
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Clinton Administration's refusal at this occasion to support China's bid for NVTO 
membership, the release of the so-called Cox report on Chinese espionage about US 
nuclear technology, and the supposedly accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy In 
Yugoslavia by NATO in May 1999, the Congress could not reach consensus over 
granting pennanent MIFN status to China. As a result, the US go'vemment decided to 
extend MFN status for another year. The belated WTO talks, which were suspended 
immediately after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, were resumed in September 
1999 and finally led to the signing of an accession agreement between two governments 
the fbHowing November. 
However, this agreement wiU not provide Beijing government with permanent 
NIIFN status automatically. Obtaining this required approval from the US Congress, 
through a revision of US domestic law. The Clinton Admini tration enthusiastically 
sought support for an amendment biH, arguing that American firms doing business in 
China could not benefit from the latter's WTO membership without MFN status bemg 
granted to Beijing. Major US multinational corporations investing in China such as 
Boeing and Motolora lobbied vigorously, spending more than $12 million before the vote 
in the House of Representatives. " Those who opposed the amendment argued that the 
United States must not give up a lever vis-a-vis China which could improve its human 
rights record. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives in May 2000, and by 
the Senate in November 2000. China finally achieved two objectives, an accession 
greement to the WTO with the US and the permanent NIFN status. ag 
allowing a setback in his economic reform programme which resulted in the cancellation of some of 
offers that Zhu had made to the United States. 
1 Greg Torode, "NTR Down to the Wire", South China Morning Post, 19 May 2000, available at 
hitp: //www. scinp. com/News/China/Article/FullText_asp_ArticleID-200005 1903 12 2 74 77. asp. The US 
government also spent money in order for the bill to be passed. It is reported that the govcTninent and 
business spent $20 million altogether in PR and lobbying. See "China PNTR: AndNow for the Real 
Issue. . . ", Asia Times, 26 May 2000, available at http: 
//www. atiines. conVator/ BE26BaOl. htiiil. 
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In International Relations theory, the less dependent party is more likely to use 
interdependent relations as a lever to achieve political objective(s) than the more 
dependent party. In the case of granting China NIFN status, this formula fitted relativelý- 
well. The United States could use China's dependence on it as a lever to pursue its 
political goal (improving democracy in the mainland) while China had to compromise on 
human rights in order to renew its NIFN status every year. In this regard, relations of 
interdependence worked as a constraint on the more dependent party, China. However, 
Beijing learnt that it could achieve its po litico -economic goal of obtaining MFN status by 
exploiting US companies' economic interests in China. These multinational corporations 
pressed the US government and lobbied vigorously in order to defend their own, and 
ultimately China's, interests. In this sense, the more dependent party can use 
interdependent relations as a source of power. The next section will focus on the skill 
shown by the Chinese goverment in taking advantage of interdependent relations. 
(3) Beijing's use of sanctions 
The Beijing govemment has been quick to learn how foreign corporations doing 
business in China could serve its interests. The Chinese leaders know how influential 
these giant multinationals are on their own governments' policy making. Thus, by 
punishing or rewarding these corporations, the mainland has been fairly successful in 
achieving its political objectives, such as forcing some European governments to refrain 
from allowing sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, as well as obtaining MFN status 
from the US. 
For example, in the early 1990s, France was the first among the European 
governments to loosen sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen massacre and in exchange 
Beijing gave a French company the contract to build a nuclear power plant. 52 Hoývever, 
52 MaUll, "Reconcilmig Chia with International Order", p. 472. 
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in 1992 when the French government announced a major arms deal Nvith Tanvan 
(involving, most importantly, six ffigates and sixty M[irage-2000 fighter aircraft). 
relations between Beijing and Paris rapidly deteriorated, thereby causing France a major 
economic IOSS. 
53 The Beijing government demonstrated its displeasure with France over 
the deal with Taiwan, with the US over the human right issues and its decision to seU 
150 F-16s to Taiwan in August 1992, and with the UK over the Hong Kong issue, by 
rewarding Germany (which was not antagonistic to China at that time) with a number of 
business opportunities. 54 A series of political tensions was created between Beijing and 
Washington in 1996. China's missile exercises during the Taiwanese presidential election 
in March not only resulted in the US dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the 
vicinity of Taiwan but also led to stronger US-Japan military ties in April. At the same 
time, the annual debate started in the US Congress over whether or not Washington 
should grant China MIFN status. China anticipated that its missile exercise might induce 
an unfavourable outcome (failure to obtain NIFN status). Subsequently, Beijing rewarded 
France, which had been making efforts to improve diplomatic relations with China since 
1993, by purchasing $1.5 billion worth of airliners from Airbus Industrie while cancelling 
55 its plan to buy aircraft from Boeing in April 1996. 
This event scared the US multinational corporations, because the mainland linked 
goverriment-to-government political relations with private companies' commercial 
This deal with Taiwan was worth "at about $7.5 billion (the equivalent of nearly four years of French 
exports to the PRC at the time)". See ibid. Chinese government's reactions included the following: 
"Bei . ing closed the French Consulate in Guanzhou and pulled the plug on trade with Pans in 1993. It 
meant that France lost about FFr6 billion of business with China. Beijing cancelled its purchase of 
wheat, Airbus, communications equipment, and subway trains from France, and most of the business 
has been awarded to Germany, whose government has not approved arms sales to Taiwan". See 
Weixing Hu, "China's Security Agenda After the Cold War", Pacific Review 8(l), 1995, p. 13 0. 
54 Combined with the German government's refrain from selling submarines to Taiwan in 1993, Berlin 
was awarded with $2.8 billion worth of contract, either signed or initiated, when Chancellor Kohl 
in visited China. Mercedes-Benz was successful in securing a major contract with Beijing 1 1994. See, 
Maull, "Reconciling China with International Order", p. 470. 
55 Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Confront 1, Wh China, p. 109. 
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interests in China, despite the fact that the US goverment had given up its pohc.,, - of 
linkage between China's MFN status and human rights record in 1994. This means that 
the US government does not have an effective counter-measure with which to retaliate 
naainst China. Thus, Beijing's canceRation of the order for Boeing aircraft provided the t: O 
impetus for US corporations investing in China to form a coalition to exert pressure on 
the US government. All that these companies wanted was stable business opportunities 
in China by removing the major causes of political instability, namely China's trade status 
and WTO membership. As mentioned above, US business contributed to China's 
achievement of these goals. 
These cases clearly demonstrate how the China policies of some European states 
and the US were commercial interest-oriented and how Beijing has skilfully used giant 
businesses to press their govermnents to develop policies favourable to China, thereby 
enabling the latter to achieve its political and economic goals. Even though China is a 
more dependent party vis-a-vis developed countries, it has been successful in taking 
advantage of private companies' commercial interests and ambitions. However, the cases 
mentioned also demonstrate that power relations between governments, and security 
issues still matter. France and Germany decided to refrain from selling weapons to 
Taiwan after retaliatory business sanctions from the mainland, while the United States 
did not refrain. This is partly because the US depends less on China than Germany and 
France do, at least psychologically, but more importantly because Washington places the 
security issue (the US strategic interest in maintaining the status quo not only across the 
Taiwan Strait but also in East Asia as a whole) higher than commercial interests. The 
same can be said of the Chinese, too. Beijing retaliated particularly harshly against 
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Western commercial interests when the Western governments' policies were felt to 
impinge on China's sovereignty, as in the case of Taiwan and Tibet. " 
In sum, the more foreign companies invest in China, the more their govertirnents' 
China policies are likely to be influenced by business interests, giving the Chinese 
goverriment more freedom in policy-making. This means that Beijing is less constrained 
than Western and Japanese governments by economic interdependence, although it is the 
more dependent party. Thus, it can be concluded that 1) even the more dependent party 
can use interdependent relations as a source of power in achieving its political objectives, 
2) interdependence works both as a constraint and a lever; and 3) the extent to which the 
government is constrained by interdependence largely depends on the nature of its 
political and economic system; but also 4) considerations about interdependence cannot 
supersede security issues. 
3. China's participation in international institutions 
In International Relations theory, liberals argue that international institutions have a 
positive effect on states' behaviour through rule-binding, while realists not only doubt 
their effectiveness, particularly when the institutions were not initiated by a hegemon and 
its supporters, but also view the rules as the product of power politics. If the liberals are 
correct, China wiH have to adjust its policies to meet international standards, thereby 
becoming less selfish. However, if the realists are correct, China will exercise power 
56 One of the latest examples is China's planned construction of a high-speed railway link between 
Shanghai and Beijing. France (TGV), Germany (Transrapid) and Japan (bullet train, or Shinkansen) 
competed for the contract. When Premier Zhu Rongji visited Germany in June 2000, his first visit to 
Europe after the NATO's bombing the Chinese Embassy, he and Chancellor Schroeder agreed on a 
feasibility study of this railway link. The mainland's reward to Germany was reported to be a sanction 
against France which was planning to sell a satellite system to Taiwan. See Yojana Sharma, "German 
deals with China back on track", Asia Times, 5 July 2000, available at http: //www. atimes. coinJ 
chma/BG05Ad0l. html; and "Business to Dominate Premier Zhu's Trip to Germany", China Web, 29 
June 2000, available at http: //www. chinaweb. com/english/ cw-html/news/Mdustries/ HK7904. html. 
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politics as a great power against its weaker neighbours and its political opponents, even 
when it is involved in inteimational institutions. 
This section first looks at the Beijing government's psychology and general 
attitude toward institutions. Then China's behaviour in international institutions xNiU be 
examined, revealing that China is skilful in using such institutions to serve its economic 
and political objectives through a 'maxi/mini' strategy. 
1) China's general attitude towards international institutions 
China's attitude towards international institutions can be basicaRy characterised as 
cautious. This is a result of the experience of the 'century of humiliation' and China's 
subsequent reflex of anti-hegemonism. Joining established international institutions 
means that China has to accept the rules and procedures that were made by the 
established powers. This reminds the Chinese of the imposition of unequal treaties by the 
great powers in the late nineteenth century. Thus, joining international institutions which 
do not reflect Chinese interest is viewed as accepting restrictions on Beijing's exercise of 
sovereignty. However, it has leamt that joining international institutions and participating 
in their decision-making is a more effective means of pursuing its objectives than 
criticising institutions from the outside. 
Before it obtained a seat in the UN in 1971, China's basic stance towards 
international institutions was non-commital and even antagonistic. Maoist China 
criticised the Bretton Woods system as a tool for economic penetration by the capitalist 
countries. However, after taking over Taipei's seat in the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council in 1971, Beijing came to regard the UN as the most important 
international institution because it had obtained a tool to exercise power by vetoing 
whatever UN Security Council resolutions it viewed as contradicting its national 
interests. Learning from this, China selectively started to commit itself to multilateral 
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talks such as the Conference on the Law of the Sea and apphed to joM international 
economic institutions, such as the World Bank, INT and the ADB. Yet China has 
remained cautious about committing itself to international organisations or multilateral 
talks other than the United Nations and certain economic organisations. A 'peacekeepmg 
operation', for example, is an interference in another country's internal affairs, from the 
Chinese point of view. " Although China participated in peacekeeping operations for the 
first time in November 1989 in the Nfiddle East and Namibia, 58 the Chinese government 
returned to its adherence to the nineteenth century notion of 'absolute sovereignty' and 
non-interference after the Gulf War. 
Since joining international society in 197 1, China has attempted to adjust itself to 
meet international standards, in the economic sphere in particular, in order to achieve its 
top priority objective, economic development. However, Beijing tends to assert itself in 
order to gain maximum benefit, by playing roles as a great power (or veto power) or as a 
developing state, depending on the situation. For example, China advocates that the 
following principles should be applied particularly to enviromnental protection and 
sustainable development issues: 1) differentiated responsibilities, 2) differentiated 
obligations, 3) state sovereignty and equality, 4) untied aid, 5) differentiated capabilities, 
and 6) preferential treatment . 
59 Beijing argues that a developing country like China 
57 According to a study which examined China's voting behaviour in the United Nations between 1971 
and 1999, another reason for Beijing's reluctance to support peacekeeping operations seemed to be to 
escape from paying China's share for such operations all over the world. This is why Beijing usually 
abstained from the votes for deploying peacekeeping operations. However, China finally had to agree 
to pay for the costs due to the 1981 UN General Assembly decision. Since then, Beijing ceased to 
abstain from voting for peacekeeping operations, except for the Security Council Resolution on the 
Falklands war in 1982. See Sally Morphet, "China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council: 
October 1971-December 1999", Security Dialogue 31(2), 2000, pp. 157-158; and Samuel S. Kiiii, 
"China and the United Nations", in Elizabeth Economy and Nfichel Oksenberg, China Joins the 
World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 54. 
51 Ibid. 
59 Samuel S. Kim, "China m the Post-Cold War World", m Stuart Haris and Gary Klitworth (eds), 
China as a Great Polwr. - Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Nm, York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995), p. 59. 
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cannot meet international standards immediately and without incurring costs to achieve 
such standards (for example, redistribution of capital and resources, changing its 4-- 
industrial structure and possible increase in unemployment rates), that developing 
countries should be allowed lower standards and/or given a moratorium period to reach 
necessary standards while developed states implement them immediately, and that funds 
and technologies necessary for the developing countries to achieve required standards 
must be aflocated and transferred without strict conditions. In short, the essence of this 
argument is to maximise the funds and technology obtained from the developed countries 
while minimising the restrictions and obligations imposed. On the other hand, China has 
never hesitated to conduct power politics. For example, Beijing successfully blocked 
Taiwan's plea for UN membership from being discussed in the UN General Assembly, 
and has vetoed India's membership of the APEC forUM. 
60 
Another aspect of China's 'maxi/mini' strategy is gaining political benefits by doing 
nothing. Abstaining from the UN resolution over sanction against Iraq resulting from the 
latter's invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and Beijing's decision not to devalue its currency, the 
yuan, during and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, are typical examples. In the 
case of the former, China could keep face among the Third World countries by 
demonstrating its identity as a Third World country while allowing the resolution to pass, 
which facilitated the subsequent lifting of post-Tianaranen sanctions by Western states. 
In the latter case (maintaining the exchange rate), Beijing could claim that it was acting 
as a responsible member of the region. These examples indicate that the Chinese leaders 
are skilful in operating a 'maxi/mini) strategy in order to pursue and achieve China's 
political objectives. 
60 According to a study which demonstrated how China used APEC as a tool to pursue Its political and 
economic objectives, Beijing played an important role in the 1997 decision in APEC that it would not 
enlarge membership for the next ten years. See Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, "China, APEC 
and Economic Regionalism *in the Asia-Pacific", Journal ofEast Asian Affairs 13(2), 1999, p-393. 
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Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions constrain states' behaviour rather 
than vice versa. However, China's behaviour in international institutions shows that 
Beijing uses institutions in order to pursue and achieve its political and economic 
objectives rather than being constrained. The Chinese are known as tough, persistent 
and, quite often, impatient negotiators. " They reiterate their position on a particular 
issue whenever they have a chance, they are highly uncompromising until the last 
moment, while they often boycott or threaten to boycott negotiations when the other 
party does not accept China's tenns easily. This negotiation style is not eased even when 
Beijing negotiates with the World Bank for borrowing money. Another example is 
Beijing's persuading the Bank to bend its own rules to approve a loan for China's 
poverty-reduction project in its Western region. " 
Beijing is generally reluctant to participate in multilateral talks, mainly due to its 
fear that the Western states will dominate the talks, thereby imposing unfavourable 
conditions or decisions on China. The experience of joining international economic 
institutions such as the World Bank and the INV, and the long-standing negotiations for 
GATT/WTO membership has taught China's government that a latecomer cannot 
participate in rule-making. Joining the established institutions means that it is more 
difficult for the Chinese to ensure that their policy towards a particular issue is reflected 
in decision-making. Nevertheless, although China was concerned about the roles of the 
United States and Japan, the perceived benefits of exerting influence from inside 
For details of this issue, see Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests 
Through 'Old Friends' (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999). 
62 This project was to resettle about 60,000 Chinese farmers to Tibet, and the World Bank approved a 
$40 million loan to China in 1999, overcoming the opposition from the United States and Germany. 
This approval was investigated by the Bank's inspection panel which had been pressed by the 
International Campaign for Tibet, one of the largest Tibetan supporting groups. As a result, it was 
revealed, in early July 2000, that the Bank had violated 7 out of 10 regulations in order to approvc 
this project. About two weeks later, China announced that it would finance the project by itself and 
withdrew from the once-approved loan. See "Bending Rules in China", Washiiigton Post, 5 July 
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persuaded the Beijing goverrument to join APEC and the ARF, and these two institutions 
have indeed so far served China's interests. 
2) China's behaviour in international institutions 
In the case of APEC, Beijing's behavioural pattern can be classified into three 
categories: slowing down the pace of trade liberalisation, using APEC as a tool to pave 
the way to WTO membership, and using APEC as a diplomatic channel to other states. 
Regarding the first point, Beijing has maintained its reservations about the speed for 
trade liberalisation in APEC (by 2010 for the developed countries and by 2020 for the 
developing countries). China supported Japan and Malaysia's effort to resist the fast- 
61 track liberalisation (known as Early Voluntary Sector Liberalisation or EVSL), thereby 
promoting its own interests. 
Beijing has also tried to use APEC to obtain WTO membership more easily than 
would otherwise be the case. For example, China is recognised as a developing country 
64 in APEC 
. 
Since the United States opposes China's entry into the WTO as a developing 
country, Beijing has a strong case to press the US to respect APEC's definition. Besides, 
Chinese officials had meetings with American counterparts on the sidelines of the 
Vancouver APEC summit in 1997, and with Mexican officials at the Brunei summit in 
2000 in order to discuss Beijing's bid for WTO membership. Thus, annual APEC 
2000, Page A20, available at http: //www. washingtonpost. com/wp-srv/WPlat62OOO-O7/05/0081- 
070500-idx. html; and Bezlova, "World Bank Upsets Its Biggest Customer". 
63 "At the 1997 meeting, APEC leaders agreed to negotiate mandatory liberalization targets in nine 
sectors on a fast-track basis covering $1.5 trillion in trade (known as Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization). Those sectors included: chemicals, fisheries, forestry, energy goods and services, 
environmental goods and services, gems and jewelry, medical equipment, toys, and a 
telecommunications mutual recognition agreement. " This was approved in June 1998. Howcver, 
Japan opposes liberalisation of fishery and forestry. In addition, Japan and Malaysia in particular 
insist that liberalisation goals not be set as mandatory and resist US demand to open all sectors for 
foreign investment. See John Gershman, "In Focus: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)", 
Foreign Policy in Focus 5(39), November 2000, available at http: //www. foreignpolicy-infocus. org/ 
briefs/vol5/v5n39apec. html. 
64 APEC defines developing states as a country of which annual per capita income is less than USS 1000. 
See Moore and Yang, "China, APEC and Economic Regionalism *in the Asia-Pacific", p. 394. 
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meetings are an important diplomatic arena in which the Chinese can negotiate over its 
entry to the WTO. Another important aspect of APEC for Beijing is that it expects 
APEC's conflict-managing mechanism to help protect it from unilateral US trade 
sanctions. China cannot depend on such a scheme in the WTO until it becomes member. 
APEC is also an arena in which China had pursued other political objectiVes. For 
example, attending the Seoul APEC conference in 1991 helped pave the way for 
normalised relations with South Korea. Chinese officials had meetings with Vietnamese 
counterparts in 1992 in Bangkok, and with Filipino officials in 1994 in Bogor., over the 
Spratly islands issue. 
In sum, China has so far been successful in using APEC as a tool to serve its 
economic and political interests. The Chinese government takes part in the making of 
rules and procedures by stating its policy and by supporting members which resist fast- 
track trade liberalisation; Beijing has successfully blocked India from becoming a 
member of APEC; and Chinese officials have vigorously met other states' officials in 
order to pursue its political objectives including entry to the WTO. On the other hand, 
China has not had imposed on it substantial legal obligations, due to APEC's approach of 
decision-making by consensus and voluntarism. Although the Beijing government is 
expected to implement trade liberalisation by 2020, it can decide, at least theoretically, 
how it achieves that goal, and at what pace. 
Another point is that China views APEC in balance of power terms. Beijing was 
concerned about APECs domination by the US and Japan. In Chinese eyes, the creation 
of a Japanese-funded Asian Monetary Fund (as proposed by Tokyo in 1997) would 
indicate a further expansion of the latter's sphere of economic influence in the region. 
Thus, China joined the US (which also fears Japan's increasing economic and political 
roles) in vetoing Japan's suggestion while criticising Japan for its slow recovery from the 
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worst recession since World War Two. On the other hand, Beijing did not lose any tune 
in criticising the United States by asserting that -big powers with influence in 
international finance are duty-bound ... to improve the supervision and regulation of the 
flow of international capital, contain over-speculation of the international hot money. and 
enhance the capability for the forecast and prevention of financial risks' . 
6' By keeping 
Japan down while criticising US hegemonism, combined with maintaining its exchange 
rate and donation to the crisis-hit countries, Beijing scored the greatest diplomatic gains 
in the power gatne played by China, Japan and the United States. 
In the case of the ARF, China's policy-makers were ambivalent about whether or 
not to join the Forum. While fearing that "US interests might dominate the enterprise", 66 
Beijing calculated that the "Forum would be better influenced from the inside than from 
an isolated outside", 67 and judged that it "could use the ARF to isolate the United States 
and its supporters", and thus undermine ASEAN's attempt to resist Beijing on the South 
61 China Sea disputes. Whatever the reason, China apparently judged that the potential 
gains outweighed the costs. The initiative for establishing this Forum was taken by 
ASEAN. In addition, the consensus amongst the participants at the first meeting in July 
1994 that the ARF was merely a high-level consultative forum rather than a rule-binding 
organisation made China comfortable, because no strict legal obligations would be 
imposed. 
65 Cited in ibid., p. 388. (Original source is Xinhua in English, 18 November 1998, cited in FBIS-CIE- 
98-322). 
Michael Leifer, 67he ASEAN Regional Forum: Expanding ASEAN's Model of Regional Secunty", 
Adelphi Paper 302,1996, p. 27. See also Michael Leifer, "China in Southeast Asia: Interdependencc 
and Accommodation", in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising: Nationalism 
and Interdependence (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 165. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Robyn Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand", Contemporaq Southeast Asia 20 (2), 
1998, p. 117. 
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Since China has claimed that the South China Sea has always been under its 
'indisputable' sovereignty and that territorial disputes there must be resolved throuO 
bilateral negotiation between China and each claimant, discussing the Lssue m multilateral 
talks such as the Indonesian-sponsored second track workshop and the first-track ARF 
has not been seen as an option by China. Thus, China resisted the Spratly issue being 
placed on the agenda at the first ARE Some participants, the Philippines in particular, 
held a contrary view, but they finally agreed not to embarrass China at the start of the 
ARF's voyage. " As a result, the Chairman's Statement at the end of the first meeting did 
not refer to the South China Sea dispute. Although the South China Sea issue has never 
been discussed in the ARF, Chinese participants have had to tolerate listening to other 
states' concerns about the issue, respond to their concerns by reiterating Beijing's official 
line - peaceful resolution through diplomatic means and joint exploration of resources 
while shelving the sovereignty issue - and see the concern expressed in the chairman's 
statements every year since the discovery of China's construction activities on Mischief 
Reef in February 1995. China's strong opposition to the Spratly issue being raised as an 
agenda item at the ARF has remained. When Thailand attempted to raise the South 
China Sea issue at the seventh ARF in Thailand in 2000, "the Chinese slapped down the 
Thai proposal brusquely and rudely. Never, they threatened, wiU Beijing discuss the 
-) 70 Spratlys in a forum - even though six nations claim the archipelago' . 
China managed to rule out discussion of the South China Sea issue in the ARE but 
it nevertheless compromised in the face of a united ASEAN voice, by agreeing to discuss 
it at the various ASEAN-China meetings such as the ASEAN-China dialogue on the 
69 Lee Lai To, "The South China Sea: China and Multilateral Dialogues", Security Dialogue 30(2), 
1999, p. 17 1. 
Vie Bangkok Post, 27 August 2000, cited in Carlyle A. Thayer, "China 's "New Security Concept" 
and ASEAN", CSIS Pacific Forum Comparative Connection: China - ASEAN (3rd Quarter 2000), 
available at http: //www. csis. org/pacfor/cc/003 Qchina asean. html. 
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sidelines of the ARF and of the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). where 
the Chinese leaders eventually had to accept to conclude a regional Code of Conduct for 
the South China Sea. In March 1995, the ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint 
statement on the South China Sea. At the first ASEAN-China SOM in April 1995, China 
suggested that the territorial disputes be discussed in the next ASEAN-China SO'M in 
1996 because of the pressure from the ASEAN side, although it was not originally an 
agenda item for the meeting. Meanwhile the Philippines and China agreed a bilateral code 
of conduct in August 1995. Although no progress was made on the matter of the 
ASEAN-China SOM in June 1996, ASEAN foreign mini ters proposed concluding a 
regional Code of Conduct for the South China Sea at the ASEAN Nfinisterial Meeting 
(AMM) in July 1996, after witnessing a bilateral code of conduct between China and 
Vietnam in July 1996. While reacting cautiously, China did not oppose the idea. 
The Code of Conduct proposal made progress after the Philippines' report in 
October 1998 that China had reinforced its construction on Mischief Reef. This time, 
Manila could not obtain enough support from its ASEAN fellows, mainly due to the 
Asian financial crisis and their gratitude towards Beijing for refraining from devaluing its 
currency. Lack of ASEAN solidarity on the issue led the Philippine goverment to 
attempt to internationalise its case by asking Germany, the chair of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) meeting scheduled in March 1999, to list the Mischief Reef issue as an 
agenda item, 71 and by seeking to bring the case to the UN-sponsored International C) 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 72 China opposed this move and turned down 
71 'Thilippine Diplomats Told to Raise South China Sea Disputed at ASENT', yahoo news Asia, 24 
February 1999, available at http: //asia. yahoo. com/headlines/240299/news/919852440-90224113403. 
newsasia. htinl. See also Johnna R. Villaviray, "South China Sea Rift Not in ASEM Agenda", Manila 
Times, 19 February, 1999 available at http: //www. manilatimes. net/news/news02l999j. htinl; and 
Johnna R. Villaviray, "ASEM Chair Cool to Spratlys Issue", Manila Times, 23 February, 1999 
available at http: //www. manilatimes. net/news/ýews022399j. html. 
72 "China Opposes Bringing Reef Issue Before UN Court", China Times, 14 April 1999 available at 
http: //www. chinatimes. com-tw//english/epolitic/88041402. htm. See also "Erap Asks UN to Help 
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the Philippines' proposal to agree a regional Code of Conduct at the Fifth ASEAN-China 
SOM in April 1999. 
However, Beijing quickly changed its mind and offered to consider the re(-, lonal 
Code of Conduct at the China-ASEAN dialogue in July 1999. China's alteration M policy 
may have been related to the Philippines Senate's passage of the Visiting Force 
Agreement, or VFA, in May. In China's realpolitik-dominated view, strengthening 
military ties between Manila and Washington implied a greater possibility of the US 
involvement in the South China Sea disputes, despite Washington's reiteration that the 
1951 US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty does not cover the disputes because 
Manila's claim in the Spratlys was made after the treaty was concluded. " Stronger US- 
Philippine military and political ties mean, in turn, that the Spratly issue could be brought 
as an agenda item to the ARF, which Beijing does not want. Thus, the Chinese 
goverment has calculated that it could avoid the issue being raised in the ARF by 
strictly limiting the discussion on the disputes and the Code of Conduct to the ASEAN- 
China meetings. 
By the time of the ASEAN-China summit on 28 November 1999, ASEAN senior 
officials had reached an agreement on the draft Code of Conduct, which due to 
Vietnamese requests would cover the Paracels as well as the Spratlys. Chinese Premier 
Zhu opposed inclusion of the Paracels which are under Chinese control after being 
Settle Row on Spratlys, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 March 1999, available at http: //MrNm. 
inquirer. net/ issues/mar99/marl9/news/news-2. htm. 
73 According to Thayer, however, US ambassador to the Philippines sent a letter to the Nlanila 
government, arguing that the 1951 treaty have both "territonal and situational applications". See 
Carlyle A. Thayer, "Some Progress, Along with Disagreements and Disarray', CSIS Pacific Fonun 
Comparative Connections: China - ASEAN (2nd Quarter 1999), available at 
http: //www. csis. org/ 
pacfor/cc/ 992QchmaLasean. html. 
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(recovered' from South Vietnam in 1974. China submitted its own draft Code to the 
ASEAN side. 
74 
ASEAN's and China's drafts were examined at the ASEAN-China SOM in March 
2000, where it was revealed that there were significant differences between them. These 
differences, which include 1) whether reinforcement of the existing structures should be 
permitted and whether new occupation of currently unoccupied features should be 
allowed, and 2) whether the scope of the Code of Conduct should include the Paracels, 
remain unresolved. 
In short, while China had to respond to ASEAN's pressure to discuss the South 
China Sea issue, it was successful in preventing it from being discussed at the ARE It is 
in Beijing's interest that this case should be dealt with only by the claimants, without 
allowing outside power(s) to interfere in the process and outcomes. Although Beijing 
was surprised at ASEAN's solidarity in 1995, it was able to take advantage of ASEAN's 
subsequent preoccupation with the financial crisis and the resultant disarray among 
ASEAN members when it resumed construction on Mischief Reef in 1998. Besides, 
Beijing is aware of the ASEAN states' concern not to upset China's leaders. Thus, 
Beijing can stiR conduct power politics vis-a-vis ASEAN, particularly when it lacks 
unity, despite engagement in the ARE In this sense, China's gains outweigh the costs of 
compromise (to discuss the Spratly issue only at ASEAN-China meetings) with regard to 
the South China Sea disputes. 
China's policy towards international institutions is essentially based on a 
4maxi/mini' strategy, which aims at getting maximum political and economic gains while 
... ing the restriction on its sovereignty. In order to maximise gain, the mainland 
74 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Beijing Consolidates Long-Tam Regional Relations", CSIS Pacific Foruin 
Comparative Connection: China - ASEAN (4th Quarter 1999), available at 
http: //www. csis. org/ 
pacfor/cc/994Qchina asean. html. 
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takes advantage of its veto power status in the UN, asserts itself as a developing country 
in APEC and its bid for WTO membership, and conducts power politics , ris-a-vis its 
weaker neighbours, depending on the situation. In addition, it has been successful in 
exerting influence on decision-making from inside APEC and the ARF, while benefiting 
from the non-binding nature of these two institutions. Although it is true that China had, 
and still has, to change and adopt its policies and domestic laws and regulations In order 
to meet international standards, in the economic sphere in particular, this has brought the 
mainland a huge amount of foreign investment, thereby serving its broader strategy of 
strengthening its comprehensive national power. 
Thus, China's behaviour in international institutions does not necessarily prove 
liberals' argument that rules and regulations in institutions effectively restrict states' 
behaviour, although there is a doubt over whether APEC and the ARF,. which are 
characterised by consensus-based decision-making and a lack of sanctions for failing 
implementation, should be categorised as institutions. The realists' argument that an 
institution which was not initiated by a hegemon is weak in terms of implementation and 
enforcement is not strongly relevant in the case of the ARF, because the ARF does not 
have such a mechanism at all. What is important, however, is that China might not have 
joined this regional security forum if the United States and/or Japan had taken the 
initiative in establishing it. Since discussions about regional security are not meaningful 
without China's participation, ASEAN's initiative in forming the ARF was important. 
Nonetheless, the realists are more correct in pointing out that power politics may be 
conducted within institutions. Since the United States has remained neutral on the 
Spratly issue as long as freedom of navigation is secure, ASEAN cannot expect the US 
to side with it in the dispute. Thus, the best ASEAN can do is to form a united front M 
order to press China for self-restraint. As seen when ASEAN's collective voice in 1995 
"41q 
Chapter 2: International Factors Affecting China's Behaviour 
forced China to take a defensive position, ASEAN as a bloc has diplomatic weight from 
China's viewpoint, although the latter is still a greater poýver than the former. Judging 
from the fact that China exploited the ASEAN states' weaker solidarity as a result of the 
financial crisis, China has used the ARF as an arena for conducting power politics. 
particularly against the Philippines. 
This section has demonstrated that 1) Beijing's behaviour has been realpolitik- 
oriented, and it has exercised power whenever possible; 2) the Chinese government has 
learnt that participation in institutional decision-making is more beneficial than non- 
participation; and 3) the Chinese leaders have been reasonably skilful In using 
international institutions as tools to serve their economic and political objectives. It can 
be concluded, therefore, that China's behaviour reflects the realists' position more than 
the liberals". 
Conclusion 
What kind of international factor most contributes to shaping Beijing's behaviour? 
In order to answer this question, this chapter considered not only balance of power but 
also economic interdependence and international institutions, which liberals believe to 
have an effect in leading a state to behave peacefully. Beijing has found that 
interdependence and international institutions can function both as constraints and as 
sources of political leverage. As was demonstrated, China has been successful M 
maximising benefits while Ing costs by exercising power politics whenever it can, i 
even in the context of growing interdependence and engagement in international 
institutions. 
Beijing has also been skilful in taking advantage of the commercial interests of 
multilateral corporations investing in China, using these businesses as a tool to exert 
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pressure on the US and European governments to alter their China policies in a manner 
favourable to Beijing. Examples were observed in the US decision to delink China's 
NIFN status from its human rights record, and to grant Beijing permanent N4F-N' status, 
and the fact that some European states (Germany and France in particular) have refrained 
from sefling weapons to Taiwan. 
Liberals' argument that asymmetrical interdependence may be a source of power 
can be applied to China's relations with Japan, the EU and the United States. Japan is a 
primary source of bilateral loans and FDI as well as China's most important trading 
partner. In this sense, China is asymmetrically dependent on Japan in relation to capital 
flow and trade. In theory, Japan can draw many concessions from China. However, 
Japan's fear of Chinese retaliation (interference with Japanese companies' business in 
China) makes Tokyo refrain from exercising power politics. In this sense, China and 
Japan are symmetrically interdependent at a psychological level. The same can be applied 
to relations between China and some EU countries. However, the United States does not 
have such a psyche, because not only is the United States less dependent on China than 
Japan and the EU, but also it is militarily, economically and technologically much 
stronger than China. Thus, Washington was better able to tolerate loss from the 
prolonged economic sanctions it imposed after the Tiananmen massacre than could Japan 
and the EU, and it could use Beijing's dependence on the US as a lever in order to 
pursue its political objectives (notably improving human rights in China). These cases 
show that what is more important is power relations among parties, rather than the 
degree of asymmetrical economic interdependence. 
The Chinese goveniment also learnt the greater effectiveness of exerting influence 
from inside international institutions than criticising from outside in pursuing its 
objectives. In the case of APEC, China not only supported Japan and Malaysia in their 
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attempts to slow down the pace of fast track liberalisation. but also used the imtitution 
as a tool to pave the way to WTO membership. In the case of the ARF, China was 
successful in limiting the discussion about the South China Sea disputes to ASEAN- 
China meetings, although it had to agree to conclude a regional Code of Conduct. Yet 
recognising the ASEAN states' concern not to provoke Beijing, the latter seems to 
believe that it can conduct power politics against ASEAN. 
China's using Western countries' commercial interests as a tool to exert power and 
its conducting power politics whenever it has had an opportunity to do so have shown 
that China's international behaviour is mainly based on a realist position. Although 
Beijing has sometimes been constrained by its economically vulnerable position vis-a-vis 
developed states and by the rules and non-ns of intemational institutions, it gives an 
impression that economic interdependence and international institutions have worked 
more as a power resource than as a constraint for China. In this regard, realism better 
explains China's international behaviour than liberalism. 
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Domestic Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, it was concluded that the balance of power element has greater 
influence on states' behaviour than economic interdependence and institutions. These 
three elements are international factors for a state in the sense that it cannot control them 
by itself. However, factors that influence states' behaviour are varied and interact xxvith 
each other in a complex manner. Critics of realism, in particular, argue that this theory 
puts too much emphasis on the 'third image' factors, such as distribution of power and 
self-help in an anarchic international system, and ignores the 'second image' factors, such 
as culture (including governing ideas and ideology) and the nature of regiMes and 
decision-making systems. ' Besides those societal aspects, psychological and cognitive 
considerations, such as a leader's character and the perceptions/misperceptions of 
decision-makers, are important as well. ' The argument about the level at which an 
observed phenomenon in international relations should be analysed is known as the 'level 
of analysis' problem in International Relations theory. ' 
The distinction between the three images was made by Waltz. The 'first image' refers to the human 
factor, and focuses on the nature of human beings. The 'second image' refers to the internal structure 
of states, while the 'third image' relates to international anarchy. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the 
State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1959). 
For the cultural approach, see Peter J. Katzenstein (ed), ne Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Ken Booth and Russell 
Trood (eds. ), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan, 1999); Alastair Iam 
Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture', International Security 19(4), 1995, pp. 32-64; 
Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region", Security Studies 3(l), 1993, pp. 44-74; 
and Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back", 
Review ofInternational Studies 25,1999, pp. 49-69. For the classic literature for decision -making, see 
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971). For discussion on the relations between regime type and war (the democratic 
peace argument), see below in the text. For literature which attempts to challenge neorealisin by 
focusing on domestic factors, see Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stem, The Domestic Bases of 
Grand Strategy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
For classic literature which focuses on perception/misperception, see Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
For the literature which focuses on the 'level of analysis problem', see J. David Singer, "The Level of 
Analysis Problem in International Relations", in James N. Rosenau (ed), International Politics and 
Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Aeory (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 20-29 
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Since the relationships between the 'third image' factors and states' behaviour 
were examined in Chapter 1, this chapter focuses on the 'second image* factors. 
fol. lowed by a section that examines other factors including 'first Image' factors. Finally. 
which factors, international or domestic, are more likely to influence states* behaviour 
will be discussed. It will be argued that international factors, geopolitical elements M 
particular, largely determine the range of options available for the state, while domestic 
characteristics play a central role in influencing choice of option. However. whether or 
not the state can achieve its goals with this choice largely depends on its interactions 
with the other party (or parties) involved. 
1. Domestic factors 
Not only a number of International Relations analysts but also scholars M such 
areas as Comparative Politics, Psychology and Sociology emphasise the importance of 
domestic factors for states' behaviour. Among the various domestic factors, an argument 
which focuses on relations between regime type and war/peace is the flourishing 
'democratic peace', or more broadly 'liberal peace', argument. As will be seen later, not 
only is there no agreement on this among scholars, but also the criticism is made by 
realists that this argument does not explain any causal-effect relations. In addition, it 
seems to be usual that even a dictator has a small number of consultants when he makes 
[Reprinted from Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds. ), The International System: Theoretical Essa " Vs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92]; and Barry Buzan, "rhe Level of Analysis 
Problem in International Relations Reconsidered", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 198-216. One study argues 
that the so-called 'level of analysis' problem is not strictly one of 'level of analysis' but rather a 
question of 'unit of analysis'. According to the study, "Every intellectual and 'scientific' study begm., ý 
with the question of how the subject under scrutiny can be analysed (the problem of methodology). 
The problem of methodology, in turn, relates to the context within which (or the level at which) we 
examine the topic. It also relates to what we study at that level, or what the major actor(s) of the 
subject is (are). The search for answers to the first question (context and level) leads us to the 'level of 
analysis', and the search for answer to the second question (what to study and actors) to the 'unit of 
analysis". And the study identifies three levels: namely, the philosophical, the theoretical, and the 
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an important decision such as going to war. Thus, the decision-making process desen-es 
attention. Furthermore, from the early 1980s onwards. the cultural approach has been 
introduced in analysing states' behaviour. Advocates of the cultural approach argue that 
a state's decisions and/or behaviour are not separable from its culture. , ),, hich is shaped 
by shared beliefs, ideas and ideology and historical experiences. These elements (nature 
of regime, decision-making system, and culture) represent government, bureaucracy and I 
society, respectively, and they are examined below. 
1) Type of regime 
As mentioned in the section on economic interdependence (Chapter 1), a revival of 
the argument that liberalism contributes to peace was accelerated by Doyle's article, 
"Liberalism and World Politics", 4 in which he examined three aspects of liberalism: 
namely trade, democracy, and institutions. Correlation between type of regime and 
states' behaviour, war in particular, is one of the most vigorously researched areas 
among the second image factors, and has become known as the 'democratic peace' 
literature. 
Since the democratic peace argument assumes a positive correlation between a 
democratic regime and peace, 'democracy' needs to be defined. Most researchers who 
have examined the relationship between democracy and peace by statistical methods 
based their studies on the criteria which Small and Singer selected: 1) free elections ývith 
opposition parties; 2) a minimum suffrage of 10 percent; and 3) the existence of a 
parliament independent of the government in terms of policy-making. ' Schweller argues 
practical (or phenomenological). See, A. Nuri Yurdusev, "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Anahsis': 
A case for Distinction", Millennium 22(l), 1993, p. 78. 
4Nfichael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", American Political Science Review 80(4), 1986, 
pp. 1151-1169. 
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965", 
er As Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1(4), 1976, p. 55. See also NlIs Pett GIL It ch 
"Democracy and Peace", Journal of Peace Research 29(4), 1992, p. 370. According to Doyle, the 
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that these criteria are not sufficient as a definition of democrac-,, - and adds some other 
elements: 1) individual civil rights must be guaranteed. and 2) the society enjoys pn, %,, ate 
property and a free enterprise economy. ' 
Among those criteria, free election is one of the most important indications used to 
measure democracy, because where there are free elections, it can be assumed that other 
factors inseparable from democracy, such as the existence of opposition parties and 
effective parliament, and freedom of speech and assembly, are also satisfied. According 
to Diamond and Myers: 
Elections are "free" when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are 
low, when there is substantial freedom for candidates and partisans of different 
political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little 
or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices. ' 
One point to be noted here is that these definitions do not necessarily concern the 
4 quality' or 'maturity' of democracy. This means that as long as a country satisfies these 
criteria nominally, even a new-born state where democracy may not be well embedded 
among the populace is considered democratic. Using these definitions, Serbia, for 
definition of 'representative government' includes 1) the minimum suffrage be 30 percent; 2) the 
government must be sovereign over military and foreign affairs; and 3) the government must last at 
least 3 years. See Nfichael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1", 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, p. 212- 
Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific? ", 
World Politics 44,1992, p. 240. 
Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers, "Introduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China", 
China Quarterly 162,2000, pp. 366. Diamond and Myers also argue that democratic elections must be 
'fair' as well. "Elections are "fair" when they are administered by a neutral authority not controlled 
by the ruling party; when that neutral authority is also sufficiently organized, resourceful and 
competent to take various precautions to prevent fraud in the voting and vote counting; when the 
police, the military and the courts treat competing candidates and parties impartially during the 
campaign, the vote counting and the resolution of any post-election disputes; when competing parties 
and candidates all have access to publicly controlled (or state-influenced) mass media; when electoral 
districts and rules do not put opposition parties at a systematic disadvantage; when party and 
independent monitors may monitor the voting and vote-counting at all locations; when the secrcvy of 
ballot is protected; when the procedures for organizing and counting the votes are transparent and 
known to all; and when there are transparent and impartial procedures for resolving election 
complaints and disputes. In addition, an election can only be democratic if essentially all adults have 
the right to vote. " Ibid., pp. 366-367. 
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example, is regarded as democratic as the United States and other Western states. In 
addition, the recent vote-counting trouble in Florida State for the US presidential 
election in 2000 demonstrates that a 'free and fair' election. even in an established 
democratic country, is hard to secure. Thus, it can be said that democracy is "surprismgly 
difficult to define and operationalize' 5. 
Since Doyle's article, quantitative analysis using statistical methods has flourished, 
with its exponents declaring that peace tends to prevail among democracies. However, 
these studies have met criticism, not only from realists, but also from liberal scholars. 
The pattern of criticism can be divided as follows; 1) positive correlations found in 
statistical studies do not explain any causal relations between democracy and war. ' 2) 
there is a confusion between explaining democratic peace at a unit level ('democracies 
are more peaceful than other types of regimes') and dyadic level (democracies do not 
fight each other'); 'O 3) there are problems related to definitions of war and democracy, 
and to methodology; " 4) the positive correlation between democracy and peace is 
insignificant, because there were few democracies and war was an infrequent occasion 
even before World War One; 12 and 5) these statistical studies ignore other important 
8 David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace", International Security 19(2), 1994, p. 55. 
9 David A. Lake, "Powerfid Pacifists: Democratic States and War", American Political Science Review 
86(l), 1992, p. 24. 
Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace", P. 371. 
On literature which pointed out the problem of definition of democracy, see Ido Oren, 
"The 
Subjectivity of the "Democratic" Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial GermanV', 
International Security 20(2), 1995, pp. 147-184; Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace", pp. 370-371; and 
Spiro, "Insignificance of Liberal Peace7', p. 5 1; and about definition of war, see Ibid.; and Scott 
Gates, 
Torbiorn L. Knutsen and Joanthon W. Moses, "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical 
View", 
Journal of Peace Research 33(l), 1996, p. 4. On criticism about the data set used 
for analysis, see 
Oren, 'The Subjectivity of the "Democratic" Peace", p. 151; and Spiro, "Insignificance of Liberal 
Peace7', p. 55; Arvid Raknerud and Havard Hegre, "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence 
for 
the Democratic Peace7l, Journal of Peace Research 34(4), 1997, pp. 385-404, and on the tNpc of 
statistical analysis used, see Spiro, "Insignificance of Liberal Peace', pp. 77-78; and Henry 
S. FarbtT 
and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace7, International Security 20(2), 1995, p. 13 7. 
12 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability Mi Europe after the Cold War", International 
Security 15(l), 1990, pp. 5-56; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic 
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political and military attributes such as extended deterrence and subordination to 
superpowers, 13 states' interests, 14 international systemic structure, " and the fact that a 
state needs "the opportunity and a reason" to make a decision to go to Nvar. 16 Since the 
task of this section is to identify the impact of the type of regime on states' behaviour. 
the focus will be on the second criticism, regarding the unit and dyadic levels of analysis. 
The assumed correlation between democratic government and peace is attributed 
to domestic institutional constraints such as checks and balances resulting from 
competitive election and the existence of opposition parties, public opinion based on free 
speech, individual rights and private property. In liberal thinking, any goverment in a 
democratic country has to be accountable to its citizens who will pay for war with blood 
and tax, and thus, will put pressure on the government in order to avoid waging war. 
However, there have been many cases in history when public opinion supported xvaging 
wars. For example, it is well known that citizens in the United Kingdom and France were 
enthusiastic about going to war in 1914, and US citizens turned to supporting war 
agrainst Japan after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. In addition, it is possible Cý 
for democratic governments to manipulate public opinion through the mass media in 
order to obtain public support. 
Thus, the assumption that the existence of a check and balance mechanism will 
preclude a government from going to war is too naive. In fact, as examined below, 
various studies have pointed out that democratic states are no less bellicose than other 
Peace7', International Security 19(2), 1994, pp. 5-49; and Erich Weede, "Democracy and War 
Involvement", Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(4), 1984, pp. 649-664. 
" Ibid. 
14 Farber and Gowa, "Politics and Peace! ', p. 125. 
" Layne, "Kant or Cant", p. 38 and p. 45. 
16 Ibid., p. 39. 
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types of regimes. " Moreover, most non-democratic states are not fighting wars aH the 
time. That is, there is 44autocratic peace" as well. " Those findings have led to a 
consensus among scholars that democratic states are not necessarily more peaceful than 
other types of regimes. 
However, democratic states rarely fight wars with each other at a dyadic level. 
Among possible explanations, the following hypothesis seems to have gained support 
among advocates of the democratic peace proposition. According to Russett and 
Antholis, "people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing 
people who share norms of live-and-let-live and respect the rights of others to self- 
determination". As a result, decision-makers in democratic states are expected not to be 
aggressive towards other democracies. Since aU democratic states are constrained by this Cý 
norm/culture, they act peacefully in relation to each other. " That is, democracies fon-n a 
community of their own and a separate zone of peace. 20 Advocates of the democratic 
peace argument assert that this can be proven statistically, particularly in the period after 
World War Two. 21 
See, for example, Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? ", Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(4), 1984, pp. 617-648; Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; 
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965"; Bruce 
Russett and William Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian 
War", Journal of Peace Research 29(4), 1992, pp. 415-434; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Margaret G. 
Hermann, "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic 
Peace! ', Journal of Peace Research 33 (3), 1996, pp. 3 09-3 22; and Raknerud and Hegre, "The Hazard 
of War". 
Raknerud and Hegre, "The Hazard of War", p. 395. (emphasis in original) 
Russett and Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each other? ", p. 417. 
21 Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural 
Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986", American Political Science Rei, iew 87(3), 1993, pp. 624- 
63 8; and Lake, 'Towerful Pacifists". 
21 On literature that proved democratic peace statistically, see Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the 
Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall? ", International Security 22(l), 1997, 
pp. 162-198; John & Oneal and Bruce Russet, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985", International Studies Quarterlv 41(2), 1997, pp. 267-294; 
John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet, "The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 195 0-85", Journal of Peace Research 3 "1 (1), 
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This position has, however, met various critlcisms. First of aH. that there are fexv 
wars among democracies does not mean that they are free of "conflict' with other states. 
whether democracies or others, in economic and political terms. Second. according to a 
study which examined the relations between democracy and military intervention 
between 1974-1991 
'22 20% of such intervention was initiated by democracies during the 
period between 1974 and 1979, and the proportion goes up to 50% betvveen 1986 and 
1991. If the initiator and the target were specified between 1974 and 1991, -- 22% of 
interventions were initiated by democracies against other democracies, 11% by 
anocracies" against democracies, and 13% by autocracies against democracies. Kegley 
and Hermann's study indicates that democracy is a rather bellicose type of regime, 
contrary to the liberals' claim. 
Another study which examined four "near miss" cases before World War Two, 24 in 
each of which two democracies were on the brink of war but managed to avoid armed 
conflicts, demonstrated how realist factors, such as pursuit of national interest and 
exercise of power politics, played a significant role in the process. They did not go to 
war, not because they respected each other's liberal nomis and culture, but because 
power relations were the determinant element in their decision-making. " In addition, 
1996, pp. 11-28; and Erich Weede, "Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement", 
Journal ofPeace Research 29 (4), 1992, pp. 3 77-3 83. 
22 In Kegley and Harmann's study, intervention is defined as "a distinct category of militanzed 
international behavior that (1) involves the use of force, (2) often results in the loss of soldiers' lives, 
and (3) is usually described by the target as a hostile act. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Margaret G. 
Hermann, "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic 
Peace! ', Journal ofPeace Research 33 (3), 1996, p. 3 11. Distinction of regime type was determined by 
the following formula, based on Polity data set. Regime type = (Democracy score - Autocracy score) x 
Concentration. States score 16 and above are defined as democracies, -20 and below as autocracies, 
and between -20 and 16 as anocracies. See ibid., p. 3 13. 
23 Anocracies are defined as those states "where the characteristics of democracy and autocracy are less 
differentiater. Ibid. 
24 Four "near miss', cases are the Anglo-American crises of 1861, and 1895-96, the Anglo-French 
confrontation in 1898 and the Franco-Greman confrontation in 1923. For details, see Layne, "Kant or 
Cant". 
25 Ibid., p. 38. 
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democratic Finland's siding with the axis powers during World War Two. which is one 
of the rare exceptions to the conventional wisdom that democracies do not fight each 
other, demonstrates what is the most irnPortant factor for states' decision-making about 
war. In the case of Finland, the government chose to join the axis side. against the 
Parliament's preference, in order to escape being annexed by the Soviet Union. In this 
sense, democracy does not preclude a government from going to war. However. 'ývith a 
closer look at why Finland had to choose this option, it is obvious that the most 
important issue for Finland was survival of the state. When a state's survival is at risk, 
the adversary's regime type must be a secondary or lesser consideration. Moreover, 
NATO's attack on Serbia in 1999, as a reaction to the latter's use of force against 
Albanian residents in Kosovo, had negative implications for the democratic peace 
araurnent, because this case was a military conflict between democracies, thereby 4;; 1 
destroying the myth of a separate zone of peace among democracies. NATO did not 
refrain from attacking Serbia just because the latter was democratic; instead it decided to 
intervene from the humanitarian point of view. When an immediate threat is faced, the 
adversary's regime type does not appear influential in decision making for war or use of 
force. 
Furthermore, liberals' assertion that democratic peace is particularly true in the 
period after World War Two needs more detailed analysis. Although Russett and 
Antholis argue that "Even when controls for [geographic] distance [among the parties], 
alliance, wealth, economic growth, and political stability are included in the analysis, an 
independent explanatory relation for democracy remains" in the post- 1945 era, 26 the 
Cold War element cannot be ignored. The world was divided into roughly two blocs and 
members within a bloc were not only encouraged to cooperate with each other 
26 Russett and Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each other? ", p. 416. 
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economically but also had military ties through various pacts and agreements. Balance of 
terror by nuclear weapons played an important role in preventing another world war 
from breaking out. Judging from the fact that democratic peace was made possible by 
those factors, liberals' assertion with statistical evidence that democracies do not fight 
each other is too simplistic. 
In sum, a democratic government is not necessarily a more peaceful type of regime 
than others. It may, rather, be beflicose when it needs to defend its values, and may 
appear to be expansionist in others' eyes when it tries to spread liberal democracy in the 
world, particularly through 'peaceful evolution' which is an attempt by Western 
countries, and the United States in particular, to eliminate undemocratic government 
through penetration of liberal and democratic values among the citizens. Citizens, 
familiar and comfortable with such values, are expected to replace a dictator with a 
democratic goverrunent. 
Although democracies rarely fight wars with each other, they do so when their vital 
interests are at risk. The mechanism for war to break out is more complex than liberals 
generally expect. First of all, there must be a conflict of interests between the parties 
concerned, where these interests are vital to at least one party. Then, the decision to go 
to war is made by assessing various factors, including at least: the states relative military 
capability vis-a-vis its adversary (or adversaries), the goals and intention of the other 
party (or parties) with regard to the conflict issue, the economic burden of transforming 
the peacetime economy to a war-time economy, the cost of redistributing available 
resources, whether it is possible to secure necessary resources and materials during the 
war, international pressure including economic sanctions and military intervention by a 
third party (or parties), and compatibility with the pursuit of other national goals. In the 
case of Finland during World War Two, it faced a problem of how it could survive. In 
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the case of the Kosovo operation, NATO nominally placed the humanitarian factor 
higher than respect for another democracy, Serbia. However. it is widely believed that 
the real intention of NATO with regard to the Kosovo operation was to satisR- the 
concern of European NATO members, such as Germany, to maintain stability in their I 
'backyard'. When a vital interest is at stake, the realist factor (pursuit of national 
interest) becomes dominant. 
Military interventions also cannot be free from another realist factor, namely. 
power politics. If intervention is classified by type of regime, democracies intervene more 
than other types of regime. However, if they are classified according to power, the 
tendency is for greater powers to intervene against smaller powers. For example, use of 
force by the US has always been against what it perceived as militarily weaker states 
which were threatening US interests in one way or another; against North Korea, North 
Vietnam, Libya, Iraq and Serbia. Comparison of human rights abuse by Serbia against 
ethnic Albanians, by Russia against Chechenya, and by China against Tibetans and 
Moslems in Xingjinag may be interesting. The US decided to use force against Serbia, 
but has not done so against the Russians or the Chinese. In addition, the potential threat 
posed by Russia or China to US security was much bigger than that posed by Serbia. 
Why is this? From the realist Point of view, the answer is easy. Fighting with the 
Russians or the Chinese could mean escalation to World War Three. More important. 
however, seems to be fear that the US homeland could be broug into war, or even 
partially destroyed by the adversary's nuclear weapons. in the case of Serbia, there was 
no such possibility. It is a rational choice for the US government to place its own 
security higher than human rights abuse in other states. Thus, there are always realist 
factors behind any kind of use of force, even in the name of humanitarian intervention. 
1-ýý 
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The essential problem for the democratic peace argument is that it lacks a deep 
analysis of what causes war and how it starts. It tends to pick up certain variables such as 
economic growth, trade relations and whether or not the adversary is a military ally. and 
compare them to find out which one is more influential than others. However, going to 
war is a matter of a political decision on a life and death issue, not a matter of 
probability, or of consideration about the adversary's type of regime. 
2) Decision-making system 
Richard Neustadt's 1960 book, Presidential Power, stimulated studies on the 
decision-making process. Although this book mainly demonstrated how the US president 
makes himself influential and how he exercises his power and influence, it also showed 
that the process of decision-making in a government is an arena of bargaining. 27 Between 
then and the late 1970s, decision-making processes were vigorously researched. 
Particularly important is Allison's Essence of Decision. In this book, Allison 
demonstrated three models, using the Cuban M[issile crisis as a case study; namely, the 
rational actor model, the organisational process model and the governmental politics 
model. " The rational actor model assumes that a state, or government, is a unitary actor 
that chooses the most rational among all possible options. However, in the real world, it 
is quite difficult for a government to satisfy this assumption. Reasons for this are vanous: 
not all decision-makers are rational; they may misperceive and misjudge the adversary's 
intention and/or the situation as a whole, particularly under conditions of inadequate 
information and/or time limitation under great pressure; or they have to compromise, to a 
greater or lesser degree, in order to be consistent in pursuing other goals. 
'9 In addition, 
Richard Neustadý Presidential Po1wr: The Politics ofLeadership (New York: Wilkey, 1960). 
28 Allison, Essence ofDecision. 
29 Greg Cashman, "at Causes War?: An Introduction to Aeories of International Conflict (San 
Francisco: Lexington Books, 1993), pp. 78-81. 
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each state has a bureaucracy, or small group of consultants at least. to assist the makma 
of decisions, from the routine to the most important. If this is the case, the decision- 
making process needs to be analysed. 
Allison later combined and developed his other two models, the organisational 
process and the governmental politics models, as the bureaucratic politics model. in 
cooperation with Morton Halperin . 
30 According to a study which examined Allison and 
Halperin's works, the bureaucratic politics model is composed of the folloxvmg four 
factors; 1) bureaucracy is made up of various organisations and numerous indiNiduals 
whose goals and interests vary, thus rejecting the rational actor model; 2) the president is 
merely one of the decision-makers, though his influence may be more significant than 
that of others; 3) the outcome, a decision, is not necessarily rational because it is a 
product of bargaining and compromise by decision-makers and 4) although a decision is 
made, there is no guarantee that it is implemented as planned, due to various types of 
errors and/or ignorance by those who are opposed to the decision. " The major 
characteristics of the bureaucratic politics model are that 1) decision-makers' attitudes 
towards a particular issue reflect the interests of the organisations they belong to; thus, 
they tend to pursue organisational objectives rather than national interest, and 2) as a 
result of conflicting interests and propositions among decision-makers, the decision- 
making process becomes an arena of bargaining and negotiations of which the outcome 
(decision) usually does not lead to a radical policy change, because it is easier to find 
consensus. Therefore, decisions are not necessarily rational. 
30 ar digm and Some Policy Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: APa 
Implications", in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (eds), Theory and Policy in International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79. 
31 Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Maldrig Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in 
PersPective7% World Politics 33(2), 1981, pp. 236-238. 
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However, these arguments have met criticisms. Krasner. , ý, ho counter-argued 
against Aflison's Essence of Decision, asserts that 1) the organisational process model 
and governmental politics model underestimate the role of the president who alone had 
authority to make a final decision; 2) if the bureaucracy played a significant role. it was 
because the president aflowed it to do so; however, 3) in the case of the Cuban "MiSsile 
crisis, regular bureaucratic procedure was marginalised by creating a small group of 
consultants (Executive Committee, or ExCom), in which President Kennedy played a 
decisive role, and 4) when a state faces a possibility of war, national interest dwarfs 
bureaucratic interests. 32 Regarding the first criticism, there is a question about whether 
the president was just one of the decision-makers. Under the conditions that other 
mini ters were hired (and could be fired) by the president, they are in general loyal to the 
president. That means not only that the president can make use of his influence, but also 
that there may not be a big debate over whatever issue is at stake. 33 
So, to what extent is the bureaucratic politics model relevant to states' behaviour'? 
The answer to this question needs to be examined from a number of aspects. As Krasner 
pointed out, too much emphasis on the role of the bureaucracy may result 
in 
underestimating the extent to which the elected president is accountable to 
his 
democratic constituency for his decisions. However, in a country like Japan, where the 
prime mnuster is not directly elected although he is assumed to be accountable, the role 
of the bureaucracy is more important than in the United States. 
The next factor to be pointed out is that the character of the political 
leader may 
determine the role of the bureaucracy. A study which compared the attitude of the 
Johnson and Nixon admini trations towards the SALT I pointed out that under 
President 
32 Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)", Foreign PolicY 
1972, pp. 168-174. 
" Cashman, "at Causes War?, p. 97. 
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Johnson the role of the bureaucracy was relatively significant because he preferred 
consensus among deaSion-makers, while President Nixon used the bureaucracy by 
merely letting it submit all options to him so that he himself could make a decision after 
studying those options . 
34 It is obvious that the role of the bureaucracy x,, -as much less 
significant under Nixon than under Johnson. 
However, regardless of the top leader's character, the more critical the issue is, the 
more it is likely that he will be involved in decision-making. Although the United States 
felt the Soviet threat during the Cold War, the negotiations oN, er SALT were not 
regarded as urgent compared to the Cuban Missile crisis, when the possibility of World 
War Three breaking out seemed high. Facing such a situation, any top leader is expected 
to play a decisive role in making the best possible decision quickly. In this case, the 
regular bureaucratic procedure is more likely to be circumvented, by creating an ad hoc 
committee for intensive debate and quick decision-making, as in the case of ExCom M 
the Cuban Missile crisis. 
Another important factor is that the bureaucracy is merely one of the elements 
which influences the decision-making process. As Halperin argues, "Domestic politics in 
the United States, public attitudes, and the international. enviromnent aH help to shape 
decisions and actions. Senators, congressmen, and interest groups are involved to 
varying degrees, depending on the issue. The relevant departments of the federal 
bureaucracy are involved, as is the President, at least on major issues ... Each wants the 
government to do different things, and each struggles to secure the decisions and actions 
he thinks besf'. 35 In addition, military leaders sometimes play a significant role 
decision making, particularly in many developing countries where the government faces 
34ROSati, "Developing a Systematic Declsion-Making Framework", pp. 239-245. 
35 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D. C.: Brookings- 
Institution, 1974), pp. 4-5. 
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various security problems, both international and domestic and thus depends heavily on 
the military for regime survival. Under these circumstances, the government may have to 
compromise with the opinion of the military, by taking a harder line than it would prefer. 
Thus, finding a positive correlation between the bureaucratic factor alone and states* 
decisions and behaviour is almost impossible. 
Finally, the problem of implementation needs to be mentioned. Even if a rational 
decision is made, there is no guarantee that it will be carried out as planned. 
Occasionally, the decision does not result in the expected outcome due to human or non- 
human errors, corruption, accidents, resistance to implementation at a lower level of an 
organisation and lack of mechanisms for command, control and communication. In 
Allison's eyes, the U. S. Navy's failure to carry out a blockade of Cuba in accordance 
with presidential orders is an example of the former's resistance to a political decision. 
The Navy had its own standard operational procedure for blockade. In the case of the 
Cuban Missile crisis, the blockade line was set as far as possible from Cuba. However, 
President Kennedy decided to set this line far closer to Cuba, in the face of the Navy's 
opposition, so that ships from the Soviet to Cuba would have more time before 
quarantine, thus giving the Kremlin more time to make a decision on its response. 
However, the outcome was that the Navy operated the blockade in accordance with its 
original procedure. 16 This case demonstrates not only how an attempt to change standard 
operational procedure can meet bureaucratic resistance, even in an emergency situation, 
but also how this resistance could influence the implementation of a decision. 
Implementation may also be cancelled or delayed by another political decision. For 
example, during the Cuban Missile crisis, President Kennedy accepted the ExCom's 
" Allison, Essence ofDecision, pp. 129-132. 
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recommendation that the US should strike the missile site in Cuba if a U-2 were shot 
down. However, when a U-2 was actually shot down, the president withheld the attack. ' 
In sum, policies are shaped by factors such as domestic politics. the mternational 
enviromnent about an issue at stake, and public opinion as NveU as bureaucracy. Although 
this is not to say that bureaucracy is insignificant in the decLSion-making process, it is 
difficult to find a direct correlation between bureaucracy and decision-making. After a 
decision is made, it is not necessarily carried out as planned, due to a number of factors 
such as errors, accidents, and resistance by the bureaucracy. Since so many factors are 
involved in the decision-making process and implementation, proving a direct connection 
between the nature of decision-making systems and states' behaviour seems almost 
impossible. Given that identifying causal relations between bureaucracy and decision- 
making is quite difficult, even in a case like the Cuban Missile crisis., theorising about the 
effect of bureaucracy on states' behaviour appears sterile. 
3) Culture 
International Relations theory, particularly as it relates to security studies, has 
traditionally been dominated by the realist school of thought, which emphasises the effect 
of distribution of power on states' behaviour. However, attempts to seek explanations of 
states' behaviour from other perspectives have become increasingly common, particularly 
since the 1970s. The cultural approach is one such attempt. 
While the 'strategic culture' debate introduced a cultural dimension into security 
studies in the late 1970s, it had already attracted attention in the field of comparatIve 
politics in the 1950s, when a study area called 'political culture' , vas established. 
Although many scholars agree that the cultural aspect is important, it seems also to be 
" Ibid., p. 140. 
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true that it is difficult to prove which aspects of culture (be it political culture or strategic 
culture)38 directly influence states' behaviour. 
What makes the cultural approach appear confusing is the difficulty of defining the 
terms 'culture', 'political culture' and 'strategic culture'. According to the Lonaman 
dictionary, culture is defined as 'the customs, beliefs, art, music, and all the other 
products of human thought made by a particular group of people at a particular time' 
The definition of political culture is 4a particular distribution in a particular nation of 
people having similar or different political attitudes, values, feelings, information, and 
5 40 skills' while that of strategic culture is "a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values 
and habits regarding the threat and use of force". 41 From these definitions, it is safe to 
infer that the essence of culture contains at least the following two aspects: the 
psychological aspect that refers to beliefs, values and feelings, in Efldns and Simeon's 
term "mind set"; 42 and a behavioural pattern such as attitudes and customs which reflects 
the psychological aspect. However there is something between the 'mind set' and 
Elkins and Simeon admits that political culture is "one of the most popular and seductive concepts in 
political science; it is also one of the most controversial and contested". See David J. Elkins and 
Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? ", 
Comparative Politics 11(2), 1979, p. 127. And Ken Booth mentions that strategic culture is a 
"contested but essential concept". Ken Booth and Russell Trood, "Preface", in Booth and Trood 
(eds. ), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. vii. 
39Longman Dictionary ofEnglish Language and Culture, 1992. 
41 Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Socialization and Political Culture7', in Gabriel A. Almond (ed), 
Comparative Politics Today: A World View (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 
p. 50. Almond originally defined political culture as 'a particular pattern of orientation to political 
action'. See Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics 18(3), 1956, 
p-396- Orientation "refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) 
"cognitive orientation", that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the 
incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) "affective orientation", or feelings about the 
political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) "evaluational orientation". the 
judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value 
standards and criteria with information and feelings". Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The 
Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton Univorsity 
Press, 1963, p. 15. 
1 Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture', in Ken Booth and Russell Trood 
(eds-), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: MacMillan, 1999), p. 8. 
42 Elldns and Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? ", 
p. 128. 
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behaviour which bridges the two. This is what Keesing recognises as a -set of control 
mechanisms" which refers to rules, plans and instructions. 43 According to Keesing. 
shared values and beliefs form rules and norms, and people behave in accordance with 
these rules and norms. In any case, the term culture is a broad concept which covers the 
process from mind set to behaviour. Although there seems to be no agreement about 
what shapes culture and which elements, including states' behaviour, should be evaluated 
If 44 as culture itse , it has also been pointed out that an attempt to define culture clearly is 
45 
a pitfall . Since identifying the boundary of culture is beyond the scope of this section, 
the task of which is to examine the extent to which the cultural approach is useful in 
explaining states' behaviour, referring to that culture as a broad and vague but important 
concept should be sufficient. 
How, then, is the cultural approach important for understanding and predicting 
states' behaviour'? Before seeking an answer to this question, which aspect of culture is 
more relevant to states' behaviour needs to be examined. According to Duffield, 
choosing an appropriate cultural approach among many is the biggest challenge for its 
advocates. 46 Since the relevant aspects of culture for this chapter are political culture and 
strategic culture, they are the focus here. 
43 Roger M. Keesing, "Theories of Culture7, Annual Review ofAnthropology 3,1974, pp. 73-97. 
44 Whether behaviour should be included in culture or not is under debate in the strategic culture 
argument, particularly between Alastair lain Johnston and Colin Gray. The former regards strategic 
culture as a variable to explami states' strategic behaviour, while the latter includes behaviour in 
culture. Besides, they also differ over whether or not technology and geography should be 'included. 
See Alastair lain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy Mi Maoist China", in Peter J. Katzenstein 
(ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), particularly pp. 221-222; Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic 
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton Unil, ersity Press, 1995), 
chapter 1; and Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context". My position is nearer to that of Johnston. 
45 Elkins and Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? ", 
p. 127. See also Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context", p. 5 0. 
46 John S. Duffield, 'Tolitical Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealaism", 
International Organization 53(4), 1999, p. 774. 
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According to Johnston, "there are consistent and persistent histOnical patterns m 
the way particular states (or state elites) think about the use of force for political ends". 4- 
He sees strategic culture as a useful tool to help understand a state's behaNioural pattern. 
and thus regards it as a strong explanatory variable for states' behaviour. It is true that 
how force is used is strongly influenced by a state's strategic thinking and its -limited, 
ranked set of grand strategic preferences",, 4' but whether or not a state actually uses 
force in a particular circumstance belongs to the higher level of political judgement. 
Decision-makers are expected to scrutinise alternatives to using force, and ývhen they are 
attempting to reach a consensus on whether or not to resort to war, they have to 
calculate its costs and benefit from various angles, as mentioned earlier. In addition, the 
influence of domestic politics and bureaucracy cannot be ignored. In particular, the more 
democratic a state's decision-making system, the more these factors are likely to be 
influential. Even if decision-makers easily agree to use force, at least when to launch an 
attack and at what level may be subjects of intense debate among them. Thus, the 
decision on whether or not to use force is too broad for strategic culture to explain. As 
Macmillan et al. suggest, it is reasonable to regard "strategic culture as being the military 
-) 49 dimension ofpolitical culture'. Since strategic culture cannot explain the full range of 
states' behaviour, political culture seems to be a more appropriate approach. " 
Let us go back to the question of the significance of the cultural approach for 
explaining states' behaviour. Advocates of the cultural approach, such as Booth and 
Trood, argue that culture, along with anarchy and distribution of power, is an important 
47 Johnston , Cultural Realism, p. 1. 
48 Ibid., p. 3 8; and Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China", p. 223. 
49 Macmillan , Booth and Trood, "Strategic Culture! 1, p. 11. (emphasIs in On gin al) 
50 Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", p. 776. 
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element in explaining the diversity of states' behaviour. " Another scholar demonstrates 
that the cultural approach as an explanatory variable is useful in the following Nvays: 
culture is an element that shapes states' basic goals, perceptions of the international 
environment, norms and rules that behaviour is expected to follow, and culture influences 
the formation of 'ranked preference' among decision-makers. " However, there are a 
number of other factors, including those that are in general culturally neutral, such as 
science and technology, that also influence states' behaviour. Although the whole 
process from formation of mind-set to behaviour may be a reflection of the state's 
political culture, it is difficult to differentiate political culture as an independent 
explanatory variable. It should rather be regarded as complementing other variables, " 
such as anarchy and distribution of power. 
Finally it must be pointed out that the cultural approach, and strategic culture in 
particular, is not totally independent of the balance of power element. As mentioned 
earlier, the strategic culture argument was introduced in order to criticise neorealism, 
which assumes that states' behaviour can be explained by structural constraints (anarchy 
and distribution of power). The core argument of the advocates of strategic culture is 
that neorealism cannot explain why states behave differently when they occupy a similar 
position in the international system, but culture can. Although such questions as 'what 
shapes cuhure? ' and 'what is cuhure? ' are under debate, 
54 it is generally agreed that 
geography and shared historical experience contribute to shaping culture. But how the 
strategic culture argument sees the balance of power element is unclear. Even Johnston. 
51 Booth and Trood, 'Treface! ', p. vii. 
52 Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", pp. 771-772. 
5' Elkins and Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? ". 
p. 140. 
54 Grey, "Strategic Culture as Context", particularly pp. 49-56. 
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who developed rigorously the definition and methodological issues relating to strategic 
culture, is peculiarly silent about it. 
According to Johnston, strategic culture is "an integrated system of sNmbols", 
which is comprised of two parts. One is the "basic assumptions about the orderliness of 
the strategic environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is 
ni.. aberrant or inevitable), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero- 
sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (the ability to control 
outcomes and elimina e threats and the conditions under which it is useful to employ 
force)", and the other is assumptions "about what strategic options are the most 
efficacious for dealing with the threat envirorunent'g. 55 However, there is no clear 
explanation about how they were formed as culture. Whether war is aberrant or 
inevitable depends on the issue at stake and interaction between the parties concerned. 
Whether a state can control outcomes and eliminate threats mainly depends on its 
relative capability vis-a-vis the other party. It is natural to assume that a small and weak 
state which has frequently been threatened by its bigger and stronger neighbour will tend 
to develop a defensive strategic culture. This is not a matter of preference or choice; it is, 
rather, the only option available. Conversely, a bigger and stronger state has more 
options vis-a-vis its smaller and weaker neighbour, and it tends to be aggressive. Thus, 
strategic culture cannot ignore the geopolitical factor, which may be decisive in shaping 
it. 
In sum, strategic culture is partly a product of geopolitics and is better considered 
as a part of a wider culture, namely, political culture. Although the cultural element can 
be observed to he behind states' behaviour, behaviour is shaped by other factors as weU. 
Thus, ElIcins and Simeon seem to be right in pointing out that -culture as an explanation 
55 Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist Era", p. 222 and p-223. 
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is seldom direct and seldom operates alone". In addition, because culture is essentially a 
psychological phenomenon, it is difficult to identify it. Culture should be identified usinc-, 
other filters such as norms and rules which generally determine codes of conduct. 
Therefore, culture is "generally permissive and almost always acts in conjunction xvith 
other variables". 56 However, these norms and rules can be distorted during the process of 
decision making and implementation. As a result, the final outcome, behaviour, could be 
quite different from what was assumed from observing culture. Thus, it can be concluded 
that culture can be identified through states' behaviour, but the latter cannot be 
understood from the former alone. 
2. Other elements 
1) Personality of decision-makers 
Since decision making is a product of various activities of human beings, each 
decision reflects decision-makers' values and preference. Thus, knowing the relations 
between decision-makers' personality and pattern of behaviour may contribute to an 
understanding of states' behaviour, particularly where the regime is a dictatorship. 
The formation of individuals' personality is deeply connected with the degree of 
satisfaction of various basic needs, which are considered to form a hierarchy. 
" Most 
essential are 'physiological 13 needs, which refers to needs for food, water, sleep, sex and 
so forth. What seems to be interesting is that a person who lacks not only food, but also 
safety, love and self-esteem tends to be hungry most of the time, thereby being deeply 
58 
attached to eating. This is not only because he is hungry, but also because he is trying 
am. Elldns and Simeon "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Expl 
"" 
p. 140. 
57 The Subsequent sentences are based on A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", 
Psychological Review 50(4), 1943, pp. 370-396. 
58 Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", p. 3 73. 
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to compensate for needs that are not satisfied by making his stomach physicaUy ful This 
type of person tends to seek power in the future. " It is also understood as an attempt to 
compensate, because it is easy to assume that he may be able to get whatever he Nvants 
when he obtains power of some sort. When physiological needs are satisfied, other 
higher needs emerge, namely, safety needs which refer to a person's need to ensure the 
environment for his own survival (for example, freedom from fatal diseases, Irrational 
and harsh treatment and fear of being killed arbitrarily). Then a new cycle starts. The 
other needs are love needs, which refers to needs for love, affection and a sense of 
belonging, and esteem needs, which refer to the need for self-respect and for the respect 
of others. A person who is high in self-esteem tends to be confident and have a feeling of 
his own indispensability. This type of person is likely to be opposed to violence and the 
use of force, while a person with low self-esteem tends to be hostile and aggressive, 
thereby not so sceptical about the effectiveness of violence. The last, and the highest, 
need is self-actualisation, which refers to the need for self-fulfibnent by achieving M the 
specific field in which he has potential. What should be pointed out here is that the 
degree of satisfaction does not need to be 100 percent. Ordinary people are assumed to 
be satisfied, more or less, in all needs. 
How these needs are satisfied is also important. Basically, childhood experience, 
particularly relations with one's parents, plays a central role in forming personality. The 
fundamental needs of new-born babies are safety, food and love to be provided by their 
parents. If a baby is not welcomed by his/her parents, he/she comes to be unable to give 
and receive love towards others at a certain age, thereby making hisIer personality 
apathetic and aggressive . 
60 Another instructive example is that a person who has 
" Cashman, "at Causes War?, p. 39. 
60 Maslow, "A Theory of Hwnan Motivation", p. 3 86. 
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experienced abuse by his/her parents M childhood tends to abuse his her own child when 
he/she becomes a parent, because a person tends to treat others as he, she was treated by 
others. As these examples show, childhood experience not only shapes the outline of the 
individual's personality but also forms his/her motivations and pattern of behaviour in the 
future. 
Moreover, birth order is also considered to have some impact on personality 
formation. According to Stewart, 
The first-born male has the greatest experience of dominance and of successful 
intervention in the affairs of others. The middle-born son, starting life in a 
position of dependence and relative weakness, gains later on an opportunity for 
dominance, having the most experience in mediation. The last-born son is from 
beginning to end in a position of dependence and relative weakness, probably 
harboring the greatest resentment toward all authority. Both the middle- and 
the last-born son, in view of their relatively weaker positions, have a greater 
need than the first-born son for devious and subtle tactics as well as appeals to 
"higher authority". The only child, dealing entirely with "higher authorities" 
whose favors he need never share, is most at home on center stage and least 
-) 61 vulnerable to peer rivalry' . 
However, it should not be forgotten that the enviromnent in which he grew up, 
and interactions with others, also influence a person's motivations and behaviours. For 
example, Mao Zedong's character was strongly related to a psychological conflict with 
his father. However, it is obvious that such factors as concern about China's colonial 
status, anger towards great powers' bullying China and the Qing dynasty's weak 
goverment, and association with two teachers who introduced Mao to Leninism- 
Marxism also played a significant role in forming his political beliefs. 
Along with political beliefs, there are some factors that can influence political 
leaders: (1) the leader's political style; (2) the leader's motivation for seeking a political 
leadership position; (3) the leader's reactions to stress and pressure; (4) the manner In 
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which the leader was first recruited into a political leadership position. (5) the leader*s 
previous political experience; and (6) the political climate when the leader was starting 
out. The first four factors are identified as the leader's personality. while the others are 
categorised as information about the leader's background. 62 If a leader believes that the 
world is hostile, he will prefer hard-line policies. If he prefers to examine all options bY 
himself, rather than letting the bureaucracy or advisors do this job, so as for him to make 
a final decision, his personality is more likely to be reflected in policy. If the leader 
obtained his leadership position through a coup d'6tat, he is more likely to fear his 
subordinates, in fear that he himself could be ousted by the next coup. 
A study which examined 13 US presidents (from T. Roosevelt to Ford) in the 
twentieth century in terms of motives (achievement, affdiation and power motives) by 
analysing their inaugural speeches revealed interesting results. Before looking at the 
findings, it is necessary to know what these motives refer to. A person who is 
'achievement motivated' is strongly concerned with excellence and long-term 
involvement. He is fairly good in competition and can take moderate risk. He tends to 
choose his advisors based on their professionalism and is flexible enough to modify his 
beliefs and behaviour in accordance with his professional advice. Thus, he is expected to 
be cooperative, and least likely to employ military action. This type of person is 
considered to fit better in the sphere of entrepreneurship than the sphere of politics. A 
person who is high in 'affiliation motive' is concerned with establishing long-term, warm 
. r.. mendships with others. Since he is sociable, he spends his time talking with his 
associates, who are chosen by the criterion of friendship rather than professionalism. His 
desire to maintain warm relations with others sometimes leads him to compromise xNith 
61 Louis H. Stewart, "Birth Order and Political Leadership", mi Margaret G. Hennann (ed), A 
Psychological Examination ofPolitical Leaders (New York: Free Press, 1977), p-234. 
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or be easily influenced by them. In circumstances of low risk and lmv pressure. he Ls 
cooperative, but when the level of pressure and risk is high, he starts vacillating between 
defensiveness and exploitation, thus becoming manipulative, due to anxiety. A person 
who is high in 'power motive' is concerned with his prestige, his influence on and his 
reputation with others. As a consequence, he tends to be hostile towards those who are 
higher in power and status than himself on the one hand, and chooses associates Nvith 
lower status than him on the other hand. This tends to lead him to act exploitatiVely. He 
does not mind taking great risks, prefers hard-line policies, and is thus, more likely to 
employ military actions, and sometimes does things that trigger strong emotional 
reactions from others. 63 Since he acts energeticafly in pursuit of his policies, combined 
with the characteristics above, this type of president is most likely to be a target of 
assassination. 
64 
Now let us go back to the findings. The results revealed that those whose 
achievement motive is high tend to display high levels of power motive but low levels of 
affiliation motive. Conversely, those whose achievement motive is low tend to be low in 
power motive but high in affiliation motive. Thus, the standard pattern is either HHL 
(High achievement motive/ High power motive/ Low affiliation motive) or LLH. Those 
with the pattern of HHL are T. Roosevelt, F. D. Roosevelt, and Johnson, while those 
with LLH pattern are Eisenhower and Ford. Amazingly, presidents before World War 
Two tended to be LLL, except for T. Roosevelt, and only one president, Kennedy, had a 
61 
HHH pattern. Truman (LHH) and Nixon (BLH) held iiTegular patterns. 
62 Margaret G. Hermann, "Ingredients of Leadership", in Margaret G. Hermann, Political Psychology 
(San Francisco and London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1986), pp. 173 -174. 
63 David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart, "Content Analysis as a Technique for Assessing Political 
Leaders", in Margaret G. Hermann (ed), A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders (New York: 
Free Press, 1977), pp. 44-48. 
64 Ibid., p. 58. 
65 Ibid., p. 53, Table 2.3 Motive Scores from Presidential Inaugural Speeches, 1905-1974. 
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Most of the presidents with high power motives were targets of assassination. 
namely, the two Roosevelts, Truman and Kennedy. President Nixon's involvement m the 
Watergate scandal was explained by suggesting that his high achievement motive ma,, 
have led him to became involved with illegal action. If he perceived this illegal action as 
the only one option to pursue his goal (re-election), he would have taken risks. He was 
also high in affiliation motives. This means that he was relatively vulnerable to those who 
treated him in a way he felt comfortable with, thereby making himself scandal-prone. 66 In 
the case of President Ford (LLH pattern), he was not seen as a strong and tough 
president by Americans. However, withdrawal from Vietnam and encouragement of arms 
control talks can be seen as a reflection of his high affiliation motive. " 
However, this method is not inUhable. For example, President Johnson was 
HIHL, and President Nixon was HLH. Concentrating on the affiliation motive (the last), 
the former would be expected to examine and make all important decisions by himself 
rather than depending on the bureaucracy, while the latter would be assumed to allow the 
bureaucracy to examine the imminent issue and submit a smaU number of options so that 
the president could make a final decision. However, as mentioned in the section on 
decision making systems, these two presidents acted counter to these expectations. 
In sum, as long as decision making is a human action, it is natural to assume that 
decision makers' beliefs, values and preferences are reflected in their decisions to various 
degrees. These beliefs, values and preferences are formed by their childhood experience, 
relations with their parents, birth order, the envirorunent they grew up in and social 
interaction with others, and influence decision-makers' performance. However. it should 
be remembered that states' behaviour is influenced by other factors, including domestic 
66 Ibid., p. 54. 
61 Ibid., p. 60. 
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politics, bureaucracy and interactions with the other party to the conflict. Thus, no 
state's behaviour can be reduced to the top decision maker's personality. 
2) Perception/misperception 
Assuming that states usuaUy perceive, make decisions and behave rationaUy. the 
element of misperception is considered as the 'key variable' of non-rationalit y. 
Although the impact of misperception on states' behaviour has attracted academic 
attention through Jervis' famous book, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, 69 study in this area has not developed significantly, particularly In terms of 
theorisation. The major reason for this is, as Jervis himself admits, that "War has so many 
causes - in part because there are so many kinds of wars - and misperception has so 
many effects - again in part because there are so many kinds of misperceptions - that it is 
not possible to draw any definitive conclusions about the impact of misperception on 
warv). 70 This section tries to identify the impact of perception/misperception on states' 
behaviour by reconstructing Jervis and other researchers' studies in this area in the light 
of questions such as which factors states misperceive, how misperception is fonned and 
how perception and misperception influence states' behaviour. 
In order to make the right decision and behave correctly, a state needs to know 
how the other side will behave. However, it is quite difficult to achieve this purpose, due 
to such factors as inadequacy or lack of information, miscommunication between parties, 
and miscalculation and misjudgement about the adversarys intention. As a result, there is 
often a gap between what a state expects to see and what really is. What causes this gap 
68 Jack S. Levy, "Nfisperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkage and Analytical Problem". 
World Politics 36(l), 1983, p. 77. 
69 Jervis 
, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics. 
70 Robert Jervis, "War and Nfisperception", in Robert 1. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The Origin and 
Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 101 
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is considered as misperception, defined as "inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of 
consequences, and misjudgments about how others will react to one*s policies". -' 
Areas of misperception 
So which factors do states tend to miscalculate and misjudge'? These factors can 
be classified as two types: those which are derived from the state itself (state A), and 
those which involve its adversary (states B). 
i. Misperception which is derived from the state itself 
Probably the easiest element to misjudge but the one where misjudgement is most 
difficult to discern is A's image of B (friendly or hostile; trustworthy or untrustable). 
Since human beings tend to see what they want to see, or what they expect to see, a 
person's image of others is easily formed based on his expectation towards them, 
although it may be quite different from how they really are. This pattern can be applied 
to itnages among states. Thus, after B acts counter to what A had originally expected, A 
recognises its misperception about B and has to modify its image of B. The next factor 
seems to be overestimation or underestimation about its own military capabilities. This is 
because A estimates its own military capabilities based on its absolute capabilities (such 
as the number of personnel, number and types of weapons system, the effectiveness of 
C'I and so forth). However, power must be compared and estimated on a relative basis. 
For example, A's absolute mffitary capabilities may be greater than C's, but may not 
match B's. Thus, a calculation depending solely on its absolute capabilities could bring A 
devastation. Another factor is that A does not know how it will behave in the future. " 
The typical example of this case is Japan's chaotic contemporary discussion about how 
to defend itself and how it should contribute to maintaining regional peace and security, 
Ibid. Levy's definition is as follows; "Nfisperccption involves a discrepancy between the psychological 
environment of the decision makers and the operational environment of the "real world"". Levy, 
"NEsperception and the Causes of War", p. 79. 
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particularly if 'an event' (military conflict) breaks out in 'an area surrounding Japan'. The 
Japanese government's indecisive attitude towards possible military conflict across the 
Taiwan Strait can be seen as 'strategic ambiguity' in many foreigners' eyes. However. it 
is viewed as merely a lack of grand strategy about national defence in ordinary Japanese 
eyes. And the most serious misjudgement in this category is that A cannot correctly 
perceive what is the current situation now and how it will be developed. " Particularly 
important for the latter factor is the possibility of involvement by a third party, and that 
third party's intentions . 
74 It is well known that the United States misperceived the 
possibility of China's involvement in the Korean War, believing that the Chinese would 
not participate in the war. As a result, the war was prolonged and the US-led 
mternational armed forces had to retreat from Pyongyang. 
I Mlisperception which concems the adversary 
As A can misperceive B, A can also misperceive B's image of A. 75 Human beings 
tend to apply their way of viewing others to themselves. For example, if X likes (or 
hates) Y, X tends to perceive that Y also likes (or hates) X. In many cases this is correct. 
However, degree of affiliation towards others can change from time to time quite easily. 
Thus, if X believes that Y likes him as long as he likes Y, it could cause trouble. The same 
at) lies to international relations. As A can miscalculate its own capabilities, A can also K-P 
miscalculate B's capabilities . 
76 This is caused in two ways. The first is that A simply 
miscalculates B's absolute capabilities, due to a lack of or delay in securing information. 
The second is that A could overestimate or underestimate B's relative capabilities vis-a- 
vis A, even if A estimated B's absolute capabilities correctly. Another, probably more 
72 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 54- 
73 Ibid., p. 56. 
74 Levy, "Nfisperception and the Causes of War", p. 82. 
75 Jervis, "War and Nfisperception", pp. 120-12 1. 
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'MPOrtant, factor is misperception about the adversary's intentions" and perceptions. For 
example, A may judge that B's intensive purchase of advanced weapons is a sign of 
expansionist purpose, while B is merely upgrading its outdated weapons. However. the 
most serious misjudgement seems to concern that the adversary's political xvil Even if a 
state is ambitious and has excellent military capabilities, its government wifl not 
necessarily decide to use them, for reasons of timing, compatibility with other goals to be 
pursued, and so forth. Conversely, if a government is determined to act aggressiVely 
towards neighbouring states, it will do so regardless of its level of military capability. 
Thus, believing that B will not attack A just because B's military capabilities are inferior 
to A's is naive. 
(2) The process of forming misperception 
The next question is how and why these misperceptions are induced. There are a 
number of psychological elements. The first factor is a psychological bias based on 
affiliation. For example, if A likes B, A tends to take B's conduct as amicable and 
favourable. However, if A hates B, the same conduct might be judged as hostile. Thus, 
this bias could preclude a state from making a rational decision by misjudging the 
adversary's intention and perception. 
The next factor is what Jervis caUs 'cognitive bias'. This is composed of four 
elements; reciprocity effects (if A likes B, we think B is apt to like A); generalization 
effects (if A likes B, we think A will like other people and that other people wiU like B); 
positivity effects (we expect A to like B); and agreement effects (we expect A and B to 
76 Levy, "Nfisperception and the Causes of War", p. 82. 
" Ibid. Jervis defines intentions as "ffie actions he will take under given circumstances (or, if the 
circumstances are hypothetical, the actions he would take if the circumstances were to materialize)". He 
also notes that this definition is deviant from many authors' definitions, which refer to 'Vhat the actor 
plans to do or what goals he hopes to reach". See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, p. 48. 
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78 have similar opinions) . The following example demonstrates that our belief that the 
other side shares the same values and way of thinking as ours is dangerous. " When the 
United States started SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. the US 
negotiators were shocked to find out that their Soviet counterparts did not share their 
nuclear strategic thinking, such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and flexible 
response. Since the United States believed that peace had been maintained through 
mutual understanding of the concept of balance of terror, MAD and flexible response, if 
a nuclear war had broken out, the US might have had to suffer as a result of the 
misperception. 
Another cause of misperception is that one tends to think that one's message is 
received correctly by the other side. As mentioned above, the United States did not 
expect Chinese participation in the Korean War. This is mainly because the US believed 
that it had been successful in convincing the Chinese of the US intention, not to attack 
Chinese soil. However, Mao Zedong was not convinced, which led him to decide to side 
with the North Koreans. " 
In addition, decision-makers and their supporting bureaucracy are often very 
slow in responding to changes in situations. This is mainly because they tend to oppose 
radical change. Often, they cannot catch up with the speed of change. Moreover, people 
usually "pay more attention to what has happened than to why it has happened". " As a 
result, analysis of the cause of the event is apt to be left untouched, thereby delaying the 
government's learning process and preparedness for similar events in the future. Even if 
they have learned something from the last experience, people still try to seek a solution 
" Ibid., p. 126. 
79 jerViS, "War and Nfisperception", p. I 18. 
'0 Jervs, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 46. 
81 Ibid., p. 228. (emphasis in original) 
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based on lessons drawn from earlier experiences. This tendency sometimes prevents 
decision-makers from responding flexibly in a new situation. " This inelasticity may also 
be caused by our psychological setting that we want to see the Nvorld in familiar terms 
and that we prefer to avoid the stress of facing new situations. 
(3) Perception/misperception and states' behaviour 
The last question is how perception and misperception influence states' 
behaviour, particularly with regard to the use of force. First of all, when states calculate 
that the benefits of war will exceed its costs, decision-makers wifl be optimistic about 
going to war. It has been pointed out that "the perceptions that war will be economicafly 
manageable, and militarily winnable and that there will be no third-party surprise" are 
likely to create such optimism. " Regarding costs, it should not be forgotten that people 
are more willing to pay costs to defend what they already have than to obtain additional 
benefit such as territory and resources. Thus, if the issue at stake is a state's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, the state is likely to fight to defend them, even if the adversary is 
much stronger. Conversely, if a state's goal in the conflict is to annex the territory of its 
opponents, the former is likely to refrain from going to war unless the benefits overweigh 
the costs. On the other hand, people also have another type of psychological pattern 
regarding costs and benefits. According to Jervis: 
Although most people are risk-averse for gains, they are risk-acceptant for 
losses. For example, given the choice between a 100 percent chance of winning 
$10 and a 20 percent chance of winning $55, most people will choose the 
former. But if the choice is between the certainty of losing $10 and a 20 
percent chance of losing $55, they will gamble and opt for the latter. In order 
to increase the chance of avoiding any loss at all, people are willing to accept 
the danger of an even greater sacrifice. 84 
82 Ibid., p. 229. 
83 Cashman, Kat Causes War?, p. 69. 
84 jerViS , "War and Nfisperception", p. 122. 
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Thus, decision-makeTs also have to calculate and perceive the opponent's 
psychology. This is quite instructive when we attempt to predict whether China might 
attack Taiwan. Many may view China's provocative behaviour as having an expansionist 
motive; that is, the mainland is going to gain additional territory, human resources, 
technologies and wealth. However, in Chinese eyes, Taiwan's independence is a loss of 
what the mainland believes it has. Judging from the discussion above, China is willing to 
pay the cost of defending it, as she has declared from time to time, and she is very 
serious, although there may be an element of bluff. 
As demonstrated above, perception and misperception directly influence decision 
making. However, over-emphasising the impact of perception/misperception on states' 
behaviour carries a risk of ignoring other parts of the decision making process. As is the 
case with all the factors discussed in this chapter, proving direct causal relations between 
perception/misperception and behaviour is ahnost inlPossible. In addition, the existence 
of misperception and its effects are usually not recognised until after the event. And, 
again, there are many factors involved in the process between decision making and 
behaviour. Thus, although perception and misperception is an important element in 
examining states' decision making, it is also only one part of a whole. 
3) Interaction between the parties concerned 
As discussed above, various domestic factors have an impact on the decision 
making process. However, in addition, a number of factors intervene in the process of 
finally executing the decision. Even if a state can manage to implement the onginal 
decision, there is no guarantee that the planned outcome will eventuate. The outcome 
may be that it achieves the goals it has set. However, it may do so in a way that was not 
originally planned. Or, the state may be unable to obtain what it wanted altogether. Or 
both sides may compromise and each get something. What kind of outcome is actuallý, 
149 
Chapter 3: Domestic Factors Affecting States' Behaviour 
brought about is uncertain, particularly when an accident happens, or the course of 
events is largely formed through the dynamism of action-reaction on both sides. This 
section briefly examines such dynamism through interaction. 
In the previous section, it was pointed out that people tend to believe that others 
also think, view and act as they do. Thus, if A views B as hostile, A believes that B is 
hostile to A. On many occasions this is true, and B also holds the similar belief (A is 
hostile to B). In this case, hostility in one side triggers hostility on the other side, thereby 
creating a spiral. For example, state A has a conflict with state B over a territory which 
contains promising natural resources. A wants to resolve this conflict through 
negotiation, and believes it is possible in spite of the fact that both A and B believe the 
other side is hostile. Both sides recognise war as the worst scenario case. While A 
publicly accuses B of its illegal sovereign claim over the territory, A starts negotiations 
with B behind the scenes. B also adopts a similar policy. However, exchange of verbal 
accusations for domestic purposes (to obtain wide support from the public, through 
which each state attempts to place itself in a stronger position in negotiations vis-a-vis 
the other party) stimulates huge demonstrations in both countries demanding resolution 
by war. While B is able to manage to quell the demonstrations, A is not. Eventually, 
citizens of A privately land on the territory in question, and are killed by B's armed 
forces. This event pushes A to take a harder line against B. As a result, both sides come 
to perceive that war is inevitable and imminen - At this point, each side prefers to strike 
first, rather than wait to be struck. A war breaks out. 
Using the logic of Game Theory, this example is seen as a transformation from 
85 
the 'Chicken' game to the 'Prisoners' Dilemma' game. The preference order of 
'Chicken' is DC>CC>CD>DD, while that of Prisoners' Dilemma is DC>CC>DD>CD. D 
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stands for defection, and C stands for cooperation. The outcome each player prefers to 
see is to gain what they want without compromise (DC). However, obtaining territory is 
a typical zero-sum situation in which one's gain is the other's loss. Since both sides claim 
sovereignty over the territory, DC is perceived as hardly possible vn ithout war. Each side 
wants a peaceful resolution, and thus starts negotiation (CC). At this point, they view 
war as the worst case (CD>DD; 'Chicken' game). However, the moment that each 
player perceives the possibility of war, they are tempted to strike first rather than wait to 
be struck. This is a change of preference order from CD>DD to DD>CD (Prisoners' 
Dilemma). A lesson to be drawn from the Chicken game is to realise that "the most 
obvious danger would result from the mistaken belief that the other will retreat and that 
it is therefore safe to stand firm". 
16 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the strategy of tit-for-tat is considered to work in the 
direction of cooperation. However, the pitfaJl of tit-for-tat is that once one side defects, 
it will result in a chain reaction of defection when the other side also adopts tit-for-tat: 
thus, states fall into the 'Prisoners' Dilemma' game. What should be noted here, 
however, is that Game theory does not necessarily explain the cause of behaviour and 
that it should be recognised simply as an analytical method. 87 
In sum, states' behaviour is influenced by a great variety of factors, both 
domestic and international. Among those factors, interaction with the other party 
sometimes creates dynamics which go beyond states' control. Domestic factors matter in 
states' behaviour, but it is this dynamism that may determine states' course of conduct. 
85 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Introduction", in Robert 1. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The Origin and 
Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 10. 
" Jervis, "War and Misperception", p. 117. 
87 Cashman, What Causes War?, p. 206. 
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Conclusion : Which are more influential: domestic or international factors? 
This chapter examined factors which influence states' behaviour by focusing on 
domestic and psychological factors, and interaction dynamism. The type of regime and 
decision making systems in a state are considered to have a big impact on states' decision 
making. However, decisions are not necessarily made rationally, due to lack of 
information and time, decision-makers' exhaustion caused by stress, pressure and lack of 
sleep, misperception, static bureaucracy, domestic politics, the influence of interest 
groups, and so forth. It was originally assumed that authoritarian regimes are more 
aggressive than democracies. However, researches about democratic peace have 
revealed that in certain circumstances democracies may be as aggressive as, or more 
aggressive than, other types of regime. 
In addition, since decision making is a human activity, decision-makers' 
personality, background, and psychological make-up cannot be ignored. For example, if 
a top decision maker is high in achievement and power motives, he wifl prefer a hard line 
policy, while if he has strong affidiation motives, he may commit his government to arms 
control talks and reconciliation of conflicting states. What kind of personality decision- 
makers hold depends on such factors as their childhood experience and relations with 
their parents in particular, the environment in which they grew up, socialisation with 
others, and birth order. Cultural factors also influence the formation of personality. Thus, 
first-image (human factor) and second-image (internal structure of states) factors are 
generally related to each other. 
After a decision is made, there is no guarantee that it wifl be carried out as 
planned, because there is a possibility of human and non-human error, accidents, 
resistance to implementation, and alteration of the decision in accordance with a chanee 
in the situation. Even if a state behaves as it planned, whether it can achieve its goal is 
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another question, because its course of action largely depends on interaction with other 
states. 
So, is there no answer to the question of which element is most strongl,.,,, - 
influential on statýs' behaviour? The following example may offer an answer. Suppose 
there is a man, X, who is 175cm. tall, relatively well-built, and can do basic martial art . He 
attempts to steal a purse from Y (a 160cm, thin woman). X has a xvide range of options 
against Y, from being threatening to employing violence. However, when X has to 
confront Z (a 200cm. tall, weH-built man with a gun), his range of options is supposed to 
be not only much narrower but also tota, Uy different from that against Y (e. g. beg for his 
life and accept Z's demand, or effectively choose to die by resisting). In this sense, 
difference in power (external, or structural element) determine the range of options 
available to states. 
Then, which option the state chooses mainly depends on domestic factors. Using 
the example of X against Y, which option X will adopt depends on his character, his 
psychological setting at the time and circumstances. If he chooses the mildest option, it 
may be because his nature is violence-averse, or because he is not bold enough to take 
the most severe option, because this is the first crime in his life, or because he perceives 
that Y will not resist. 
However, whether X can get Y's purse by threatening her depends on Ys 
response and Xs interaction with her. If Y resists with all her strength, contrary to Xs 
expectation, he must do something to suppress her resistance (for example, use 
violence). Finally he may be successful in achieving his goal, but may leave her dead. 
There may be a criticism that individuals and states are different. Exactly. 
However, the basic structure is the same. Difference is part of decision making. 
Individuals can make decisions alone, immediately, while more factors are mNýol',,, ed and 
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procedure becomes more complicated in the case of states. Thus, it can be concluded 
that international factors largely determine the range of options available to a state. %vhile 
domestic factors play a central role in choosing options. However. the outcome is a 
product of the other party's involvement and interaction with it. As Jervis puts it. the 
question of which level of analysis is most useful for explaining states' behaviour 
depends on "how rich and detailed an answer we are seeking. The enviroranent may 
influence the general outline of the state's policy but not its specific responses". " 
" Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 17. 
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Chapter 4 
Domestic Factors Affecting China's Behaviour 
Introduction 
Based on the neoliberal argument that understanding a particular state's 
international behaviour inevitably requires an assessment of the state's domestic factors. 
such considerations as impact of regime type, decision making system and culture were 
examined in the previous chapter. In this chapter, these factors will be applied to the 
context of China's international behaviour. It wiR be argued that 1) contrary to the 
'democratic peace' argument, China's decision-making system has a greater influence on 
its international behaviour than non-democratic nature of the CCP regime itself, 2) 
change in the nature of the CCP regime was influenced by change in the intemational 
security environment; thus, 3) international factors have been more influential on China's 
international behaviour than domestic factors. 
1. The CCP regilne and war 
Many International Relations analysts have observed a tendency that democracies 
rarely fight each other and a number of studies have supported this claim with statistical 
evidence. Although it was shown that democracies are not necessarily more peaceful 
than other types of regime, there has been an effort by advocates of the 'democratic 
peace' argument to find a correlation between a particular type of regime and frequency 
of war. This section examines 1) whether or not the CCP regime is democratic, and 2) 
the relationship between the CCP regime and China's use of military means In 
intemational conflicts. 
1) Is the CCP regime democratic? 
Although there exists no universal definition of democracy, as discussed in Chapter 
3,. the concept of democracy is composed of such elements as free and fk elections . 
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existence of a parliament independent of the goverment and existence of opposition 
parties. In the case of the PRC, there is an election system called 'democratic centralism' 
which refers to the "process by which lower levels elect higher levels, ýýho m tum make 
decisions to be passed down along the hierarchyý'. l Constituency elects the members of 
Basic Level (village level) People's Congress, who in turn elect the members of County 
People's Congress. Then they elect the members of Provincial People's Congress. who in 
turn, elect the members of National People's Congress (N-PC), which is constitutionally 
the highest level of state organ. In practice, however, the NPC has not played a central 
role in foreign policy making. The State Council, which is composed of the premier, vice 
premiers, and ministers, is responsible to the NPC. However, the members of the State 
Council have rarely been appointed or deposed by the NPC. The party usually makes 
such decisions: Liu Shauqi's removal from the State Premiership (1968), Hua Goufeng's 
appointment as Prime Minister and Deng Xiaoping's removal as a Party Secretary- 
General (1976), and Deng's return to power (1985) are examples. Thus, there is a gap 
between theory and practice in China's domestic political system. 
Regarding pluralism, there are a number of small parties besides the CCP. 
However, the Communist Party has prohibited them from functioning as opposition 
parties, and denied the introduction of pluralism. In addition, a secret ballot has not been 
always guaranteed. Although the first direct election took place at the village level in 
19889 2 and the Communist Party has experimented with the township level direct 
June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, Third edition, revised and 
updated (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 88. 
2 Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Election", China Quarterly 
162,2000, p. 490. See also Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Accommodating "Democracy- in a 
One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China", China Quarterly 162,2000, pp. 465-489. 
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elections free and competitive election' at the national level is far from likely to be 
realised in the foreseeable future. 
Since the 'open door" policy was introduced in the 1980s, citizens have araduafly 
begun to enjoy the rights of private property, and many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
have been or are being privatised. In addition, citizens have come to enjoy greater 
political freedom, reflected in criticism of the government's ineffectiveness in dealing 
with corruption, nepotism, pollution, unemployment, increasing crime, and the Nviderdn-g 
income gap between coastal and interior areas. However, the government continues to 
suppress political dissidents, accusing them of conspiring with foreign countries which 
intend to overthrow socialism and ultimately the CCP regime on the one hand, and 
calling for stronger nationalism among citizens on the other. Judging from these 
conditions, China cannot be viewed as satisfying the criteria for democracy. 
2) The CCP regime and China's use of force in international conflicts 
The next task is to examine the relationship between China's involvement In 
militarised conflicts and the non-democratic nature of the Chinese regime. A study which 
examined China's involvement in militarised interstate disputes during the period 
between 1949 and 1992, using statistical methods, provides some interesting findings 
which reveal the pattern of Chinese behaviour in international disputes. According to this 
study, 4 1) China was the second most dispute-prone country during the Cold War era, 
ranking after only the United States'; 2) once involved in disputes, the Beijing regime has 
shown the same level of hostility' as, or a higher level of hostility than, that displayed by 
' Susan V. Laurence, "Village Democracy", Far Eastern Economic ReOe it,, 27 January 2000, p. 17. 
4 Alastair lain Johnston, "China's Nfilitarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-92: A First Cut at the 
Data", China Quarterly 153,1998, pp. 1-30. The subsequent findings are drawn from pp. 8-18. 
5 Ibid., p. 9. 
6 Ibid., p. 14. The hostility levels are scaled as follows: 1) no militarises response; 2) threat of force; 3) 
display of force; 4) use of force; 5) intersate war. Ibid., p. 12, footnote 3 1. 
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the other party in more than 80 percent of disputes; 3) its violence score per dispute Ls 
the highest among the major powerS7 ; and 4) China has not gone into interstate war with 
8 the purpose of changing the other state's policy or regime. but she has opted to choose 
military means to resolve territorial disputes (48%). ' These findings indicate that the 
CCP regime has been rather befficose. 
If we examine these findings in detail, however, some other aspects can be 
observed. First of all, 49 percent of China's militarised disputes were related to territory. 
Nearly half its territorial disputes (41 percent) occurred in the first decade after the PRC 
was established. 'O This figure appears to be compatible with the general idea that newly- 
bom states tend to be highly sensitive about territorial control. In the case of the PRC, 
the government declared its deternfination in 1949 that no additional foreign 
inftingement on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity would be allowed. In 
addition, since Imperial China, which adopted a tribute system with the political entities 
surrounding China, did not fix the borders with neighbouring polities, it was inevitable 
that Beijing would face demarcation problems sooner or later. Furthermore, the 
Communist regime asserted that China's 'century of shame' wiH not be over until 
Taiwan, where the Nationalists fled and declared the KMT to be the sole legitimate 
government of China in 1949, is unified with the mainland under the CCP rule. Since the 
Ibid., p. 15. Violence level = hostility level x action code. Ibid., p. 14. Actions are classified as follows: 
1) threat to use force; 2) threat to blockade; 3) threat to occupy territory; 4) threat to declare war; 5) 
threat to use nuclear weapons; 6) alert; 7) mobilisation; 8) show of troops; 9) show of ships; 10) show 
of planes; 11) fortification of border; 12) nuclear alert; 13) border violation; 14) blockade; 15) 
occupation of territory; 16) seizure of material or personnel; 17) clash; 18) other use of military force; 
19) declaration of war; 20) tactical use of nuclear weapons; 2 1) interstate war. For this categonsation, 
see ibid., p. 12, footnote 3 1. For example, the violence score of 'a threat to blockade' is 4 hostilitv 
level 2x action code 2), and that of 'use of "D in al-out interwar' is 105 (= hostility level 5x 
action code 2 1). See ibid., p. 14, footnote 3 6. 
Ibid., p. 15. 
9 Ibid., p. 16. 
10 Ibid., p. II and p. 12. 
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last point is a source of the CCP's legitimacy, it seems to be natural for Beijing to behaý e 
with bellicosity, particularly against Taiwan. 
Second, there is no observable correlation between internal MStability and the CCP 
regime's involvement in militarised disputes. " It is sometimes asserted that totalitarian 
states are ready to go to war in order to divert their citizens' attention from 
dissatisfaction about internal economic and political conditions. 12 China has been one of 
the most dispute-prone, and the most aggressive since 1949. However, there was one 
five-year period during which the hostility level sharply dropped: 1969-1973, when 
China was preoccupied with the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. If the 
'diversionary' theory is correct, China should have been even more aggressive in its 
international behaviour during these years, because this was the very period when the 
extreme left, led by the 'Gang of Four' who scared even Mao, played a crucial role M 
both domestic politics and foreign policy making. Moreover, the data about China's 
frequency of involvement in militarised conflict per five-year period shows that it 
dropped sharply in 1969-1973 and has maintained almost the same level since then. " If 
the Beijmg goverriment was merely too preoccupied with the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in 1969-1973, the level of its 
commitment to militarised disputes after 1973 should have recovered to that of pre- 
1969. The fact that it has remained unfrequent indicates that domestic instability/stability 
has not necessarily been reflected in foreign policy. 
" Ibid., p. 18. 
12 See for example, Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each other?: Evidence 
from the Peloponnesian War", Journal of Peace Research 29(4), 1992, p-417. See also Greg 
Cashman, "at Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict (New York: 
Lexington Books, 1993), p. 146. 
13 Johnston, "China's Nfilitalized International Dispute Behaviour 1949-92", p. 10, Figure 3 Chinesc 
NED Frequencies per Five Year Period. 
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Third, despite the attachment to Marxism-Leninism- Mao Zedong Thought, China*s 
efforts to change other states' regimes accounted for only 7 percent of China's 
militarised disputes throughout the period of study. 14 Since 1973, Beijing has not been 
involved in disputes of this category. " 
If China's befficosity has weakened since the end of the 1960s, though its recrime 
has remained undemocratic, it can be assumed that there was an alteration in foreign 
policy making at that time. The causes need to be analysed in relation to both 
international and domestic factors. As for international factors, China's security 
enviromnent had changed vis-a-vis the two superpowers. With the experience of defeat 
in the border war against the Soviet Union in 1969, the latter came to be seen by Chinese 
leaders more as a source of military threat than as an ideological rival. Fortunately for 
China, Washington had sought rapprochement by this time, in order to terminate the 
Vietnam War. Better relations with Washington benefited China in two ways; 1) the US 
military threat to the mainland from Indochina would dimini h in the near future, and 2) 
China could form a united front with the US against the Soviet Union, which meant 
Beijing could practise its traditional strategy of 'playing a barbarian against another 
barbarian'). 
As for domestic factors, the major influence was China's preoccupation with 
managing the consequences of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). In addition, some 
studies have pointed out that Mao's political power had been weakened somewhat by the 
early 1970s, mainly due to his deteriorating health, " although his authority as the 
ultimate decision maker remained until his death in 1976. And Deng was less ideological 
14 Ibid., p. 12. 
" Ibid., p. 11, Figure 5 Frequency of Chinese NUDs by Dispute Type per Five Year Period. 
'6 Dick Wilson, Mao: Ae People's Emperor (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 425. See also Drevcr, 
China's Political System, p. 103. 
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and more pragmatic than Mao, choosing to concentrate on developIng China*s economy 
and building Chinese-style socialism rather than exporting revolution. With the collapse 
of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries at the end of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, the appeal of communism to the ordinary Chinese lost 
credence even more. In addition, Jiang Zemin, who is viewed as a technocrat. has 
followed Deng's policies of economic development and building socialism, although his 
stance towards the open door policy is more conservative than Deng's. Thus, the CCP 
regime has grown less ideological with the passage of time, and its nature has been 
changing accordingly. In order to know whether this less bellicose tendency is related to 
the CCP's changing nature, an examination of Beijing's decision-making is needed. 
2. China's decision-making system 
In the case of the PRC, the role of the bureaucracy in decision-making has until 
recently been insignificant for several reasons. First of all, it has been traditionally 
believed in China that rulers were selected in accordance with a 'mandate of Heaven. 
This meant that the rulers) will was interpreted as 'Heaven's will', which in turn meant 
that rulers were viewed as morally correct. When a particular ruler's moral rectitude 
decayed, dynastic change occurred. Under these circumstances, the bureaucracy's major 
task was to implement the policies and orders which were determined 
by the higher 
authority, rather than involve itself with policy-making. Second, although the 
NPC in the 
PRC is constitutionally the highest organ of state power, as in other communist states the 
party is superior to the government in practice. As a result, 
intra-party Politics had 
greater influence on policies than debate in the Congress. This means that 
how decisions 
were made depended on the power balance among decision-makers. 
The more dominant 
the top leader was, the more his personality, ideology, preference and world-view tended 
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to be reflected in decision-making and policies. Third, Asian nations generally prefer 
informal mechanisms and consensus-building among a few top decision- mak- ers behind 
closed doors to a legal approach. AR these elements indicate that China's foreign pohcy 
decisions are difficult to predict accurately. 
1) The decision-malcing system under Mao, Deng and Jiang 
Looking at the Maoist era, decision-making power was heavily concentrated in the 
person of Mao. It is well known that he hated bureaucracy, criticising it for establishing 
-) 17 its own 'independent kingdom . Although nobody can prove exactly what happened, 
Mao believed and feared that the bureaucracy did not necessarily respect the CCP's 
decisions as a result of gaining policy-making power, thereby undermining the control of 
the party. In a Marxist-Leninist state, the party is supposed to command not only guns 
but also government and bureaucracy. Although he consulted the Politburo and its 
Standing Committee over imminen domestic and international problems, Mao was 
totally dominant and made all big decisions by himself " 
Compared to Mao, Deng was less totalitarian. Having twice personally 
experienced being purged from the political scene in the past, Deng tried to eliminate the 
negative sides of the Maoist era. The first step was to move away from the cult of 
personality. He preferred consensus among the top decision-makers. Although he usually 
provided an overall policy framework in advance so that decision-makers could reach an 
agreement consistent with the direction in which he wanted to go, reaching consensus 
among top leaders was not necessarily a smooth process, particularly over the open-door 
policy. Intra-party debate and controversy between reformers and conservatives were an 
" Ibid., p. 84. 
Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice", in Samuel S. Kim (ed), China and the 
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Nvc-stview Press. 
1994), p. 23. See also A. Doak Barnett, The Making ofForeign Policy in China (London: I. B. Tauns. 
1985), p. 7. 
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important element in determining who was involved in decision-making. Although party 
and government cannot be clearly separated because those who occupy important party 
positions also hold goverment and/or bureaucratic positions, there was a tendency when 
reformers were stronger than conservatives for government and bureaucracy to play a 
bigger role. This was because implementation of the 'four modemisations"9 inevitably 
led to enlargement of the bureaucracy; for one thing, bureaucratic bodies were necessary 
to implement new policy, and implementation required specialists' knowledge and 
judgement. This implied that the involvement of the bureaucracy increased on the one 
hand, and that decision-making was graduaRy institutionalised in accordance with 
procedures and regulations on the other. However, when the conservatives were 
revitalised, the party tended to dominate important decisions. Thus, intra-party politics 
can be said to have shaped pohcies in Deng's era, too. 
When Jiang, without charisma or mihtary record, took over &om Zhao Ziyang just 
after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, many observers imagined that he would be a 'one 
point relief, and hardly expected that his admini tration would last long after Deng' 
death. However, he survived. Jiang has been able to solidify his power base by taking 
advantage of his institutional posts as a head of the party, the state and military; this 
means that these posts enabled him to appoint those loyal to him to important positions 
in the party, government and military. In addition, he has been successful in repelling his 
opponents by forcing some to retire and by indicting others for corruption . 
20 This means 
" They include modemisation of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national 
defence. 
20 For literature that gives details about Jiang's effort to force elders to retire, see Richard Bauin. 
"The 
Fifteenth National Party Congress: Jiang Takes Command? ", China Quarterly 153,1998, especialk 
pp. 150-152. On indictments, see "China's New Ideology Campaign for Party and Nlodemization';, 
BBC Monitoring, 20 June 2000, available at http: //www. insidechina. com/localpress/bbcinonitor. 
php3? id=170497; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Tresidcnt Profiting from Tough Sentence", 
South China 
Morning Post, 3 August 2000, available at http: //www. scmp. com/News/China/Article/FullText-asp- 
Articlell)-20000803 025 53 1400. asp; and Nfichael Dwyer, "Two Years Out, 'Fourth Generation' 
Gears 
Up in Race to Replace Jiang", Australian Financial Review, 13 October 2000, available at 
http: //www. afr. com. au/world/20001013/A47823-200OOctl2. html. 
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that intra-party politics under Jiang between reformers and conservatives has taken a 
milder form than under his predecessors. That there was no radical political campaign 
resulting in a major toning-down of economic reform programmes or some big potitical 
figures' purge and/or rehabilitation is further evidence. 
However, the decision-making mechanism has become more personal under Jiang 
than under Deng. Since Jiang Zemin does not have charisma or an iRustrious military 
record, the main factor that enables him to stay in power is his hold on institutional 
positions. Considering the fact that the party has been superior to military and 
government in the PRC, the post of General Secretary of the Party is more unportant 
than those of a chief commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and President 
of the state. Therefore, Jiang has made a great effort to strengthen the power of the 
CCP, and ultimately his own power base. 
These elements generated some new characteristics in the decision-making 
system. " The first is the rise of the so-caRed 'Shanghai faction'. Jiang graduaRy caUed 
his previous subordinates, his old friends, specialists and party cadres from Shanghai to 
Beijing, providing them with important positions in the bureaucracy, government, 
military and party. Jiang increased the power of the Central Committee General Office 
which took over the functions of the Central Committee Secretariat, " and he created the 
'Jiang Zemin Office'. Although these two Offices should not in theory play policy- 
making roles, they have exercised decision-making powers in such areas as internal 
security, economic policy, party organisation and ideology and propaganda. " Judging 
from the fact that Deng had to let other leaders control financial policy, and the legal and 
The subsequent sentences depend on Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Amin (Singapore, New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney and Mexico City: Prentice Hall, 1999), particularly chapters I to 3. 
22 The fimctions include 'Inaking policy and issuing top-level party documents and controlling the paper 
flow between headquarters and other CCP organs". Ibid., p. 34. 
21 Ibid., p. 29. 
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security establishment, 24 Jiang has been far more successful than Deng m penetratM2 his 
power into the various state organs. The stronger the Shanghai faction becomes. the 
more likely it is that the decision-making system will move towards a dictatorship. 
The second characteristic is that Jiang recognises, the importance of populism. This 
does not mean that he is democratic. Rather this is a part of his strategy to raise his 
status to match Mao's and Deng's. By appearing on the prime time news programmes. 
he implants an impression among the people that he is the top-decision maker. Making 
efforts in such areas as narrowing the income gap between coastal and internal areas and 
eliminating corruption, which are two of the citizens' main grievances, helps enhance the 
legitimacy of Jiang's administration and the CCP regime. In a sense, Jiang deals xvith the 
(negative heritage' left over by Deng. However, tackling such problems also contributes 
to strengthen his power base in two ways: 1) development of China's Western regions 
could be an effective measure to suppress separatism although there is also a risk that the 
development programme itself might provoke separatist movements; and 2) his anti- 
corruption campaign has enabled Jiang to wrest political power from the 'Beijing faction' 
who benefited from Deng's policies and who generally looked down on Jiang. 
The third new characteristic of the decision-making system is that Jiang has 
emphasised the superiority of the party over all other institutions. This has meant that the 
retreat of the idea of the 'rule of law' which had burgeoned and been accompanied by 
economic reforms during the 1980s. On the one hand, Jiang drew the lesson from the 
Tiananmen massacre that putting politics or ideology in a secondary position during the 
1980s had allowed space for the democratic movement. On the other hand, economic 
development requires internal stability. As a result, indoctrination of ideology was 
strengthened. This means that the CCP's ideology is placed higher than laws. This. in 
24 Ibid., p. 33. 
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turn, means that the role of the NPC, the highest law-making body under constitution. 
which had been increasingly assertive in policy-making since the mid 1990s. has been 
curtailed as Jiang has consolidated his power. Qlao Shi, who was speaker of the 'NPC 
and Jiang's long-standing rival, was replaced by conservative Li Peng in 1998. All these 
elements indicate that the CCP regime under Jiang has turned the clock back toNvards the 
Maoist era in some respects. 
Mao dominated the party and made all major decisions by himself Deng was 
skilled in coordinating different opinions and preferred collective leadership, although he 
had decisive influence in decision-making. In the case of Jiang, the Shanghai faction is 
predominant and the Central Committee General Office and Jiang Zemin Office play 
significant roles in policy-making and decision-making, although they are not legally 
allowed to do so. In this respect, the decision-making mechanism is more personalised 
under Jiang than Deng, and Jiang's opinions are likely to be reflected in policies. 
2) Chinese leaders' personalities and China's international behaviour 
The next question is whether the top leaders' personalities and their major policies 
correlate with the state's aggressive international behaviour. Mao valued mcessant class 
struggle, created chaos and accepted violence in order to complete China's domestic 
revolution. As mentioned in the previous section, the Maoist era was the most aggressive 
in terms of China's international behaviour, particularly in the first decade after the 
establishment of the PRC. China involved itself in the Korean War (1950-1953), and in 
wars with India (1962) and the Soviet Union (1969). Besides, it used military forces 
against Taiwan (until 1958) and South Vietnam (1974), and interfered in other states' 
internal affairs by materiaRy supporting communist insurgent movements in neighbouring 
countries. Deng, with bitter experience of two purges caused by the Mao-dommated 
decision-making system, made efforts to avoid a personal cult being established, 
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respected the collective leadership, pursued China's own economic development rather 
than world revolution, and sought domestic stability and international security. As a 
result, the CCP regime ceased to support communist insurgency in other states, and 
attempted to make China attractive for foreign investment. With the exceptions of the 
use of force against Vietnarn in 1979 and 1988, China did not engage in serious military 
confrontation under Deng. Jiang also made stability a top priority. Compared to the 
Maoist era, the PRC's foreign policy behaviour under Jiang can be said to be relatively 
low profile, in the sense that China has not been involved in any large scale armed 
conflict. However, Beijing has stiU been provocative, as seen in the cases of military 
threat against Taiwan (1996 and 1999), expansion in the South China Sea, particularly to 
the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef area (1995 and 1998-1999), and the actiVities of 
spying ships in and adjacent to Japanese territorial waters (1999 onward). 
3) Which category of factors. ) domestic or international, has been more influential on 
China's international behaviour? 
It may be true that the top leader's personality/ideology plays a significant role in 
making foreign policy decisions. However, other factors which influence top leaders' 
decision-making, such as national interests and the international security environment, 
should not be ignored. In the case of Mao, it is safe to conclude that he was more 
aggressive than Deng and Jiang. At the same time, however, Maoist China's aggressive 
international behaviour cannot be fully explained by the non-democratic nature of the 
CCP regime which was dominated by Mao, because China's security enviroment during 
the Maoist era was more dangerous, unstable and uncertain than under Deng and Jiang. 
As a top leader, Mao made decisions in the light of China's security enviromnent during 
the Cold War. For example, Mao, with fresh memories of the mainland's having been 
semi-colonised by stronger powers in the first half of the twentieth century, perceived the 
US-led UN forces in the Korean War as posing a serious military threat to China. Having, 
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Moscow as an ally enabled Beijing to enter the Korean War. The Vietnam War was seen 
as a serious threat in the south and this was the major reason, along with the ideological 
belief that Beijing should fight against imperialism, why China supported North Vietnam 
materially and militarily as weU as diplomatically. 
However, the Soviet Union replaced the US as the mainland's primary enemy after 
the border war of 1969. Although China fought against the US in Korea, its soil was not 
a theatre of war and its forces were strong enough to compel the UN-forces to retreat to 
the 38th paraHel. In the case of the border war with the Soviet Union, Chinese territory 
and forces were damaged by the Soviets' predominant military power and China's 
leaders were concerned about the possibility of the Soviets using nuclear weapons. 
Compared to the Soviet threat, the US was, after aH, a distant enemy, despite their 
engagement in Indochina. The Sino-Soviet border war forced Mao to recognise that the 
Soviet military was a more serious security threat to China than US imperialism. 
Evidence can be seen in the fact that Beijing moved to rapprochement with Washington 
in the early 1970s in order to contain or at least deter Moscow, while simultaneously 
eliminating the security threat from Indochina. 
These two factors (deterring Moscow and rapprochement with Washington) 
contributed to improving China's security environment during the 1970s. By this time, in 
other major disputes such as the Sino-Indian border territory and the Taiwan issue, a 
status quo had been established. This meant that Beijing had no need to be particularly 
aggressive in relations with India and Taiwan, unless an event occurred which gave the 
mainland an excuse to use force. 
Johnston argues that under Deng, China was not remarkably less aggressive than 
the late Maoist era. " However, it can also be argued that China's aggressiveness 
25 Johnston, "China's Nfilitalized International Dispute Behaviour 1949-92", p. 11. 
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declined as its security environment improved in the early 1970s. and has remained at 
almost the same level since then. If this is the case, the non-democratic nature of the 
regime and/or the top leader's personality and ideology has been less important in foreign 
policy- and decision-making than international factors. 
This argument could be criticised on the ground that the major reason why China's 
aggressiveness declined in the early 1970s is that the govemment was preoccupied xvith 
dealing with the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. It is true that this factor is 
important. However, if this argument is correct, there remains the question of why 
China's aggressiveness did not recover to the pre-Cultural Revolution level after Deng 
took power. Deng's personality alone cannot give an answer to this question. During the 
Dengist era, there was no Korean War, Vietnam War or the border war with the Soviet 
Union, and no significant possibility of nuclear war. China's reduced aggressiveness since 
the 1970s cannot be explained without considering its international security envirorument. 
As concluded in the previous chapter, international factors such as power relations vis-a- 
vis the adversary and the nature of the international security enviromnent provide the 
range of actions that China can take; the nature of the regime mainly determines the 
selection of action to be taken; and interactions with adversaries influence how detailed 
foreign objectives may be achieved. 
3. A cultural aspect : China Is Realpolitik world-view 
As discussed in the previous chapter, culture contains two aspects: one 
psychological and one behavioural. The psychological aspect refers to beliefs, values and 
feelings (mind-set). Behaviour is to a large extent a reflection of the mind-set. Ho-wever. 
mind-set does not necessarily lead to behaviour when the latter is considered to be 
violating established noms and rules and/or conflicting with another part of the mind-set. 
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For example, A's words (or deeds) upset B and B wants to beat A. However. m many 
cases B refrains from doing so, partly because he feels a sort of constraint (because of 
laws) and partly because beating others is against his moral or religious belief This 
section examines the Chinese leaders' mind-set and the Beijing gove=ent .s 
international behaviour by focusing on their world-view and military thinking. 
Before the experience of a 'century of humiliation' starting in the nud-raneteenth 
century, China had been the most influential great power in the region. Asia, in general, 
did not have a state system as it has now. Neighbouring political entities were expected 
to pay tribute to the Chinese emperors, and in exchange they were recognised by China 
and enjoyed almost complete autonomy without Chinese intervention. Although China 
was frequently governed by foreigners such as Mongolians and Manchurians, they were 
soon assimilated into Han Chinese culture. During this process, China gained its 'middle 
kingdom' mentality and came to take pride in what it saw as its cultural superiority. 
However, the Chinese recognised that their cultural superionty did not work in the 
face of superior Western military power during the era of the Qing Dynasty. The defeat 
in the Opium War (1839-42) led to a series of compromises with the Western powers, 
placing China in a semi-colonial position. The loss of the war against Japan (1894-95) 
threatened the Dynasty"s survivability even more, because 1) it exposed the weakness of 
the Dynasty's military power to the world and domestically, and 2) the Qing government 
had to pay astronomical amounts of reparation to Japan through foreign loans, thus 3) it 
had to grant various rights, including establishing railroads and mining, to Westem 
powers (Russia, Germany and France in particular), which allowed them to semi-colonise 
the declinin dynasty. These conditions triggered internal political conflicts In the 
government and social unrest, and finally the Dynasty was superseded by Republican 
China in 1911. After the struggles against Japanese invasion during World War T,, N-o and 
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the subsequent civil war against the KMT, the People's Republic of China ývas 
established in October 1949. 
Whether or not the PRC is a continuation of Imperial China is debatable. This 
argument is important to answer the question of what kind of great power - regional or 
global - China will become. Advocates of 'continuity' argue that the PRC xvill not 
pursue hegemony as Imperial China did not, while those who support 'discontinuity' 
argue that the PRC is different from Imperial China due to the experience of the 'century 
of humiliation' which taught the Chinese a costly lesson about being a weak state; 
therefore it will seek traditional great power status . 
26 The answer may be found in Mao's 
opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference on 21 September 1949: 
The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is 
only in modem times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to 
oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary 
governments ... From now on, our nation will 
belong to the community of the 
peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously 
and industriously to foster its civilization and well-being and at the same time 
to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject 
to insult and humiliation. We have stood up ... Our national 
defence will be 
consolidated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our 
land. " 
The People's Republic of China is a mixture of continuity from Imperial China in the 
sense that it holds the Nfiddle Kingdom mentality, and discontinuity in the sense that it 
has concluded that military might will enable it not only to secure its sovereignty and 
26 For detail, see Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice", pp. 12-16. 
Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Isetung, vol-5 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1977), pp. 
16- 
18. China's resentment towards the 'century of humiliation' can still be seen in the report by the 
State 
Council in July 1998, stating that "Following the Opium War in 1840, China was gradually reduced 
to a semi-colonial. and semi-feudal country, and the Chinese nation was subject to the linperialist 
powers' invasion, oppression, bullying and humiliation on time and time again. After a protracted, 
persistent and heroic struggle, the Chinese people won independence for their country and the 
emancipation of the nation; thereby they hold dear their hard-earned right to independence". 
See 
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National 
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territorial integrity, but also to regain great power status and the respect which the 
Chinese people deserve. In other words, Nfiddle Kingdom mentality and the experience 
of the 'century of humlation' are twin piUars which shape China's mind-set. 
These twin piHars are evident in the PRC's international behaviour. First of aR. it 
has sought military might in order to be immune from being bullied again. to secure 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to regain great power status and respect. 
Second, Beijing has been determined to fight against imperialism. Ho-wever. China holds 
double standards on sovereign states; it asserts against superpowers that all sovereign 
states are equal, while it has tended to see other states - particularly in East and 
Southeast Asia - in the hght of patron-client relations. During the Cold War, perceptions 
of who were the 'running dogs' of the United States and/or the Soviet Union were an 
important aspect of China's foreign relations. These points highlight China's view of the 
world in terms of balance of power; it can be concluded that China's mind-set is 
realpolitik-oriented. 
This realpolitik orientation can also be seen in China's military thinking. "To 
subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme exceRence", and "what is of supreme 
importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances 
by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack 
cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative ... -)928 - these phrases are among 
the best known in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, which is generafly viewed as the root of 
Chinese military thinking. Although it appears at first glance that Sun Tzu ranks non- 
military measures higher than use of force, he does recommend attacking the enemy if 
there is a chance of victory. Thus, 'attacking the enemy's strategy', 'disruptMg his 
Defense" (Beijing, 1998), 11. National Defense Policy, available at http: //www. fas. org/nuke,, guidel 
China/doctrine/cnd9807/ index/html. 
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alliance by diplomacy'), 'attacking his army' and 'attacking the enemy's cities' are 
considered as a 'menu' from which a state can select in the event of conflict. Since the 
conditions before and during war are constantly changing, it is necessary to shift one's 
tactics flexibly in accordance with the changing situation, exerting every effort to 
maintain or create a better situation. 
Compared with Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong's military thinking is more explicitly 
bellicose. This appears to have derived mainly from his participation in the anti-Japanese 
war, combined with some ideas from Marxism and the semi-colonised conditions in 
China 
. 
29 During the anti-japanese war, a combination of guerrilla warfare (mainly 
exercised by the communist Red Army) and regular war (led by the KMT) worked well. 
Success in guerrilla warfare requires flexibility: "[The] enemy advances, we retreat; [the] 
enemy halts, we harass; [the] enemy tires, we attack; [the] enemy retreats, we pursue' ,. 30 
This does not mean, however, that guerrilla warfare needs no organised plan for victory. 
Nor does it mean that guerrilla warfare is completely different from regular war. " Mao 
set three stages to win in war: 'the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic 
defensive' (stage 1), 'strategic stalemate' (stage 2) and 'our counter-offensive' (stage 
21 General Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu The Art of War (Hartfordshiere: Wordsworth Reference, 1993), 
p. 105. 
29 Ross Terrill points out that "Mao's political methods and broad worldview probably owed more to 
Chinese traditions than to Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, it is clear there was little about the modern 
world - with the partial exception of Marxism - that Mao knew well; he reached into Chinese 
tradition for his instinctual knowledge. " Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography, revised and expanded 
edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2 I. 
30 Mao Tse-tung, A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953), 
p. 15. 
31 Mao describes regular warfare of the Chinese type as "the concentration of forces for a mobile war and 
a certain degree of centralisation and planning in command and organisation; in other aspects it i,,., 
still of a guerrilla character and on a low level, and cannot be spoken of in the same breath with the 
warfare of foreign armies and, in some ways, is even different from that of the Kuoinintang army. 
Thus in a sense this type of regular warfare is only guerrilla warfare on a higher level". Mao Ts-c- 
tung, Problems o War and Strategy (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1954), p. 20. ýf 
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3 ). 32 At stage 1, the key element is mobility, supported by guerrilla and regular warfare. 
At stage 2, a large portion of troops is transferred from the front to the enemy"s rear 
because the enemy is fully stretched and unable to protect himself everýAvhere. The 
enemy is divided and attacked, meanwhile the revolutionary forces prepare to counter- 
attack, depending mainly on guerrilla warfare. Even if this stage is basically defensive. 
attack is primary, by carrying out a series of small, quick-decision offensive actions. 33 
Stage 3 entails a return to mobile and regular warfare. 
Nuclear deterrence, however, is not consistent with Mao's 'People's War'. While 
'People's War' assumes an invasion by a militarily superior enemy across the land border 
and ground battles involving large numbers of troops, the purposes of China having 
nuclear weapons were to deter the enemy's attack on the one hand, and to destroy the 
(nuclear monopoly' of the superpowers on the other. 34 In this sense, China did not 
develop nuclear weapons based on the theoretical necessity to complement 'People's 
War'. It did so, rather, driven by the reality that the primary enemy, the United States, 
had the most advanced weapons (nuclear weapons) while China's access to Soviet 
nuclear technology was blocked. In order to maintain maximum independence, both 
politically and militarily, it was an urgent task for Beijing to develop nuclear weapons. 
By the time Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, it had become obvious to the 
Chinese elite that the 'People's War' theory had become increasingly irrelevant to 
China's security environment, because some assumptions of the theory were no longer 
realistic. However, nobody could reject Maoist theory directly, because to alter militarý' 
thin. king would mean re-evaluating Mao's whole ideology, which had dominated the 
32 For detail, see Mao's "On the Protracted War" in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 
(London: Laurence & Wishart, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 139-149. 
" Ibid., p. 80. 
34 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University PrL, -,,,,. 
1988), p. 35. 
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country for nearly three decades. Mao's successor needed to establish his legitimacy by 
stressing the link with Mao, but it was also necessary to amend military thinkMg In 
accordance with the changing security enviromnent and developing technolo 3' As a 
result, the post-Mao era ushered in partial change in "People's War" in terms of 'hoxv to 
fight'. For example, 'luring the enemy in deep' traditionally meant willingness to sacrifice 
the security of China's heartland, in order to bring the enemy into the vast interior, 
forcing the latter to be fully stretched. Then the Chinese would not only fight at the front 
but also attack the enemy's rear in order to cut off the latter's logistical lines. However, 
under the 'four modernizations' policy, China cannot afford to sacrifice its coastal 
industrial areas. The new circumstances necessitate 'meeting the enemy at the gate', 
rather than defence in deep. The product of the dilemma of how to change China's 
military doctrine without rejecting Mao's thinking was 'People's War under modem 
conditions', a term which was introduced for the first time in 1977. 
A comprehensive review of military thfilking, including the type of war that China 
might wage, followed in the mid- I 980s. The outcome of this review was the introduction 
of the concept of Imited war'. So what would local/limited wars in the future be like 
from the Chinese perspective? At least the following three features can be perceived. 
Firstly, limited wars will be fought for limited objectives in limited time and space, in 
order to accomplish wider political goals. Annibilation of the enemy is not the objective 
any more. Thus, secondly, victory will be determined more by diplomatic negotiations 
and pohtical compromises than by the degree of destruction caused by the military 
attack. Thirdly, surprise attack, or gaining the initiative by striking first, will lead to a 
quick resolution in China's favour. Lastly, with rapid advancement in science and 
35 For the process of seeking how to change military doctrine without undermining Mao's theory, see 
Ellis Joffe, ""People's War under Modern Conditions": A Doctrine for Modem War", Cliina 
Quarterly 112,1987, pp. 555-571. 
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technology, any local/limited war would be fought with highly destructive and lethal 
conventional weapons; using nuclear weapons is less likely than in the past. " This means 
that the assumption that China will necessarily fight against a superior state. such as the 
Soviet Union and/or the United States, is a thing of the past. In a limited/local war, the 
enemy would not necessarily be stronger than China. Thus, 'wmning victon, over 
superiority through inferiority' is no longer a prerequisite. 
In short, an offensive rather than defensive stance has been observed since ancient 
times. To attack the enemy whenever there is a chance of victory has been recommended 
since the time of Sun Tzu. Although Mao's People's War (1uring the enemy in deep') 
gives an impression that his strategic thinking was defensive in nature, this is a reflection 
of China's military weakness in terms of weapons and technology. Nonetheless, China's 
actual behaviour was rather offensive, as seen in the cases of the Korean War and the 
border war with India. AH of these were fought beyond China's border. Departure from 
'luring the enemy in deep' was accelerated as China's economy, In the coastal regions In 
particular, developed. This necessitated China's strategy to shift to 'meeting the enemy 
at the gate'. In addition, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) based on the advance of 
science and technology also gives China an incentive to strike first. Judging from these 
elements, China's strategic culture has been, and is likely to be, offensive in nature. 
China's bellicosity was accentuated by ideology, during the Maoist era in 
particular. For Mao, class struggle was the key to completing the revolution, and chaos 
provided people with the way to resolve problems that Chinese society faced. These 
factors explain why China had a series of domestic political campaigns such as the 'three 
36 Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A ChinL, ' Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, 
Perspectiveý', China Quarterly 146,1996, pp. 447-448. See also Paul H. B. GodwIn, "Chinese M'litarv 
Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 519,1992, p. 194. 
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antis' in 195 1, the 'five antis' of 1952,37 the Hundred Flo-wers in 1956. the Great Leap 
Forward of 1956-58 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. Externally. the stress was 
on anti-imperialism, particularly before Beijing broke with Moscow in the early 1960s. 
Before the split, the most famous example on anti-imperialism rhetoric was Mao's 
statement that "the east wind is prevailing against the west wind" when the Soviet Union 
launched Sputnik in October 1957. As relations with Moscow deteriorated. caused 
mainly by Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin, and of China's Great Leap Forward, Chinese 
leaders started to condemn the USSR as 'revisionist'. This condemnation escalated to an 
accusation of 'social imperialism' after the Brezhnev doctrine" was launched in 1968, 
and to the border clash with the Soviets in 1969. However, the importance of ideology 
was superseded by imminent military threat, as evidenced by the characterisation of 
Moscow as a primary enemy and subsequent rapprochement with Washington. 
The ideological flavour in Beijing's world-view and foreign relations has 
diminished in the post-Mao era. This is mainly due to leadership change, China's own 
economic development and a better security environment. Deng adopted less ideological 
and more pragmatic measures in building socialism in China, by pursuing 'four 
modernisations', based on an open-door policy, of which the prerequisites are domestic 
stability and low profile international behaviour. As a result, the number of domestic 
political campaigns dropped dramatically while Beijing made efforts to reinforce andor 
to establish stable foreign relations with its neighbours in particular. Jiang Zemin has 
fol. lowed Deng's policy, which prioritised economic development. 
37 'Three antis' means anti-corruption, anti-waist and anti-bureaucracy. 'Five antis' 
i 
to be tackled were 
bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and theft of state economic secrets. 
38 The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to suppress the democratic moveincnt in 
the latter. After this invasion, the Soviets enunciated what is known as the 'Brezhne,,, doctrine' whicli 
refers to the socialist states' right to interfere in other socialist countries' internal affairs which N%, LTe 
Perceived as a danger for the socialist community, thereby restricting state sovereignty. 
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China's remarkable economic success also contributed to reducing its ideological 
vehemence. First of all, attracting foreign direct investment and boosting its exports 
forced the Beijing government to accept the standards and practices of liberal democratic 
countries and to adjust China's economic and legal systems accordingly. As a result. the 
Chinese government established a fiction named 'socialist market economy'. In addition, 
the improvement of living standards began to change citiZens' value systems. That iLs, 
people became more interested in money-making than ideology. 
One of the most important factors that caused ideological decline was the collapse 
of communism worldwide. Democratic movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union also had a spill-over effect on China, which led to the Tiananmen Square massacre 
in June 1989. The goverrument's strengthening of ideological education after the June 4 
massacre demonstrated that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought no longer held 
credibility among ordinary people. Since the ideology is directly connected xvith the 
CCP's legitimacy and survival, the latter cannot afford to let the ideology diminish too 
. r___ far, whatever the reality may be. At the same time, the Chinese leaders know that simply 
trying to resume Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought wiH not work. Under the 
conditions that there are no other ideological alternatives for the CCP to stay m power, 
the post-Tiananmen Communist regime has increasingly depended on nationalism. The 
Beijing government occasionaRy attempts to indoctrinate its citizens, stating that foreign 
imperialism (currently peaceful evolution) and domestic reactionaries (political dissidents 
who conspire with foreign imperialists) are going to undermine Chinese unity and 
overthrow the CCP regime. Accordingly, this period also witnessed the revival of the 
nineteenth century concept of absolute sovereignty. In this sense, the combination of 
anti-imperialism and reinforcement of nationalism has re-emerged to shape the Beijing 
government's foreign policy. 
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With the end of the Cold War, Beijing's leaders came to perceive that the United 
States' position as the sole remaining superpower is a source of threat, not only for 
China but also for international society, and that the international system had been 
shifting from bipolarity to multipolarity. " Although Beijing recognises that great powers 
should be paid due respect by others, it has never failed to accuse the US of exercising 
hegemonism., based on Washington's allegedly anachronistic Cold War mentality which 
refers to the enlargement of the NATO military bloc and the strengthening of bilateral 
military alliances (such as the US-Japan treaty). The Chinese leaders Nvam that 
"Hegemonism and power politics remain the main source of threats", 40 while arguing that 
international peace and security should be achieved by respecting the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence .4' At the same time, Beijing is attached to the "sense of a patron- 
ý 42 client hierarch)ý . That 
is, the government emphasises, the importance of bilateral 
relations, vis-a-vis its smaller neighbours in the region in particular, "where its hand is 
stronger and leverage greater than when dealing with several at once", 43 while basically 
opposing multilateral talks for the resolution of the disputes. In short, China demands 
equality against the stronger states while exercising power politics towards the weaker 
states. Since the attachment to sovereignty and bilateralism and the hierarchical view of 
the world based on distribution of power are core elements for realist thinking, this 
evidence reinforces the assessment that Beijing's world-view is realpolitik-orlented. 
39 Wayne Bert, "Chinese Policies and U. S. Interests in Southeast Asia", Asian Suney 33(3), 1993, 
p. 319. See also "China's National Defense7% L The International Security Situation. 
40 Ibid. 
4, The Five Principles are 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial mitegrity, 
2) nonaggression, 3) 
noninterference in each other's internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 
5) peaceftil co- 
existence. 
42 Nfichael Studeman, "Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers 
of "Expansionism ..... Naval War College Review 51(2), 1998, p. 84. 
43 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to examine which factors, domestic or mternational. are 
more influential in shaping China's international behaviour. Liberals argue that 
understanding a state's behaviour inevitably requires examination of domestic factors. 
The Chinese case showed that the undemocratic CCP regime was not the most beflicose, 
though it has ranked second in bellicosity after the United States. Beijing's 
aggressiveness, particularly in territory- and sovereignty-related disputes, was 
concentrated in the first decade after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. 
Since newly-established countries are generally quite sensitive over issues of territorial 
control, the mainland's aggressiveness particularly in this period can be considered as 
being related more to the problems of a new-born state than to the totalitarian nature of 
the CCP regime. 
The nature of Communist China has also changed over time. Mao's totalitarianism 
shifted to Deng's and Rangs authoritarianism. Mao was much more aggressiVe than 
Deng and Jiang, and dominated the party. This means that Mao's personality and 
ideology were strongly reflected in foreign policy-making. Deng preferred collective 
leadership and was skilful in coordinating various opinions. Although holding ultimate 
authority, he could not dominate the party, particularly in the economic sphere. Jiang 
shows a tendency to turn the clock back towards the Mao era. Decision-making under 
Jiang has become more personalised, and he is reported to control almost all state 
organs. However, he has not initiated any devastating political campaigns., as Mao did. 
Although Beijing's strategic thinking has shifted to a more explicitly offensive one - from 
'luring the enemy in deep' to 'meeting the enemy at the gate" - aggressiveness in its 
actual behaviour has been toned down. This indicates that China's international 
behaviour is more related to the decision-making mechanism than the non-democratic 
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nature of its regime itself. In this regard, liberals' assumption that there is a positive 
correlation between a particular type of regime and international behaviour cannot be 
fully supported. 
What was more important for China's foreign policy-making is that the security 
environment was not favourable to China during most of the Maoist era. Rapprochement 
with Washington in the early 1970s greatly contributed to Beijing's improved secunty 
environment, by removing the security threat from Indochina and forming a united front 
against the Soviet Union. It also allowed the mainland to gain access to intemational Cý 
economic organisations, and developed countries' markets, funds and technologies. 
Although the arrest of the 'gang of four' also helped pave the way for Deng's 'open 
door' policy, without these international conditions China could not have opened the 
door to build its economy which, in turn, led to a change in the nature of the CCP 
regime. This point clearly demonstrates that political relations largely determine 
economic relations, and that international political relations were largely determined by 
the geopolitical setting. In this sense, international factors are more influential on China's 
international behaviour than various domestic factors. 
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China's Attitude Towards the South China Sea Disputes 
Introduction 
The PRC had territorial disputes with ahnost all its neighbours at the time of its 
establishment in 1949. Some were resolved, but others remain unsolved. As was 
examined in the previous chapter, past evidence shows that Beijing has tended to resort 
to military action to deal with territorial disputes. However, China's policies towards 
overlapping territorial claims can be roughly divided into three patterns. The first, and 
traditional, pattern is to use force or to threaten use of force; the border wars with India 
in 1962 and the Soviet Union in 1969 fall into this category. China also resorted to force 
against South Vietnam over the Paracels in 1974. Regarding Taiwan, the PRC not only 0 
bombed the KMT-occupied islands, such as Kinmen and Matsu, during the 1950s, but 
also tried to affect the outcome of Taiwan's presidential election in 1996 by conducting 
missile exercises near the island, and in 2000 by issuing a white paper stating that 
Taiwan's indefinite prolongation of reunification talk would cause a war. and by 
displaying military power. ' The second pattern is to resolve border disputes through 
negotiation. This pattern can be observed particularly M the 1990s, for example in the 
case of the land borders shared with Russia, the Central Asian states that had won 
2 independence from the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam. The third pattern, seen in the 
case of the South China Sea, is 'creeping' expansion, by occupying new reefs and shoals 
and/or reinforcing the already existing structures while avoiding any military clash. 
A few weeks before the Taiwanese Presidential election, China showed its will by letting a 7600-tonne 
Sovremenny-class destroyer, equipped with SSN-22 anti-ship mIssiles, sail through the Taiwan Strait 
on its way from Russia to a Chinese naval base. This was the first of the two that Beijing ordered to 
Moscow in 1997. See "Chinese Purchase of Russian Warship Not a Significant Threat: US", Agence 
France Presse, II February 2000, available at http: //taiwansecurity. org/AFP/AFP-021 I 00-Warship. 
htm; and "China's Destroyers Worry Taiwan", Associated Press, 9 February 2000, m'ailable at 
http: //taiwansecurity. org/AP/AP-020900-Destroyers. htm. 
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This chapter aims to identify the extent to which the preNrious, chapter's conclusion 
can be applied to China's attitude towards the South China Sea disputes. In other words. 
can the CCP government's aggressiveness, based on its realpolitik orientation, be largely 
attributed to the problems of a newly established state until the late-1950s and a 
changing international security environment thereafter'? Answering this question requires 
examination of a wide range of factors because the South China Sea disputes are 
multifaceted. They involve not only claimant states but also outside powers such as the 
United States and Japan. They also contain not only the sovereignty issue, but also 
economic, political, military and legal aspects. Thus, the first section examines the nature 
of the disputes and the significance of the South China Sea. This IS f6flowed by a brief 
history of the disputes. After investigating China's possible motivations in expanding far 
beyond its coast, the future prospects for the disputes will be outlined. 
1. Background 
1) Geography3 
The disputed waters called the South China Sea are encircled by Taiwan, the 
mainland China's southem coast, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines (Mapl). 
Among these claimants, the PRC, Taiwan and Vietnam lay claim to the entire area. 
Mainland China has reiterated its official line, since just before the San Francisco Peace 
Conference in September 195 1, that 
China concluded border treaties with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tapkistan in 1996, and with 
Vietnam for the land border in 1999. 
This section depends on Chi-Kin Lo, China's Policy Tolvards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the 
South China Sea Islands (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 10- 11; Marwyn S. Samuels. 
Contestfor the South China Sea (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 3; Esmond D. Smith, Jr., "China's 
Aspirations in the Spratly Islands", Contemporary Southeast Asia 16(3), 1994, p. 276; and Henn- J. 
Kenny, "The South China Sea: The Dangerous Ground", Naval War College Review 49(3), 1996, 
P. 99. 
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... just like all the Nan Sha Islands (Spratlys), Chung Sha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and Tung Sha Islands (Pratas), Si Sha Islands and Nan Wei Island have 
always been China's territory. 4 
However, 
The Pratas are currently under the control of the Taiwanese (Republic of 
China, ROC) government. The dispute over them may be understood as part of 
the unresolved struggle between the two rival Chinese governments for control 
over the entirety of China. Macclesfield Bank, however, is permanently 
submerged and the question of exercising control over it is not a practical 5 matter. 
For this reason, the scope of this discussion is limited to the Paracels and Spratlys. 
The Paracel archipelago is composed of fifteen islands and about twelve reefs and 
shoals. It is located between latitude 16' and 17'N, less than 150 nautical miles from the 
southeast of China's Hainan Island and about 240 nautical miles from Da Nang in 
Vietnam. It can be divided into two groups, namely the Amphitrite Group (northern part) 
and the Crescent Group (southern part). The most important island is Woody Island 
(belonging to the Amphitrite group) which is 2 kilometres long and I kilometre wide 
(Map 2). 
The Spratly archipelago is composed of more than 100 islets, reefs, shoals and 
sand banks, stretching more than 1000 kilometres from southeast to northwest, and 
covering an area of about 180,000 square kilometres. Many of the features are 
submerged at high tide. It is located between latitude 4' to I 1'30'N and longitude 
109'30'E. By nearest point measures, it is 650 kilometres from Cam Ranh Bay In 
Vietnam, 750 kilometres south of the Paracels, 1000 kilometres from China's Hainan 
Islands to the northern-most of the Spratlys, 250 kilometres from the Sabah coast, 160 
Supplement to People's China, I September 1951, pp. 1-6, cited in Lo, China's Polic. v To"W'ds 
Territorial Disputes, p. 28. 
Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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kilometres from Malaysia's Sarawak coast and 100 kilometres from the PhihppMes* 
Palawan Island (Map 3). 
2) Significance of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea is a focus of various kinds of interest not only for the 
claimants but also for outside powers such as the United States and Japan. Those 
interests involve not only political (sovereignty) but also economic, strategic and legal 
dimensions. 
Regarding economic interest, the South China Sea is characterised as nch M 
resources, both living and non-living. It has been a rich fishing ground, and the littoral 
counties in particular have benefited from it, partly because fish is traditionally a major 
component of the diet, and partly because fishery is an important industry for some of the 
regional countries. 
The South China Sea was also believed to contain large oil and natural gas 
reserves. This belief can be dated back to 1968-1970, "when an extensive undersea 
seismic survey was conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations Committee 
for the Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting in Asian Off-shore Areas". ' In addition, by the 
mid-1970s, offihore oil drilling became technologically available and economically 
feasible. ' However, it is difficult to judge correctly how large those reserves really are: 
estimates vary widely. For example, a Chinese survey, conducted by the Nlinistry of 
Geology and Mineral Resources and reported in May 1989, estimated about 17.7 billion 
tons of oil and natural gas deposits, ranking the South China Sea fourth in the world and 
8 
surpassing Kuwait (estimated reserves of 13 billion tons). Another, more specific surve,, 
6 Smith, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands", p. 278. 
Ibid. 
Nfichael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection", 
Survival 37(2), 1995, p. 44. 
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of the Spratly Islands by China, announced in December 1989. reported that -The sea 
floor contained 25 billion cubic metres of natural gas. 370.000 tons of phosphorous and 
105 billion barrels of oil 19 and "the James Shoal area contained another lar-cre deposit 
basin with an estimated 91 billion barrels of oil". ' In addition, a Russian study in 1995. 
conducted by the Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries, estimated that 
"the Spratly area could contain up to six bn [billion] barrels of oil equivalent, of which 
70% could be natural gas'9.10 While there are criticisms that these estimations are 
optirnistic, 11 the Occidental Corporation's drilling off northwest Palawan in about 1,280 
metres, of water in December 1994 implies the existence of the reserves of oil large 
enough to "justify the expense of deep-water drilling, perhaps 100-150m barrels at a 
-) 12 lifting cost of $10 per barrel'. China's past experience proved, however, that the South 
China Sea was not as promising as had been expected, because only 39 weRs out of 120 
wells drilled between 1980 and 1984 revealed oil and gas. 13 
Strategic interests are largely a matter of maintaining sea lanes of communication 
(SLOC), for both commercial and naval vessels. Since more than 50 percent of the 
ASEAN states' trade is conducted with East Asian economies, assurance of free 
navigation through regional waters is critically important not only for economic welfare 
but also survival. Even more importantly, the South China Sea is located on the route 
the Indian Ocean and North East Asia. More than 80 percent of the oil that Japan 
imports from the Nfiddle East is transported across this sea. As China's economy 
9 China Daily, 24 December 1989, cited in John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China 
Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests", China Quarterly 13 2,1992, p. 10 15. 
'0 Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", Adelphi Paper 298,1995, p. 10. 
11 Ibid.; and F. F. Durkee, 'Oily Claims', Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March 1995, p. 4. 
12 Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", p. 11 - 
Maindouh G. Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict", Surt-ival 37(4). 1995 
96. 
p. 134. In the South China Sea, the area around Po Hai Gulf in China is considered to 
bc inost 
promising. See Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), Chapter 3. 
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develops, its dependence on imported oil, particularly from the Nfiddle East. has been 
increasing. Thus, Japan and China are expected to compete, In the future. not only over 
Nfiddle East oil itself but also to secure the trading route running through the South 
China Sea. 
The sea is also strategically important for the US Navy, which needs free access to 
conduct its operations and exercises. The South China Sea may have added value m the 
light of United States pursuing the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in Asia, since 
it is expected to be sea-based. In order for the system to be effective, ships (both surface 
and submarines) that launch anti-ballistic missiles need to be close to the missile sites. So. 
free navigation for the US Navy in the South China Sea, particularly in the area near the 
mainland's south coast, where some of China's missile sites are located, is increasingly 
crucial not only to complete the system but also to defend Taiwan. This means that the 
US needs to maxfi-nise the area of free navigation by minimising waters subject to coastal 
states' sovereign rights. This is why Washington resisted Beijing's demand for an 
apology over the row caused by the US EP-3: the US position was that the incident 
occurred over international waters., rather than within China's 12-mile territorial limit. An 
apology might have been taken to mean that the United States accepted China's 
sovereignty claim over the entire South China Sea. 
14 
Conversely, the South China Sea is increasingly important for Beijing's strategic 
thinking. If confrontation between China and Taiwan were to have a spiHover effect (by 
interfering with or threatening SLOCs, for example) to the South China Sea, the Chinese 
would have to take into consideration the possibilitY Of US involvement. It has been 
pointed out that China's behaviour in the South China Sea may be aimed - at least in 
14 "Tokyo Walks Tightrope as Elderly Chinese 'Await' War", . 4sia 
Times, 10 April 2001, aN'ailable at 
http: //www. atiines. com/japan-econ/CDIODhO2. html. 
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part - at establishing a foothold in order for the blockade of Taiwan to be more 
effective" in the case of military confrontation across the Strait. 
SLOC security could be threatened in several ways: 1) accidents; " 2) low level 
threats such as piracy and terrorism; 17 3) regional military conflict. particularly that 
involving China over the Spratlys, Taiwan and oil exploration in the South China Sea. " 
and 4) the littoral states' 'creeping jurisdiction'. '9 The possibility of a large-scale military 
clash between the ASEAN states is considered to be low (although small scale militarý 
skirmishes could occur), because ASEAN has an established norm of peaceful resolution 
through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ASEAN Declaration on the South 
China Sea. The degree of uncertainty rises when China is involved, however. Although in 
1995 the Chinese government made clear its will to guarantee free navigation in the 
South China Sea, 'O doubt was cast on the credibility of this guarantee by its missfle 
exercises off Taiwanese ports during the Taiwanese presidential campaign in 1996, and 
the US spy plane incident in April 2001. These cases imply that China could attempt to 
restrict freedom of international navigation for security reasons. 
Another important factor, particularly for military vessels and aircraft, is exercise 
of the so-called 'creeping jurisdiction' by the coastal states which attempt to restrict 
JR Nyquist, "Chinese Premier Calls for Nuclear War Preparations", Newmax Com, 23 March 1999, 
available at http: //www. frecrepublic. com/forum/a-16f8cf4bOb46. htm. 
16 Stanley B. Weeks, "Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access", University of 
California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 33,1998, available at 
http: //www-igcc. ucsd. edu/. 
" Ibid.; and Seo-Hang Lee, "Security of SLOCs in East Asia", University of California, Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 33,1998, available at http: //www-lgcc. ucsd. edu/. 
Mark J. Valencia, "Asia, Law of the Sea and International Relations", International Affairs 73(2). 
1997, P. 274 
19 Weeks, "Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access". See also Lee, "Securit", of 
SLOCs in East Asia7; and Valencia, "Asia, Law of the Sea and International Relations", p-275. 
20 "While safeguarding its sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and its maritline rights and 
interests, China will fulfil its duty of guaranteeing freedom of navigation for foreign ships and wr 
routes through and over the intemational passage of the South China Sea according to international 
law. " PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing Rei, iew 8-14 May 1995, p. 22. 
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freedom of navigation for security reasons. For example, a number of Asian coastal 
states have created miJitary warning zones, and/or require other parties to secure 
permission before entering partiCUlar WaterS, 2 ' although foreign military vessels and 
aircraft are allowed innocent passage in and over the coastal states' 12-mile territonal 
seas by the UNCLOS. Thus, the easiest way to maintain SLOC security is to secure the 
maximum area of high seas, thereby preventing any coastal state from exercising 
unilateral sovereignty. 
Since the disputed area (the Spratlys) is well-known as 'dangerous ground', vessels 
usuafly use a route near the Vietnamese coast, far west of the Spratlys. In this regard, the 
political impact of Spratly disputes on SLOC security appears insignificant. However, the 
Spratly islands are considered to offer strategic importance "as bases for sea-lane 
defence, interdiction and surveillance". 22 In the past, Japan used Itu Aba, the biggest 
island in the Spratlys, as a base in the invasion of British, French and Dutch colonies in 
Southeast Asia and to fight against US forces during World War Two. More recently, on 
3 February 1988, the PRC began construction of an observation station on Fiery Cross 
Reef in. the Spratlys, which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) had asked China to build in March 1987. Although this was not 
built for military purposes, it definitely provided China with not only a justifiable reason 
to start a pertnanent presence in the Spratlys, but also an opportunity to boost its claim 
in the South China Sea. If the Spratly islands have strategic significance to defend and, or 
"Burma, India and Vietnam still have military warning zones 24 nm [nautical Mlles] wide, while 
Cambodia and Indonesia have declared such zones 12 nm wide. North Korea has a i. 11tary warning 
zone of some 50nm off both of its coasts. Alien warship and military aircraft are prohibited froin 
these waters; M the Vietnamese zone, other vessels also must secure pemission to pass through thL-,, (: 
waters. China also disputes the right of innocent passage through its 12 nm territorial sea and att(T 
June 1997 will require permission to be sought for foreign warships to enter Hong Kong watLTs". See 
Valencia, "Asia, the Law of the Sea and Intcmational Relations", pp. 275-276. 
22 [bid., p. 269. 
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threaten SLOC in the South China Sea, the course of the Spratly disputes could mfluence 
SLOC security. 
Resolving the South China Sea disputes through legal measures seems to be almost 
impossible for a number of reasons. First of all, no claimants want to submit cases to the 
International Court of Justice. Even if one or more claimants attempt this, resolution is 
still not feasible because China asserts its sovereignty over the South China Sea as 
indisputable. Second, no claimant is able to make a persuasive case for a stronger claim 
than the others, because some of the claimants assert their sovereignty based on 
'historical use', which is difficult to prove. This is why the claimants do not want to 
depend on legal measures. Finally, and most importantly, resolution of territorial disputes 
requires political agreements among the parties concerned, and is not simply a matter for 
the judgement of a neutral party. For this reason, the discussion below will not focus on 
details of the legal aspect. " 
2. Brief history 
According to the claims propounded by the PRC and Vietnam, each claims to have 
traditionally owned the South China Sea. Although both states have well-documented 
records (though, of the two, China's are much better-documented), it is difficult to 
determine who had exercised sovereignty, in terms of effective control in particular. 
Besides, it is uncertain to what extent they could exercise their sovereignty under the 
For the discussion about the South China Sea disputes firom the legal pomt of view, see Hungdai 
Chiu 
and Choon-Ho Park, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands", Ocean Dei, elopment and 
International Law Journal 3(l), 1975, pp. 1-28; Choon-Ho Park, "The South China Sea Disputes: 
Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources? ", Ocean Deielopment and International 
Law 
Journal 5(l), 1978, pp. 27-59; Barry Buzan, "A Sea of Trouble?: Sources of Dispute in the 
Ncw Ocean 
Regime", Adel , 
44 ipelago Disputc: Is the phi Paper 143,1978; Gerardo M. C. Valero Spratly Archi I 
Question of Sovereignty Still Relevant? ", Marine Policy 18(4), 1994; and XaVier 
Furtado, 
" International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOST', 
Contemporar. ý 
Southeast Asia 21(3), 1999, pp. 3 86-404. 
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circumstances that China's sovereignty on the mainland itself was, at risk during the 
6 century of humiliation' and that Vietnam was colonised by France from the late 
nineteenth century until 1954. 
An even more important point regarding China's claim, made by Samuels. is that 
the evidence suggests that China's sovereignty claim in the South China Sea was limited 
to the Paracels, until the end of the 193 OS. 
24 A Cantonese merchant, named Ho Jul-nien. 
submitted an application form to Kuangtung Provincial Bureau of Mines in 1921 in order 
to get permission for mining of phosphate and fishing in the Paracels area. He was given 
pennission, but it was cancelled several years later, partly due to conflicting jurisdiction 
at local government level and partly due to the suspicion that Ho's company was 
Japanese-affiliated. Nevertheless, this case brought the political and economic 
importance of the Paracels, for China to the attention of the Nationalist government. 
Subsequently, in May 1928, a government commission sponsored a scientific and naval 
expedition to the Paracels. After this expedition, a report (Tiao-ch'a Hsi-sha ch'ýn-tao 
pao-kao shu [Report on the Investigation of the Paracels Archipelago]) was submitted 
wbich claimed: 
The Paracel archipelago is our nation's southernmost territory. However, our 
people have paid it little attention, and the natural resources of the area have 
been coveted by foreigners. For several decades now the Japanese have 
monopolized the trade of the area. However, our government recently realized 
that our nation's sovereignty over the area could not be allowed to decline and 
that the resources and industrial potential could no longer be ignored. Thus, 
preparations for this official investigation were initiated. 
" 
Since this was an official report, it revealed that the Chinese goverment 
did not 
recognise the Spratlys as its territory at this time. China's sovereignty over the 
Spratlys 
was not supported internationally either. The evidence is that the Ho Jui-nien case 
led the 
24 The subsequent sentences depend on Sainuels, Contestfor the South China Sea, pp. 
55-60. 
25 Shen Feng-fei, Fiao-ch'a Hsi-sha ch'iin-taopao-kaO Shu, p. 5, cited in bid., p. 
57. (einphasis added. ) 
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Japanese and the French (who colonised Vietnam in 1884) to discuss the status of the 
Spratlys in 1927. At the beginning of the discussion, the Japanese goverment suggested 
to the French that only the Spratlys should be discussed because the status of the 
Paracels should be discussed between Japan and China. This 1MPhes, that Japan 
recognised Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels, and French soverelgntý- over the 
Spratlys. However, France announced its claim over the Paracels in December I 9, ý, 1.21 
This created tension between France and China. The latter argued that the 1887 Sino- 
French Convention made it clear that the Paracels belonged to China. The exchange of 
protests between them continued until April 1939, when Japan declared "the 
incorporation of Shinnan Gunto [New South Islands] and placed it under the 
administration of Taiwan [then under Japanese rule]" . 
27 
During World War Two, Generallissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued the Cairo 
Declaration of 27 November 1943, with American President F. D. Roosevelt and British 
Prime Nfinister Winston Churchill, which made clear that the Allied Powers would 
confiscate from Japan "all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or occupied since 
the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan had 
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China". " The Paracels, and the Spratlys were not identified in 
this declaration as territories that should be returned to the ROC. Subsequently, with the 
Japanese defeat in 1945, the Supreme Alhed Commander ordered aU Japanese forces 
north of 16'N latitude to surrender to the Chinese. This order did not include the 
21 Ibid., p. 61. 
Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys! (Singapore: Dolphin Books, 1995), pp. 39-40 (Emphasis in original). In 
December 1939, France protested against the Japanese occupation of Itu Aba, claiming that it was a 
French territory. See ibid., p. 39, note 156. 
28 Declaration of the Conference of President F. D. Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chmag Kai-shek and Prime 
Minister W. Churchill in North Africa, US Department of State Bulletin, ",, ol. LX. No. 212,4 
December 1943, cited in Valero, "Spratly Archipelago Dispute", p. 331 
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Spratlys. However, Nationalist China ordered the Japanese forces in the Spratlys as weN I 
as those in Paracels to surrender to them . 
29Behind this can be obsen,, ed China*s attempt 
to assert its sovereignty over the Spratlys. Although China reiterates that not only the 
Paracels, but also the Spratlys have always been Chinese territory since ancient times. 
China's sovereignty claim, be it by the Nationalists or Communists, appears to haN-e 
emerged suddenly around the end of World War Two. 
The contest over sovereignty in the South China Sea resumed immediately after the 
end of World War Two. France returned to Vietnam and resumed naval activities in the 
Spratly area. At the same time, France and Nationalist China began discussions over the 
status of the islands in late 1945. While finding no solution between them, the Philippines 
joined in this contest. Japan's attack on British and Dutch colonies and the Philippines 
from the Spratlys during the war made the Philippines conclude that it needed to 
incorporate the Spratlys for national defence reasons. 'O 
The issue of sovereignty is basically a political one, and, thus, a political solution 
was needed, especially under the circumstances that no claimant could justify its claim 
legally. However, the disputes seem to have missed the best chance for a political and 
legal solution when the Peace Treaty with Japan of 8 September 1951 failed to mention 
who should assume Japan's 'sovereignty' over the South China Sea, despite the efforts 
of the People's Republic of China, and Vietnam (still a French colony) to persuade the 
San Francisco Peace Conference to confirm their sovereignty. For example, Vietnam's 
Prime Nfinister, Tran Van Huu, stated that Vietnam had sovereignty over the Paracels 
and Spratlys, at the seventh Plenary Session of the peace talks on 7 September 195 1. 
" 
The People's Republic of China made its first official statement about its sovereign claim 
29 Lu, Flashpoint Spratlys. 11 p. 26. 
Ibid., p. 50. 
" Ibid., p. 41. 
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over the South China Sea in August 195 1, in response to the Draft Treaty of Peace with 
Japan. The United States and Britain had prepared the Draft, which did not mention 
which country should assume sovereignty over the South China Sea from Japan. 
Subsequently, Beijing not only asserted its sovereignty but also persuaded the Soviet 
Union to submit an amendment to the Draft Treaty on its behalf, because neither the 
PRC nor the Republic of China was invited, due to the disagreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union about which Chinese government should be present at the 
Conference. The amendment fully confirmed the PRC's sovereignty over Chung Sha 
(Macclesfield Bank), Tung Sha Islands (Pratas), Si Sha (Paracel) Islands and Nan Sha 
(Spratly) Islands. However, this amendment was rejected, mainly because of an objection 
from the United States, the dominant state in the Conference, and partly because of the 
Soviet Union 9s confusion about geographical recognition in the South China Sea. " On 8 
September 195 1, the peace treaty was finally signed. Article 2, which referred to Japan's 
renunciation of rights Over the South China Sea, provided that "Japan renounces aU 
rights, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands". 
" The problem of 
which state(s) should assume sovereignty was left unresolved. 
Due to the absence of the ROC government from the San Francisco Conference, 
Japan started negotiating with the ROC to conclude a bilateral peace treaty. Article 2 of 
the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, signed on 29 April 1952, followed the same pattern as 
Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It recognised: 
32 The amendment proposed that "Japan recognises full sovereignty over the 
Chinese People's Republic 
over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the 
Pen(g)hitletao 
Island (the Pescadores), the Tun(g)shatsuntao (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the Islands of 
Sishatsuntao and Chun (g) shatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of the Amphitrites, and 
the stoal 
of Maxfield (sic)), and Nanshatsuntao including the Spratly, and renounces all right, title and claim 
to the territories named herein". See Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the 
Peace Treaty 
with Japan, Record of Proceedings, Washington, D. C., Department of State, 
195 1, p. 119, cited in Lo, 
China's Policy Toi4vrds Tertitorial Disputes, p. 28. 
" United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 136, p. 48, cited in Lu, Flashpoint Spratlys-1, p. 
29. 
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... that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8,195 1. Japan 
has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and P*eng-hu (Pescadores) as well as the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. 34 
This was a product of Japan's ambivalent policy towards the treaty durm-i4 the 
negotiation with Taipei. On the one hand Japan insisted on naming all the territones that 
should belong to the ROC, but on the other hand Japan also Insisted on folloxvIng the 
San Francisco Treaty. As a result, the Sino-Japanese Treaty did not state who should 
assume the sovereignty over the South China Sea. " 
China soon faced a challenge from the Philippines. In May 1956, a Philippme 
citizen named Tomas Cloma, declared discovery and formal possession of 33 features In 
the Spratly area, covering a total area of 64,976 square nautical miles, under the name of 
the Kalayaan (Freedom) JSlandS. 
36 At the same time, he sent a letter to the Philippine 
Vice-President and Foreign Minister, Carlos Garcia, asking for the government's 
support, backing and protection of the Kalayaan, because his private possession of the 
features presumed the Philippines' sovereignty. " 
The ROCý seriously alarmed by Cloma's 'declaration ', despatched a task force to 
the Spratlys. The Philippine government, on the other hand, told Taiwan that the latter 
need not be alarmed, because the official position of the Philippines remained pending. 
Nonetheless, on 19 May 1956, Garcia claimed that some of the Spratly Islands should 
34 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 13 8, p. 3 8, cited in ibid., p. 29. 
" Samuels, Contestfor the South China Sea, p. 80. This position was made clear when Japan recogniscki 
the PRC twenty years later. The Joint Sino-Japanese Communiqu6, signed on 29 September 1972 in 
Beijing, stated that "Taiwan and the Pescadores were to be returned to China". New China Nm, 
Agency, 29 September 1972, p. 6, cited in ibid. Judging from this Communiqu6 and Article 2 of the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, it is implied that Japan came to regard the Paracels and the Spratlys as 
Chinese territories by the early 1970s. 
36LU 
, Flashpoint Spratlys!, pp. 50-5 1. 
37 Ibid., p. 5 1. 
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belong to the Philippines, due to their proximity. The PRC protested a week later that it 
owned the Spratlys. 
Another chaRenge to the PRC emerged in the next month. On I June 1956, the 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) issued a statement that asserted its sovereignty over the 
Spratlys in response to Clorna's declaration. The ROC immediately responded by 
sending an official to the Spratlys. What made the matter more comphcated Nvas that the 
French chargd d'affaires in Manila claimed, on 9 June, that France had not ceded the 
Spratlys to Vietnam. At the same time, France dispatched a naval vessel to the SpratlyS. 
This was against Vietnam's interpretation that "France's granting Vietnam independence 
automatically included a transfer of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands". " 
Saigon sent a naval unit to the Spratlys for the first time in the summer of 1956, and 
annexed the Spratly Islands to its Phyoc Tuy Province. The PRC protested. 
The position of the Philippine government became clear when the Vice-President 
and Foreign Minister finally responded in December 1956 to Cloma's letter stating: 1) 
the goverment's recognition of the Kalayaan Islands, exclusiVe of the Spratly group 
composed of seven islands, as res nufflus, and thus open for Philippine nationals as long 
as no country established sovereignty in accordance with international law or recognised 
by the international society; 2) its view of the seven Spratly Islands as being under the de 
facto trusteeship of the Aflied Powers, and thus open to promoting Philippine nationals 
and any member of the Allied Powers as long as no settlement of the territorial disputes 
over the Spratlys was achieved; and 3) the government's interest in promoting Philippine 
nationals' economic activities and settlement in the uninha ited or unoccupied islands as 
31 Ibid., p. 43. (emphasis in original) The position of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was to 
recognise Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys until the evc of reunification in 
1975. This caused deterioration in the relationship between Vietnam and the PRC. 
196 
Chapter 5: China's Attitude towards the South China Sea Disputes 
long as they were legitimate. '9 Interestingly, this line of argument did not meet ývith any 
public response from the PRC. After those events, the dispute was relati'Vely cah-n until 
the end of the 1960s. The nature of the disputes over the Paracels and the Spratlys until 
then can be summarised as verbal assertion by the PRC and the Philippines and actiN-e 
promotion of its claim by the ROC and the RVN. 
This cahnness was broken in the early 1970s when the Philippines and the RVN 
stepped up support for their claims. The Philippine government made its first official 
claim to the Kalayaan Islands, defined in the December 1956 statement, in June 1971, 
and subsequently incorporated them into its Palawan province in April 1972.40 T eRVN 
contracted an American company to conduct a seismic survey off the eastern and the 
southern coasts of Vietnam in 1969, and made an official announcement in July 1973 that 
it had awarded eight exploration blocks to major Western oil companies such as Shell, 
Exxon and MobiI54 1 negotiation of which began in early 1973. Some of the eight blocks 
fell into the area that the PRC claimed. In addition, South Vietnam not only incorporated 
the Spratlys into Phuoc Tuy Province in September 1973 but also strengthened its 
military activities in the islands from the early 1970s onwards. 
The PRC's protest towards the South Vietnam, made on II January 1974, was 
quite acid. In addition to its basic claim that the Paracels and the Spratlys, had always 
belonged to China, it denounced Saigon's administrative decision in September 1973 as 
4a wanton inffingement of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty' and warned that 
"The Chinese government will never tolerate any infringement on China's territonal 
integrity and sovereignty by the Saigon authorities' 
1.42 The consequence was naval 
'9 Ibid., p. 52. 
40 Ibid., p52 and p. 53. 
41 Samuels, Contestfor the South China Sea, p-99- 
42 Peking Review, 18 January 1974, p. 3- 
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fighting between the PRC and the RVN on 19 January 1974, foHoxNMg skirýhes 
between them from 16 to 18 January. The Vietnamese forces were defeated and had to 
withdraw from the Paracels, allowing the PRC to take over the Vietnamese- o cc upled 
islands in the Crescent Group of the Paracels, adding to its control over the Amphitrite 
Group. Beijing thus established its control over the whole Paracels group. 
The PRC's seizure of the Paracels forced the ROC and the Philippines to rush into 
the Spratlys in order to reinforce their positions. The ROC "reportedly sent t,,, k, o 
destroyers to the Spratlys in the last week of January and deployed two more destroyers 
and two landing ships in the first half of Februaiy'. 43 The Philippines also enhanced its 
presence in the Spratlys, and announced on 5 February 1974 that it had occupied five 
islands. Since then the 'occupation race' among the claimants, South Vietnam and the 
Philippines in particular, accelerated. 
Saigon, worried about China's expansion in the Spratlys, sent its troops to the 
Spratlys and seized six islands immediately after its defeat in the Paracels. At the same 
time, it began diplomatic appeals to the United Nations Security Council and to the 
signatories of the Paris Agreement of 1973, in order to win international support. 
However, these diplomatic efforts did not bear fi7uit, because even its closest ally, the 
United States, had already started collaborating with the PRC to contain North Vietnam 
after the establisbmen of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972. Regarding the 
RVN's activities in the Spratlys, the PRC issued in February 1974 the same line of 
warning as in January 1974. However, "Almost certainly because of the complexity of 
the dispute over the Spratly Islands and the limitations in its military capabilitý,. China's 
warning this time was not translated into action". 44 
43 Lu, Flashpoint Spratlys!, p. 45, footnote 188. 
44 u, China's Policy Tomrds Territorial Disputes, pp. 57-5 8. 
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North Vietnam's position began to change dramaticaBy around this time. as 
became clear when its navy seized the six South Vietnamese- occupied islands. apparently 
out of fear of pre-emption by China, on II April 1975, which was "almost three weeks 
-) 45 before the capture of Saigon'. Subsequently, Vietnam printed a map. including the 
Paracels and the Spratlys in its territories, in its official newspaper in May 1975. Beijing 
did not make any public protest at this time. However, China criticised Vietnarn's 
44. unreasonable attitude" in a memo issued by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to 
Hanoi in September 1975.46 
In addition to the occupation race, oil exploration emerged as an important factor 
during the 1970s. In 1976, the Philippine govertiment signed a contract with a Sxvedish- 
Philippine consortium for oil exploration in the Reed Bank area. The PRC protested, 
claiming sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys and stating that -Any foreign 
country's claim to sovereignty over any of the Nansha, island is illegal and null and 
void" . 
47 Hanoi also took a step towards oil exploration. When Saigon fell, Hanoi at once 
cancelled the oil exploration contracts which the Saigon regime had signed 
in 1973. 
However, it started signing with non-US western oil companies in 1976. 
In sum, the nature of the disputes after the 1974 military clash until the end of the 
1970s can be described as follows: 1) an occupation race emerged among the claimants. 
Vietnam and the Philippines in particular; 2) the Spratlys became the major theatre of the 
contest; 3) the oil factor emerged as an important element in the contest; and 
4) the 
PRC's protests were purely declaratory. However, the last element 
began to change in 
the 1980s, when the PLA Navy's (PLAN's) capability had been enhanced, while other 
Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea", p. 1005 (emphasis in original). 
46 Ibid., p. 1006. 
47 Peking Review, 18 June 1976, p. 4. 
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elements remained the same; this seems to be the very factor that marked a distinction 
between the disputes before the end of the 1970s and those in the 1980s. 
China's 'entry' into the Spratlys started in November 1980 when two H-6 bombers 
conducted Beijing's first air patrol over the Spratlys, and by 1983 "there , N, ere repeated 
PLA-N air patrols in the Spratlys". 48 In April and May 1983. the Oceanographic Bureau 
sent research vessels into the Spratlys waters, covering 'a wide strip of ocean north of 
- 49 the Spratlys from near the Vietnamese coast eastward to just off the Philippine coast' . 
In May of the same year, the PLA Navy undertook an excursion in order to survey James 
Reef, which the PRC regards as 'the southern-most outpost of China's territory 50 (Map 
1). Its purposes were patrolling and training, including familiarising its personnel xvith the 
Spratlys waters. The participants of this mission included naval vessel commanders, 
professionals and chief navigators, school and college instructors, and so forth. " In 
1984, "the South Seas Oceanic Research Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Science 
conducted the first comprehensive survey of the Spratlys, taking the longer route south 
along the west coast of the Philippines and Palawan Trough to James Shoal, before 
turning north to the Spratlys v). 52 This survey seems to have enabled the PLA Navy's first 
large-scale patrol of the Spratlys from 16 May until 6 June 1987. 
China's construction of an observation station on Fiery Cross Reef started on 3 
February 1988. On 31 January 1988, the Vietnamese navy escorted workers and 
construction materials headed for Fiery Cross Reef However, the Chinese intercepted 
the Vietnamese vessels and turned them away. " Meantime, Chinese task forces arrived 
48 Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea", p. 1008. 
49 Ibid. 
'o Ibid. 
5' Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p. 1009. 
" Ibid., p. 1012. 
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at Fiery Cross Reef in the beginning of February. Judging from the information that the 
c4order of battle included Luda-class guided missile destroyers from the South and East 
Sea Fleets", 54 the PRC was prepared for a battle with Vietnam. On 17 Februar. y. 
Vietnamese vessels were discovered by the Chinese in the vicinity of Guarteron Reef. 
which is located between Fiery Cross Reef and Spratly Island. the Vietnamese main base 
in the group. The Vietnamese ships were heading towards Fiery Cross Reef, and were 
followed by a Chinese destroyer. The Sino-Vietnamese confrontation finally led to the 
clash on 14 March 1988 at Johnson Reef, which was 'unoccupied' according to the 
Chinese claim but 'under Vietnamese control' according to the Vietnamese. The Chinese 
were better prepared and had superior forces. After less than half an hour, the battle 
ended in a Chinese victory. On the Vietnamese side, one vessel (freighter) was sunk and 
two (one freighter and one landing ship) badly damaged, with 77 killed or missing. In 
August 1988, Cbina's observation station on Fiery Cross Reef was completed. Durmg 
1988, the PRC occupied further features to six and increased the number of its 
occupations to eight in 1989. 
After the March 1988 military clash, most claimants were even more inclined to 
makefaits accomplis to strengthen their claims, such as allocating concessions to foreign 
oil companies and occupying and/or fortifying the islands and reefs under control. On the 
other hand, there were some movements towards seeking resolution of the disputes 
through informal discussion. For example, Indonesia took the initiative to sponsor a 
workshop to discuss the South China Sea disputes. At the first 1991 workshop meeting 
in Bandung, all claimants agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully and refrain from taking 
unilateral actions so as not to jeopardise the dialogue process . 
55There was also a chan, -, e 
54 Lu, Flashpoint Spratlys!, p. 88. 
55 Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", p. 13. 
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in Beijing's attitude towards the disputes. Chinese Premier Li Peng made clear. during 
his visit to Singapore m* August 1990, that China was ready to enter into jomt (bilateral) 
arrangements for oil exploration while putting aside the matter of sovereignty. Beijing's 
intention appeared to be cooperation and confidence building among the claimants. 
leading to a solution of disputes in the future. 
However, many cases have been observed where there was a discrepancy betNN, een 
the Chinese government's words and deeds. For example, China signed a contract xvith a 
U. S. oil company, Crestone Energy Co., in May 1992 to explore for oil in an area which 
overlaps the Vietnamese claim. This occurred three months after the People's National 
Congress passed the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone on 25 February 1992, which empowered the PLA to use force if 
necessary in order to protect its sovereignty claim and economic interests in the South 
China Sea. In addition, during the Indonesian-sponsored workshop in Jogjakarta in July 
1992, China occupied the Vietnamese-claimed Da Lac Reef This event forced the 
Philippines, the host country of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meetings in July 1992, to 
take the initiative for ASEAN to issue a Declaration on the South China Sea, which 
called for a peaceful solution of the disputes. This declaration, however, failed to win 
wide support from the extra-regional powers such as the United States and China, 
despite their official positions favouring peaceful resolution. The reasons are thought to 
be that the US wanted to stay neutral about the disputes as long as freedom of navigation 
was guaranteed, while Beijing recognised that the declaration was targeted at itself 
These factors, combined with the concern induced by the United States' 
announcement in November 1992 of its withdrawal from the Philippine bases. 
contributed to ASEAN's decisions in 1993 to establish a forum for discussing security 
issues, including the role of extra-regional powers. The ARF met for the first time in Julý 
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1994 in Bangkok. It was agreed that the ARF would be a high-level consultative forum. 
aiming at confidence-building and preventive diplomacy and that ASEAN's Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia should be respected as a code of conduct. 
An acute challenge to ASEAN emerged in February 1995 when the Philippines 
discovered that the Chinese had been constructing what they called 'shelters for 
fishermen' on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. Until this tUne. it was xvidely 
believed that China would act aggressively only towards Vietnam. China's targeting an 
ASEAN member destroyed this illusion. Moreover, Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in 
July 1995 may have deepened ASEAN's concern about its possible direct involvement in 
the confrontation between China, on the one hand, and the Vietnam and or the 
Philippines, on the other. Nonetheless, ASEAN was able to speak with one voice against 
China's behaviour on Mischief Reef at the ASEAN-China SOM in April 1995. ASEAN's 
collective voice led to China's compromise in agreeing to place the South China Sea 
disputes on the formal agenda for future ASEAN-China SOM. 
In July 1995, at ASEAN's Annual Ministerial Meeting in Brunei, the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, claimed that "China would be willing to use international 
law and UNCLOS as a basis for negotiating the issues it would discuss with all seven 
ASEAN members". 56 However, this was proof that China used international law in order 
to justify its claim, rather than as a tool to seek a solution. Evidence can be seen in the 
Chinese government's announcement m May 1996 of baselines for not only the 
mainland's coast but also for the Paracels. Subsequently, in the same month, the 
PRC 
ratified UNCLOS. 57 Not surprisingly, other claimants, Vietnam in Particular, protested. 
" Ibid., p. 23. 
"By this, it was estimated that China would expand the area of the sea under its jurisdiction 
to abotit 
3,000,0001an 2 from the present 370,000 kM2 . As 
far as the baselines drawn for the Paracels wer e 
concerned, they were based on the rights or conventional practice of an archipelagic state, 
thuý, 
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Tension among claimants over the Spratlys was submerged until October 199S 
when the Phihppines discovered that China had been expanding its structures on, % lischief 
Reef Manila not only strongly protested but also tried to intemationalise this case m 
order to attract attention from the international community, therebý- finding a way for a 
resolution, or at least gaining support for the Philippines' case (see belovv). Ho,, vever. 
Manila could not gain enough support even from other ASEAN members, which Nvere 
preoccupied with dealing with the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis which had 
started in July 1997. More importantly this disarray among the ASEAN states was 
essentially a reflection of their different threat perception about China. In addition, 
ASEAN as a whole was reluctant to accuse Beijing, for fear that China might devalue the 
currency, the yuan, in retaliation against ASEAN's coRective voice. The ASEAN 
members were also grateful for China's financial support to the crisis-hit nations. All 
these factors prevented ASEAN from provoking coUectlVely against China's 
reconstruction on Mischief Reef. 
However, this event forced ASEAN to think seriously about having a regional 
code of conduct in the South China Sea, following the bilateral codes of conduct 
established between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines. SMce there are 
still some essential differences to be resolved, the regional code of conduct has not been 
concluded (for details, see Chapter 2). Since the begi-ninin of 2000, the theatre of tension 
shifted from M[ischief Reef to Scarborough Shoal, which is located in the Philippines' 
200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), due to Chinese fishing boats' increasing 
presence and activities, not only in terms of fishing but also of poaching of endan2ered 
species such as turtles and coral. In 2001 the Arroyo goverment not only lodged a 
diplomatic protest with China but also directed the Philippines armed forces to confiscate 
allowIng it to expand the area of waters under its Jurisdiction". See Lee Lal To, China anti the 
South 
I 
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what the Chinese fishermen had caught. These Philippine actions met diplomatic counter- 
protest by Beijing. 
Regarding bilateral relations (between Vietnam and China, and the PhilippMes and 
China), three of them made efforts to improve their relations, at least so as to avoid the 
dispute having a spillover effect on overall relations. In the case of Vietnam, when the 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Vietnam in November 1994, Jiang Zemin and Do 
Muoi, the Vietnam Communist Party chief, agreed to "Put their differences aside and 
focus on improving relations". And in May 1995, Foreign Ministers of the two countries 
"agreed to resolve the disputes through peaceful negotiations; to disavow the use and C) 
threat of force; to refrain from any action that might aggravate the disputes: and to 
prevent the disagreement from affecting the normal development of bilateral relations". " 
Since China's target shifted to the Philippines, their overall relations have been improving 
to the point where Beijing and Hanoi resolved their land border dispute in December 
1999, while demarcation of maritime borders is not in sight. Besides, when Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin visited Vietnam in 2000, they agreed to enhance their military 
cooperation. However, this does not mean that they have no bilateral problems. For 
example, Beijing and Hanoi still compete for influence over Cambodia and Laos. In 
addition, Vietnam's Saigon Giai Phong paper revealed in February 2001, when Defence 
Minister Chi Haotian visited Vietnam, a report from a Vietnamese naval patrol that the 
59 
Chinese had violated Vietnamese maritime territory nearly 300 times during - 
Needless to say, the Chinese side protested against this report by reiterating its officlal 
line that other claimants' activities in China's integrated territory were illegal and iniv, alid. 
China Sea Dialogues (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1999), p. 77. 
" Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", p. 37 and p. 38. 
59 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Regional Rivalries and Bilateral Irritants", CSIS Pacific Forum Comparativc 
Connection: China-ASEAN (Ist quarter 2001), available at http: //www. csis. org/pacfor/cc'OIOIQ 
china--asean. htinl. 
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In the case of the Philippines, Manila accused Beijing of , iolating international law 
and the spirit of the ASEAN Declaration in the Mischief Reef area. After mutual protests 
and heightened tension, the PRC and the Philippines finafly reached an agreement. In 
August 1995, 'on a code of conduct that rejects the use of force to settle their disputes. 
and which will be sent to ASEAN for its consultation") . 
60 China's expansion of structures 
on Nfischief Reef in 1998/99 prompted the Phihppines not only to call the attention of the 
international community to the disputes but also to strengthen ties, military in particular. 
with the United States, while continuing bilateral talks with China. For example, the 
Philippines made clear in November 1998 her intention to call a conference involving all 
claimants. 61 In January 1999, China opposed this, while the United States was reported 
to be willing to host such a meeting. " In February 1999, the Philippines lobbied to 
discuss the Spratly disputes at the ASEM the fbHowing month. This attempt was not 
realised, however, because of vigorous counter-lobbying by China and her threat to 
"walk out of the meeting if Manila insists on discussing the claims". " After this defeat in 
the diplomatic battle over ASEM's agenda, the Philippines then brought this issue to the 
United Nations in March 1999.64 By this time, the Chinese had finished the three-storey 
structures which are "of a size and solidity which seems unusual for the fishing industry, 
" Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", PAT 
61 Sol Jose Vanzi, "RP Proposes Conference of All Spratly Claimants", Newsflash, 15 November 1998, 
available at http: //www. newlflash. org/19881 IAA1001082. htm. 
62 "China Opposes Spratly Meeting", BBC, 13 January 1999, available at http: //news. bbc-co. uk 
hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid 
- 
254000/254600. stm; and Sol Jose Vanzi, "US Backs Conference 
of Spratly Claimants", Newsfiash, 13 January 1999, available at http: //www. newsflash. org/19991 
01/111/hI011103.1itin 
61 Johnna R Villaviray, "ASEM Chair Cool to Spratly Issue", Manila Times, 23 February 1999, 
available at http: //www. manilatimes. net/news/newsO2l999j. html. 
64 "Erap Asks UN to Help Settle Row on Spratlys", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 March 1999, available 
at http: //www. inquirer. net/issues/mar99/marl9/news/mews. -2. 
htm. Under ITLOS (International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea), Manila does not need the consent of Beijing to raise the case. 
China 
Opposed it. See "China Oppose Bringing Reef Issue Before UN Court: Philippines", China Times, 14 
April 1999, available at http: //www. chinatimes. com. tw //english/epolitic/88041402. htiii. 
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and are protected by two Chinese military vessels. a transport ship and a sun-ey craft**. 
although China insists that they are shelters for fishermen. " 
Manila has been enthusiastic about strengthening military ties xvith the United 
States, particularly since the Chinese expansion of structures in Mischief Reef. The 
Estrada government was alarmed by the fact that the Philippines armed forces were 
unable to defend the country's interests without the US defence umbrella. Manila's 
security enviromnent was worsened due to the failure of the Philippine Senate to approve 
renewal of base agreement in 1991 which caused the US withdrawal from the Subic Bay 
in 1992 and subsequent cool relations between the two govermnents, which finally led to 
the US cancellation of annual joint military exercises in 1996. Lack of a solid defence 
relationship with Washington in the face of growing China's pressure in the Spratlys led 
Manila to agree to the renewal of the VFA with Washington in August 1998. Before 
alip roval by the Philippines Senate in May 1999, President Estrada called for its support, I- p 
arguing that the VFA would serve to deter Chinese attacks. 66 
Nonetheless, the Philippines was also making efforts not to let the disputes have 
negative effects on other areas of relations with China. For example, despite the call of 
Congress leaders, including foreign relations committee chairman Luwalhati Antonio, for 
review of the one-China policy in April 1999 and a planned visit by Taiwan President Lee 
Teng-hui for private meetings, the government managed to avoid offending China by 
65 6t Chinese Claim Spratly Island Facilities are Non-Military', BBC, 23 March 1999, available at 
http: //www. freerepublic. com/forum/a36f759c7le8e. htm. 
President Estrada was reported as saying on 2 August 1998 that "joint RP-US military exercises 
resulting from the approval of the Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) could deter Chinese attacks 
stemming from a dispute over the potentially oil- and mineral-rich Spratlys". "China Won't Go to 
War Over Spratlys", Yahoo! News, 6 August 1998, available at http: //dailynews. yahoo. com/headline,,, 
world/asian/story. html? s--. -n/the philippines - star/world/19980805/19980805201. 
However, it needs 
ratification by Senate; the vote was scheduled to be held in nlid- to late-May 1999. Approval of the 
VFA by Senate was not very optimistic, because there were concerns among senators about the 
possible increase in crime and prostitution resulting from US forces' visits. Nor was public opinion 
necessarily supportive, judging from the demonstration by around 2000 Filipinos, protesting the VFA 
on May 1999. "Thousands Protest U. S. -Philippine Military Accord", 
CNN, 5 May 1999, available at 
http: //www. cnn-comiWORLD/asiapcf/9905/05/BC-Pl-ULIPPINES-USA. reut/index. html. 
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barring Lee's visit and by abstaining from a UN resolution which condemns China's 
human rights record. " 
China, on the other hand, reiterated the formal line, asserting that the South China 
Sea has traditionaRy been China's territory and that the disputes should be resolved by 
peaceful means based on bilateral dialogue. China also opposed any movement towards 
internationalisation of the disputes, while continuing construction in the Mischief Reef 
area, ignoring the Philippines' request to remove the structures. In addition, China 
seemed to loose enthusiasm for discussing its own earlier offer of joint use of the 
structures. Moreover, Beijing created new tension with the Philippines by aflowing its 
fishermen to fish near Scarborough Shoal. However, China at least demonstrated its 
serious desire not to damage relations with the ASEAN states unduly, by concluding a 
bilateral code of conduct with Vietnam and the Philippines, and has been discussing a 
regional code of conduct. 
In sum, the claimants in the South China Sea shifted their emphasis from the vague 
claim of historical use to UNCLOS-based territorial and EEZ clainas in the 1990s. While 
ASEAN and China discussed a regional code of conduct, each claimant made efforts to 
strengthen and defend its claim. The latter can be interpreted as each claimant's 
maximising its fait accompli before the establishment of a regional code of conduct, 
which may freeze the status quo. China's overall bilateral relations with Vietnam and the 
Philippines have appeared equable, although the former's unilateral actions created 
tensions with the latter. The Vietnamese side revealed China's infringement on 
Vietnamese maritime territory, while the Philippines faced Chinese expansion on to 
Scarborough Shoal. While all of them tried not to let the disputes have negative spillover 
effects, neither Vietnam nor the Philippines was successful in gettIng more than the 
67 "PhiliPPme Congress Leaders Calls for Review of One-China Polley", AFP, 24 APnl 1999, availablc 
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official line from China: 1) the disputes should be resolved through peacefal consultation 
and dialogue, basically bilaterally; 2) China will use international law. including 
UNCLOS, as a basis for resolving the disputes; 3) each claimant should refrain from 
conducting any unilateral action which might complicate the issue. and 4) claimants 
should focus on cooperation such as joint exploration of maritune resource and trade. 
while shelving the sovereignty issue for the time being. However. a Nvide gap between 
Beijing's words and deeds makes it difficult to judge the PRC's real intention and goals 
in the South China Sea. The next section tries to identify the driving force for Beijing's 
behaviour in the South China Sea. 
3. China's motivations in the South China Sea 
China's naval presence in the South China Sea reached a peak in the early fifteenth 
century during the Ming Dynasty. After this peak, the South China Sea became an open 
sea which witnessed a number of other countries' vessels (particularly Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch, British and French) pursuing commercial and strategic interests. 
Although China allegedly exercised sovereign rights as recently as the 1930s, this was 
limited to the Amphitrite Group of the Paracels, where sovereignty was confirmed by the 
Chinese commission in 1928. Moreover, Nationalist China's Generaflissimo, Chiang Kai- 
shek, agreed at the Cairo Conference in 1943 that the Paracels and Spratlys ývere 
territories over which China was not sure whether it could assume sovereignty. Thus, 
China's claim to the historical use of the entire South China Sea suggests that Beijing 
authority suddenly decided to assert its sovereignty around the end of World War Two. 
Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, China began to make efforts to 
obtain international recognition of its sovereignty over the entire South China 
Sea. 
at http: //www. frecrepublic. com/foruiiVa3722b76b4O4a. htm. 
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However, China's real intention remains unclear because of the folloxvMg three facts. at 
least. First of all, the 1958 Declaration on China's Territorial Sea does not treat the 
South China Sea as China's internal waters. " Second, between May 1959 and December 
1971 a number of warnings against the US were issued "only when U. S. vessels intruded 
into sea areas within the 12-mile limit of the coasts of the islands" [that is, the 
Parace s. 69 And China has never specified the exact extent of its claim: the maps show 
that China's territorial claim line is open-ended. On the other hand, China has never 
hesitated to occupy islands, reefs and shoals and/or strengthen its structures on occupied 
features, whenever possible. 
The gap between the Chinese goverment's words and theory on the one hand, and 
practice on the other, raises a question about the PRC's motivation in the South China 
Sea. There are a number of interpretations: 1) China's motivation is simply irredentist; 'o 
2) China has a stronger claitn; 7 ' 3) economic factors can explain China's behaviour; 72 4) 
geopolitical factors are the driving force; " and 5) a combination of geopolitical 
calculation and the PLA's growing capability is the motivating factor. 74 
China's effective occupation started in the Paracels only after the 1974 battle with 
the Vietnamese and in the Spratlys in the late 1980s. Before those occupations were 
possible, China had no option but to protest verbally due to a number of constraints, 
The Declaration states that: "The Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the 
Nansha Islands ... are separated 
from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas". Quoted 
in Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes, p. 44 (emphasis added by Lo). 
69 Ibid., p. 3 0 and p. 44. 
70 Lu, Flashpoint Spratlys. 1 
71 Chiu and Park, "Legal Status of the Paracels and Spratly Islands". 
72 Bates Gill and Nfichael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Nfilitarý', National Interest 56,1999, p. 60. 
73 Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes; Samuels, Contestfor the South China Sea; and Shee 
Poon Kim, "The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinidng", Contemporary Southeast Asia 
19(4), 1998, pp. 369-387. 
7*' Ang Cheng Guan, "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited", Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 54(2), 2000, pp. 201-215. 
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such as the prevailing security, political and economic environment (both domestic and 
international) and the PLA's limited capability to defend its claim in the South China Sea. 
As changes in these elements occurred, China's behaviour changed accordMgly. 
This section tries to identify which of the possible motivations - uTedentism. 
having a stronger claim, economic reasons, geopolitical factors and the PLA's capabihty 
- can best explain China's behaviour in the South China Sea. Before investiLyatina, 
China's motivations, it is necessary to examine the meaning of the South China Sea for 
the Chinese goverment. 
Regarding motivations, China's geopolitical calculation, which a number of 
observers support, is firstly examined. Then, the oil factor will be considered. China has 
been a net oil importer since 1993 and with its rapid economic growth NviH require 
greater amounts of oil in the future. Thus, discovering new reserves and/or securing the 
oil supply to the industries are crucial to Beijing's top priority, economic modernisation. 
Since the South China Sea was believed to hold promising reserves, the correlation 
between China's behaviour and the oil factor needs to be examined. However, the 
Spratlys are far from southern China. This means that defending sovereignty and interests 
in this area inevitably requires the PLA to be capable of achieving this task. Thus, as the 
PLA, PLAN in particular, has been modernised, it was arguably natural for China to go 
beyond its coast. Thus, PLA's capabilities should also be examined. It wiU be argued that 
1) the South China Sea disputes are essentially a matter of sovereignty for China, and 2) 
China's behaviour can be largely explained by a combination of geopolitical calculation 
and PLA's capabilities. Beijing seems to have been trying to manage the disputes in a 
wider geopolitical and security context, particularly in terms of the possible militarý' 
conflict across the Taiwan Strait and US-led TMD system in Asia. 
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1) The essential meaning of the South China Sea for China 
The South China Sea today is valuable in many respects. it is a traditionally nch 
fishing ground, and is expected to have promising oil and gas reserves. However, it was 
not until 1968 that an undersea seismic survey was conducted in the South China Sea. 
while offshore drilling became possible only in the mid-1970s. Moreover. China's 
onshore production of oil was booming in the early 1970s. China's imperative need for 
r- - fish as a source of protein emerged in the 1980s when the per capita consumption of fish 
doubled compared to that in the previous decade. In the 1990s, as Beijing depended 
more on imported oil and its trade with regional states increased, the South China Sea 
came to be seen as an important trade route. 
Along with national unity, sovereignty is China's most fundamental national 
interest. " It derives from the Chinese experience of 'a century of humiliation', starting 
with the Opium War (1839-1842). This experience implanted in the Chinese psyche the 
importance of a strong state and national unity as a core element of national security. 
Thus, the communists presented themselves to the public as "the true champions of 
China's nationalism and guardians of its national sovereignty". Consequently, conceding 
territory to foreign powers directly links to the question of the legitimacy of the 
communist regime. 76 In this regard, "China's emotion over the Spratlys is compounded 
by its consciousness of, and sensitivity to matters of national sovereignty in general", 
" 
once the South China Sea was recognised by the ordinary Chinese as China's territory. 
Chu Shulong, "National Unity, Sovereignty and Territorial Integration", Ofina Joiirnal 36,1996 
(July), P. 98. 
64 erence to the Philipp '6Chen Jie, China's Spratly Policy: With SPeclal Refl 1 nes and Malaysia", 
Astan 
Sun, ey 34(10), 1994, p. 894. 
77 fbid. 
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In addition to the matter of sovereignty, China may have expected the South China 
Sea to play the role of a buffer zone for its security, " as did the Eastern and Central 
European states for the Soviet Union. With the fresh memory of Japanese attacks on 
Southeast Asian countries from bases in Itu Aba in the Spratlys. and given that the 
prelude of the Cold War had already started by the end of World War Two, it was onlv 
natural for China to be concerned about the possibility that the South China Sea nught 
come into her enemies' possession. As the Soviet Union incorporated the Eastern and 
Central European countries as its satellite states for security reasons, China may have 
simply needed a buffer zone. With the US pursuing establishment of the sea-based TMD 
system in Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Beijing's need for the South 
China Sea as a buffer zone has increased even more. 
Whatever the case, either purely as a matter of sovereignty or because of a 
combination of sovereignty concerns and the need for a buffer zone, China has regarded 
the South China Sea as an indispensable component of its national security and the 
Communist Party's legitimacy since 1949. Thus, its claim over the entire South China 
Sea in the late 1940s was motivated primarily by the necessity of recovering 'lost 
territory'. However, as China's security enviromnent changed and as the South China 
Sea's economic and strategic value increased, China's attitude towards the disputes, and 
its motivations, also changed. The next section examines Beijing's possible motivatlons 
in the South China Sea. 
2) Motivation 1: Geopolitics 
Beijing's South China Sea policy has been to a large extent influenced by 
geopolitical factors. From the establishment of the PRC, its security enviromnent was 
perceived as insecure by Chinese leaders until the end of the Cold War. Immediately after 
Chang Pao-Min, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea islands", Contemporaýv SwitheastAsi*a 
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World War Two, China was incorporated into the Cold War structure in xvhich the 
United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other. While Beijing allied with 
Moscow, the former faced an imminent security threat by the US in the Korean 
peninsula. In addition, the United States formed a logistic network linking Okinawa. 
Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines based on the bilateral treaties In 1951 and the 
SEATO in 1954, China viewed this line as an encirclement of China. After the break ývith 
the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, it had to deal with threats from t,, vo directions. A 
border war between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 led to MoscoNN, replacing 
Washington as the primary enemy. Internally, China was preoccupied with the Cultural 
Revolution. In addition, the PLA was not capable of defending territorial claims far from 
the mainland. Thus, the best Beijing could do against other claimants' infiingement on 
China's sovereignty in the South China Sea was protest verbaRy. 
The battle with South Vietnam over the Paracels in 1974 was a turning point In 
China's behaviour in the South China Sea. China for the first time translated its claim 
into action over 'its territory' far from the mainland, separated by sea. The PLA's 
capabilities had not been significantly enhanced by the time of the battle. Still, Beijing 
deployed ships to the Paracels. It is assumed, therefore, that there must have been a 
reason why China had to act at that time, and a perceived change in the regional balance 
of power can explain why. 
Rapprochement between China and the United States in 1971 had several 
important consequences. First of all, the United States was no longer recognised as the 
primary enemy; indeed, the US became a potential ally to contain the Soviet 
Union. 
Thus, the pro-American ASEAN states were regarded as an important element 
in a 
united front vis-a-vis North Vietnam. Second, the Soviet Union replaced the 
US as 
12(l), 1990, p-24. 
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China's primary enemy. And the fact that the Soviet Union and India, another enemy of 
China, concluded the Soviet-India Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in 1971 
fuelled China's concern about encirclement by the Soviet Union. Third. the relationship 
between North Vietnam and China rapidly deteriorated after the Sino-US 
rapprochement, because North Vietnam regarded it as "the second major seU-out by 
China in the thirty years of struggle for independence and liberation' . 
79Thus, by the time 
the Paracels battle occurred, a new geopolitical structure pitting China against the Soviet 
Union and North Vietnam had emerged. In addition, the US was scheduled to withdraw 
from Indochina, thus creating a power vacuum there. Consequently China perceaed that 
the Soviet Union might not only fill this vacuum but also attempt to contain China using 
the islands in the Paracels originaUy occupied by South Vietnam, which North Vietnam 
would take over. It was easy for China to "recover" those islands when they were under 
the control of South Vietnam, because the United States would not intervene, let alone 
the Soviet Union. China's objective of excluding Soviet naval power in the South China 
Sea was realised in January 1974 on the basis of these calculations. 
" 
China could also have perceived quite a low possibility of external intervention 
(from either the US or the Soviet Union) in the 1988 military clash with Vietnam over 
Johnson Reef This occurred at the beginning of the end of the Cold War between the 
superpowers. Sino-Soviet relations were improving after Gorbachev's taking power 
in 
1985, while Soviet-Vietnam relations were deteriorating. Although Vietnam was seeking 
to withdraw from Cambodia, relations between Beijing and Hanoi were still at 
their 
nadir. One symptom of the poor bilateral relationship was that 
Vietnam was enhancing 
its claim in the waters around Fiery Cross Reef on which 
China Axas building an 
79 Lo, China's Policy Tomrds Territorial Disputes, p. 69. The first Sell-out' was the 
Geneva Conference 
on Indochina in 1954. See ibid. 
" lbid, pp. 63-73. 
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observation station. A military skirmish between China and Vietnam Nvas highly lik-elv. 
while the Soviets seemed unlikely to intervene in support of Vietnam. Although this was 
to be the first military operation in the Spratlys, and the modernisation of the PLA had 
only begun in earnest in 1987, China could calculate on winning against a militarily xveak- 
Vietnam if the PLA was better prepared. And it was, as seen by the fact that the Chinese 
force even opened fire on the un-anned Vietnamese vessels. 
The Chinese seizure of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995 shocked the 
ASEAN states, by "destroying the myth that China would only act aggressively towards 
Vietnam and leave other claimants alone". 81 In fact, this 'myth' was created by China 
itself on 16 September 1988 when its ambassador to Manila, Wang Yingfan, promised 
that its aggressive action was targeted only at Vietnam. " So why did China take action 
towards the Phidippines? 
There were several reasons why the Philippines were targeted. First, the Philippines 
had been quite active, along with Vietnam, in occupying islands and in oil exploration. In 
China's eyes, the Philippines had long taken advantage of China's need for the 
Philippines as an ally to form a united front against Vietnam and the Soviet Union. 
Second, in addition to infiinging Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, the 
Philippines had acted against China's interests in many ways. For example, the 
Philippines had defacto official relations with Taiwan, and it not only initiated the issuing 
of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992 but also sought to 
internationalise the South China Sea disputes in cooperation with Vietnam. And finally, 
the Phihppines' reaction to the Tiananmen massacre was more in accordance with that of 
Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", pp. 6-7. Ang 
Cheng Guan points out a 
possibility that the Nfischief Reef action may have been taken by the PLA without approval 
troin the 
government, since Jiang, the chairman of the Central Nfilitary Committee since 
1989, did not 
consolidate his power in the PLA until around 1997/1998. See Guan, "The 
South China Sea Disputc 
Revisited", p. 206. 
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the Western countries than that of the other ASEAN states: "It not only expressed 
sadness over the killings, but also announced a ban on visiting China by Filiplnos and a 
suspension of civil air link with China, which other ASEAN govermnents did not". '-' 
Despite those factors, China has not supported the Philippine's New People*s 
Army since the early 1970s, which had been a source of major internal secuntý- problems 
in the Philippines since 1968. However, there was no reason for China to refrain from 
asserting sovereignty in the Spratlys any more. First, the importance of the Phihppines as 
an ally was lost when the Cambodian conflict was resolved in 199 1. Second. the 
Philippines was one of the weakest among the ASEAN states in terms of military 
capability, and the possibility of the US intervention was calculated as quite low. due to 
the US withdrawal from the Philippine bases in 1992 and Washington's stance of 
distancing itself from the disputes. 84 And third, the PLA was increasingly capable of 
achieving its missions in the Spratlys. 
Under these circumstances, the Maschief Reef incident could have occurred any 
time after the closure of the Philippine bases. The next question is why China chose the 
thing of early 1995. One possible influence was Vietnam's scheduled accession of 
ASEAN in July 1995. If the M[ischief Reef incident was 46a message to its adversaries, 
especially Vietnam, that China had reached a limit and would not accept any further 
"encroachment" of its territory", " it also meant that neither Vietnam nor the Philippines 
could any longer hide behind ASEAN. It should be noted, however, that Beijing was 
82 Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys", Issues & Studies 31(7), 1995, p. 34. 
Chen Jie, "Shaking Off an Historical Burden: China's Relations with the ASEAN-based 
Communist 
Insurgency in Deng's Era", Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27(4), 1994, p. 460. 
84 The US told the Philippines in the aftermath of the 1995 construction in Mschief Reef that 
"the U. S. - 
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty does not automatically cover the Spratlys since they are 
disputed 
territory which were not even claimed by Manila until after the Treaty was signed". 
See Ralph A. 
COssa, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring 
Potential Triggers of 
Conflict' 1, CSIS Asia Pacific Forum Special Report (Hawaii, March 1998). 
c 85 K im, "'Fhe South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking", p. 379 
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surprised by ASEAN's subsequent unity in expressing their concerns over the 'Mischief 
Reef case. 
However, to the Philippines' disappointment, ASEAN was very slow to shoxv a 
unified response to Beijing towards the 1998-1999 expansion of the structure on 
Mischief Reef. ASEAN's silence can be attributed to at least two factors. The first is the 
Asian economic crisis. Most ASEAN states were preoccupied with economic recoveiA-. 
ASEAN was grateful to China for resisting the pressure to devalue the Remninbi. If 
China were to devalue the Renminbi in response to ASEAN's strong protest, most of the 
ASEAN states would be compelled to devalue their currencies due to unbearable 
competition in exports markets, and the signs of economic recovery would be reversed. 
In addition, there was a general expectation that better economic relations with China 
would contribute to economic recovery. Furthermore, there was no agreed policy toward 
China among the ASEAN countries. Under these circumstances, ASEAN could not form 
a united voice, which may provoke China. 
A more important point, perhaps, is that the ASEAN states recognised that they 
could not dissuade China from using force when she judged it was necessary, as seen in 
the case of the missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait before and during the presidential 
election in March 1996. The ASEAN states also knew that economic interdependence 
and institutional binding were not enough to restrict China. However, ASEAN's military 
power, even aggregated, did not match China's. As a result, the other claimants in the 
region had no practical option but to tolerate China's 'creeping expansioni. 
China understood the ASEAN states' psyche and was sure that there would 
be no 
intervention by the United States. Thus, the timing was favourable for China to impose 
its will on smaller and weaker neighbours. Probably both China and ASEAN 
learned a 
lesson in 1999: China understood that "finiher expansion will not 
be seriously protested, 
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much less contested"" if she could choose her timing and geopolitical setting %ý hile 
ASEAN reconfirmed that "diplomacy is unlikely to stop China from vigorously 
exercising its claim to the Spratly Islands". 87 These understandings were correct. as seen 
in the case of China's further expansion to Scarborough Shoal since 2000. 
3) Motivation 2: The oil factor 
China's behaviour towards its claims before the Paracels battle was relati-vel,, - 
simple: it was primarily dominated by the geopolitical environment, and constrained by 
the limitation of its insufficient military capability. However, with the relatively optimistic 
reports on the oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea in the early 1970s and 
technical feasibility of drilling since the mid-1970s, the South China Sea acquired added 
importance as a source of economic development. China's participation in the Uruted 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction during 1972-1973 is considered to have stimulated 
China's interest in maritime space and maritime rights. " 
China's interests in natural resources as well as rights to the islands' surrounding 
water were, for the first time, expressed in its protest against South Vietnam in January 
1974, responding to South Vietnam's incorporation of the Spratlys into Phuoc Tuy 
Provýice in September 1973: '9 
The goverrunent of the People's Republic of China hereby reiterates that the 
Nansha, Hsisha, Chungsha, and Tungsha Islands are all part of China's 
territory. The PRC had indisputable sovereignty over these islands. The natural 
resources in the sea area around them also belong to China. 
" 
86 Ralph A. Cossa, "Mischief Reef. A Double Betrayal", CSIS PacNet Newsletter No. 49,22 Deceinb(T 
1998, available at http: //www. csis. org/facfor/pac4998. html. 
87 44 China Remains Firm on Spratlys", BBC Online Network, 23 March 1999, available at 
http: //Nvw', v. 
frecrepublic. com/forum/a36faOd9329be. htm. 
88 U, China's Policy Tomrds Territorial Disputes, p. 40 and p. 6 1. 
" Ibid. p. 61. 
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It was not until 1977 that China's offshore oil programme was developed. Several 
reasons motivated this programme. First, there were signs that the booming onshore oil 
exploration would soon end, " and China needed to explore and secure control over 
other reserves. Second, lack of technology had previously prevented China from 
exploring not only the Tarim Basin and offshore oil. Without the cooperation of the 
Western oil companies, it was not possible. However, the introduction of Westem 
technology was prohibited by an ideological barrier, especially before *the gancy of four' L- 
were arrested. Thus, as soon as the 'open door' policy was introduced in 1978, China 
began to conduct surveys in the South China Sea and signed contracts with major 
international oil companies. Other claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, have 
also been active in oil exploration since the 1970s. The Philippines started oil exploration 
activities in the early 1970s and drilling by the Swedish-Philippirie consortium In the 
Reed Bank Area begun in 1976 and continued until the early 1980s. Vietnam resumed 
cooperation with major non-American oil companies in 1976. Since then, both countries 
have continued oil exploration activities. 
The outcome of the offshore exploration was, however, disappointing. In 1996. 
output from offshore oilfields (mainly off Hainan Island and in the East China Sea) 
90 Peking Reviews, 18 January 1974, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
China has three major onshore oilfields in eastern and northeastern provinces: namely, Daqing 
oilfield (Heilongiian province), Sherigh oilfield (Shandong province) and Liaohe ollfield (Llaoning 
province). They have been exploited since the early 1960s and produced more than 70% of China's 
total crude oil output. See Ji Guoxing, "Energy Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacifc", Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 8(2), 1996, p. 283; Salainch, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional 
Conflict", p. 135; and Shao Zuze, Guo Peixing and Li Yong, "Development of China's Petroleum 
Industry and Its Effect on China-ASEAN Economic Relations", in Chia Soiw Yue and Cheng Bifan 
(eds. ), ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Developments in ASEAN and China (SMgapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 116, Table 5.3 Petroleum Output of Major Chinese Ollficlds. 
1986. However, they showed, around this time, signs of depleting in the near future. Othcr onshore 
fields in Xinjiang provmice were also expected to deplete in the early 2000s. See Salameh, -China, 
Oil 
and the Risk of Regional Conflict", p. 14 1. 
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accounted for only 10% of China's total output, " and the South China Sea also proved 
to be disappointing. Thus, the Chinese government allowed foreign companies to 
develop the Tarim Basin in 1993. Although it has a large reserve (estimated at 147 bilhon 
barrels), its geological complexity and astronomical investment needed for the pipelines 
to transport oil to China's coastal region make the exploration of this source 
unprofitable. As a result, the gap between capacity of supply and increasing demands has 
widened. 
There are three measures that the Beijing government can take to fiU the supply- 
demand gap. The first is to import oil. The volume of imported oil has been increasing 
year by year. For example, imported oil cost China $376 milhon in 1986, $545 miffion in 
1988 and $1.744 biRion in 1989.9' Those amounts accounted for only 1.2%, 1.11/6 and 
2.8% of China's total export earnings. However, it cost $13.5 billion for the period of 
January to November in 2000 . 
94 Dependence on imported oil has increased accordingly, 
from 6.6% in 1995 to 11% in 1996,15% in 1998 and 25% in 2000. This figure is 
15 
expected to rise to 30-40% in 2010 and 50-60% in 2020. Since China set a target of 
8% economic growth for the Ninth Five-Year Plan, starting in 1996, corresponding ofl 
demand is estimated to be 11.4% of annual growth. " Under these circumstances. 
92 Erica Strecker Downs, China's Questfor Energy Security, RAND Corporation MR- 1244-AF, October 
2000, available at http: //www. rand. org/publications/NHUMR1244/, p. 7. 
9' Larry Chuen-ho Chow, "The Changing Role of Oil in Chinese Exports, 1974-89", China Quarterly 
13 1ý 1992, p. 762. 
94 "China's Crude Oil Imports Exceed 60 Million Tons", People's Daily, 16 December, 2000, available 
at http: //english. peopledaily. coin. cn/200012/16/eng20001216-57996. htnil. 
95 Dependence rate was collected from the following sources: Strecker Downs, "China's 
Quest for 
Energy Security", pp. 8-9. See also Sergel Troush, "China's Changing Oil Strategy and its 
Foreign 
Policy Implications", CNAPS Working Paper, Fall 1999, available at http: //www. brookings. edu/fp/ 
cnaps/papers/1999 - 
troush. htm; and "Oiling Chmaýs War Machine', STRATFORCONI. 
11 March 
2000, available at http: //www. atimes. com/china/BCIIAdOl. html. According to the volume of 
imported oil, it was 27 million tons (mt) in 1998,40mt in 1999, and more than 
70int in 2000. It Is 
expected to import about 100mt in 2010. Troush, "China's Changing Oil Strategy and its 
Foreign 
Policy Implications". See also Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", p. 
16. 
96 SaJameh er wth Ra cs in 
, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional 
Conflict", p. 136, Table 4P centageGro 
GDP and Oil Demand for China. 
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China's dependence on the Nfiddle East in particular will inevitably increase. B-Idence 
can be seen in the fact that China has extended its supply agreement xvith Saudi Arabia. " 
The second measure taken by the Chinese government was Investing in the 
exploration of foreign states' oilfields. China made deals -with Sudan, Kazakhstan. 
Venezuela and Iraq in 1997. China wants to diversify its sources of supply. thereby 
reducing China's dependence on a particular supplier and stabilising domestic petroleum 
prices by securing a certain volume of oil. China also played an important role in taking 
the initiative to build pipelines running from oilfields to China, such as one from westem 
Kazakhstan to western China, and one from Turkmenistan to the east coast of China (to 
be extended to Japan and possibly South Korea). One of the biggest reasons wh), China 
has been enthusiastic about building pipelines is considered to be China's incapability of 
defending SLOCs from the Nfiddle East through the South China Sea to China, where 
98 
the US Navy is dominant. According to one study, "With an oil blockade being a 
primary option for NATO during the recent U. S. military involvement in Kosovo, China 
gained a clear understanding of U. S. influence with respect to energy flows". " Thus, 
pipelines were regarded as a more secure way to import oil, avoiding potential US 
intervention against China's oil supplies. However, the feasibihty of this option is 
Daniel Yergin, Dennis Eklof and Jefferson Edwards, "Fueling Asia's Recovery", Foreign Affairs 
77(2), 1998, p. 42. Major oil suppliers to China are Oman, Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Indonesia and Angola. See Troush, "China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy 
Implications". At the end of the twentieth century, China's dependence on the Middle East is around 
50%, and it is expected to rise more than 80% in 2010. See ibid. 
98 For a comprehensive study about China's energy strategy and oil exploration activities, see 
Strecker 
Downs, "Chinaýs Quest for Energy Security". For details about China's relations with Central Asian 
states and Russia over energy cooperation, see Keun-Wook Paik, "Energy Cooperation in 
Sino- 
Russian Relations: The Importance of Oil and Gas", Pacific ReWew 9(l), 1996, pp. 77-95; and 
Ainy 
Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The 
Real Geopolitics 
of Energy", Surv, ival 40(4), 1998-99, pp. 112-131. See also "Oiling China's 
War Machine". 
STRATFORCOM, 11 March 2000; Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict". Ji, 
"Energy Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific"; and Jin Song, "Energy 
Security in the Aia- 
Pacific: Competition or Cooperation? ", Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
(15 Januarý- 1999, 
Honolulu, Hawaii), available at http: //www. apcss. org/ReporL-Energy-Secunty. 
99. htinl. 
Troush "China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Pol cy ImplicatIons". 
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questionable. One of the most serious bottlenecks is a lack of capital. Another important 
factor is that these pipelines are running through politically unstable areas. Consequently. 
this option has not been pursued fin-ther. 
The third measure that the Chinese leaders are considering is to build a strategic oil 
reserve. The National People's Congress discussed it in March 2000. This strategic oil 
reserve is also expected to serve as a cushion in time of petroleum price hike. It also 
undennines adversaries' supply disruptions, thereby reducing China's vulnerability. 
However, China needs to invest a huge amount of money. According to a report, "At 
today's oil price, a 90-day reserve to satisfy China's current demand of 4 million barrels 
per day would cost more than $10 billion - about the same amount as its official defense 
expenditure for 2000". '00 It would be feasible, though, because the government may be 
, -ýu able to take advantage of China's largest petrochemical company Sinopec's (China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corp. ) decision that it plans to "double its oil stockpiles from 
the current 5 -6 miflion tons in two or three years"). 
10 1 
What implications, then, can be drawn from considering the oil factor in the South 
China Sea dispute'? Judging from the demand-supply balance, which will see increasing 
demand for oil paralleffing finiher economic development and modernisation, it is 
obvious that China needs new sources of oil to satisfy its demand. In this regard, reserves 
in the South China Sea have constituted one of the options. 
However, the South China Sea has not lived up to expectations so far, and China 
has turned to the Nfiddle East countries, Central Asian states and Russia in order to 
secure its oil needs. She is also considering diversify energy sources, including greater 
'00 "Oiling China's War Machine", STRATFOR-COM, II March 2000. See also Eric Ng and Agencies, 
"First Step Towards Strategic Reserve! ', South China Morning Post, 17 March 2001, available at 
http: //biz. scmp. coin/ZZZ8PYNJDKC. html. 
101 Xie Ye, "Nation to Stockpile Oil in Case of Crisis", China Daily, 16 Nlarch 
2001, available at 
http: //www. chinadaily. net/cover/storydb/2001/03/16/mn-boil. 3 16. htinl. 
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use of natural gas and nuclear energy. In this respect, 4ýa militaly grab for -one potentiaNY 
minor oil field" in the Spratlys does not make economic sense". 10' It can be concluded. 
therefore, that China's need for oil does not seem to be a deciding factor in her 
behaviour in the South China Sea. 
For Beijing, the South China Sea is primarily a matter of sovereignty. though her 
claim over the Spratlys may be both historically and legally questionable. The importance 
of sovereignty is why China blocked the resupply of a Vietnamese oil drilling rig in July 
1994 and intercepted the Philippine govemment-sponsored journalists' tour around 
Mischief Reef in 1995. In addition, since the South China Sea has a greater value as a 
trade route and strategic maritime space than as a potential oil reserve, China is likely to 
deal with the Spratly disputes in the wider context of its national interests (including, 
importantly, economic modernisation and reunification with Taiwan), while continuing 
4creeping expansion' in the Spratlys whenever possible. 
Nonetheless, how far China can go in defending the waters depends on the PLA's 
capability. The next section examines the capability of the PLA in the South China Sea. 
4) Motivation 3: The PLA's capability 
The PLA's military capability constitutes an important element that influences 
China's behaviour in the South China Sea. When the South China Sea remained beyond 
the reach of China's defensible front fine until the 1980s, the only method that China 
could deploy in support of its claim was verbal protest against other claimants' 
inffingement of China's sovereignty. However, enhanced military capability provides the 
Chinese goverment with broader policy options, including use of force, as weU as 
lending more credibility in the view of other claimants its will to 4recover' territories. 
This is an opinion of David Findley, an oil expert at the East-West 
Centre, quoted in Harlwi W. 
Jencks, "The PRCs Nfilitary and Security Policy M the Post-Cold War Era". 
Issues & Studie-s 300 1), 
1994, p. 91. 
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The PLA's activities in the South China Sea can be dated back to 1971 when it 
began construction of infrastructure on Woody Island, following the survey of the 
Amphitrite Group in the Paracels. Although the Chinese beat the South Vietnamese force 
in 1974, Beijing recognised the PLAN's weakness and prionty was given to the 
modernisation of the PLAN as well as establishing actual and effective control in the 
whole Paracels. As a result, military activities were intensified on a number of islands M 
the Paracels by 1979. 
In the 1980s and thereafter, a number of factors influencing the PLA's capabilitY 
emerged. The first point to be mentioned is China's rush into importing Western and 
Soviet/Russian weapons and weapons systems, which came to be available as a result of 
China's 'open door' policy in 1979, a quasi-alliance with the US in the 1980s against the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam, and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union from the late- 
1980s. Second, because superpower rivalry was waning, China reviewed its security 
environment, and re-assessed the prospects of war: a limited local war was now seen as 
more likely than a global nuclear war. This led to a review of military strategy and the 
restructuring of military forces. Third, increases in defence budget after the Tiananmen 
massacre enabled the PLA to accelerate its moden-iisation, of the Navy in particular. 
Lastly, the booming economy partly caused many of the other claimants also to 
accelerate their purchase of advanced weapons, equipment and weapons systems, 
particularly for their navies. 
Although efforts have been made to support its claim over the Spratlys since the 
early 1980s by the PLA undertaking excursions in the Spratlys waters, the first step m 
the strategic shift towards strengthening the PLA Navy represented a change in Chinese 
leaders' perception of war. At the enlarged Conference of the Central 
Military 
Committee (CMC) in 1985, the doctrine of 'people's war under modem conditions' was 
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adopted and the perception of the most likely major conflict was altered from a 21obal 
nuclear war to a limited local war with conventional weapons. As a result, the 'Navy and 
the Air Force have been given priority over the ground force in the o,,,, eraH strategy. 
Influenced by the additional factors of the ongoing discussion on the Law of the Sea 
(where httoral states' rights and obligations in their maritime territory were to be 
determined) and having the science-and-technology-minded Liu Huanqing as naval 
commander since 1982, the Navy's modernisation was accelerated. By the late 1980s, 
the PLAN's acknowledged major weaknesses such as resupply operations at sea. longy- 
distance communications and navigation capability, and the lack of a global navigation 
system had been overcome. 103 For example, a super-long-wave radio network developed 
in 1986 enabled the navy headquarters to communicate with its ships wherever they 
were. 104 In addition, construction of an observation station at Fiery Cross Reef in 1988, 
the first Chinese foothold in the Spratlys, served the Chinese objective of establishing a 
permanent physical presence in the Spratlys. With the end of the Cold War. China 
vigorously purchased advanced weapons from Russia in particular, including Su-27/30s, 
Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers. 
The implications of these factors are, first, that China's mi-litary capability has been 
enhanced to some extent, in terms of hardware in particular. Second, however, the 
capability of some claimants has also been upgraded. Moreover, hardware alone is not 
the decisive factor for assessing military capability. Other elements, such as capability of 
absorption, the degree of training and readiness, effectiveness of C'I (command, control, 
communication and intelligence) and other support system including logistics should 
be 
taken into account. In addition, not aH advanced weapons and equipment 
have been 
"' Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys", p. 29. 
104 Ibid., p. 30. 
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allocated to the Guangzhou (Canton) Military Region to which the South Sea Fleet. 
responsible for the South China Sea, belongs. Thus, assessing the PLA's capability in the 
South China Sea is quite a challenging task. Evidence is seen in the fact that there are 
confficting assessments among observers. "' 
China's recent intensive arms acquisitions from Russia demonstrate its emphasis on 
modernising the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). This reflects the facts that not only is air 
power crucial for modem warfare, but also that PLA leaders recognise that the Air Force 
is presumably the Chinese anned forces' least capable element. Although it has several 
hundred locally produced J-5, J-6, and J-7 fighters and some 160 H-5 and H-6 bombers, 
they are outdated models and lack crucial capabilities, such as C3 1, early warning. 
surveillance and air-refuelling capabilities, which are required for effective operation. 
Thus, China purchased some modem and advanced aircraft, engMes and missiles for 
'quick fix' purposes. They include Su-27 fighters, IL-76 long-range transports, S-300 
missiles and RD-31 jet engines for J-7s. In addition, China's 'wish list' Mcludes 
production of Su-30s under the licence from Russia, purchase and manufacturing of Su- 
'0' On the assessment that China's capability is growing, see, for example, Chong-Pm Lin, "Chinese 
Military Modernization: Perceptions, Progress, and Prospects", Security Studies 3 (4), 1994, pp. 71 8- 
754; Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", 
International Security 18(3), 1993/94, pp. 78-112; Denney Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's 
Threat to East Asian Security", International Security 19(l), 1994, pp. 149-168; Larry N/1. Wortzel, 
"China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status", Orbis 38(2), 1994, pp. 157-175; and Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict i4th China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). 
On the assessment that the PLA is not so capable, see, for example, Robert S. Ross, "Chula 11. Beijing 
as a Conservative Power", Foreign Affairs 76(2), 1997, pp. 33-44; Robert S. 
i 
Ross. -Why Otu- 
Hardliners Are Wrong", National Interest 49,1997, pp. 42-5 1; Joseph S. Nye, "China's Re-einergencc 
and the Future of the Asia-Pacific", Survival 39(4), 1997-1999, pp. 65-79; Nfichacl 
G. Gallagher, 
44 China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea", International Security 19(l), 1994, pp. 169-194, 
Taeho Kim, "A Reality Check: The "Rise of Chia" and Its Military Capability Toward 2010". 
Journal of East Asian Affairs 12(2), 1998, pp. 321-363; and Andrew J. Nathan and 
Robert S. Ross, 
Ae Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security 
(New York: \V. W. Norton, 
1997). 
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30MKs (a Chinese version of the Su-30s), R77 air-to-air missiles (for Su-30s) and 
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) radar system. 
106 
Su-27s, whose operational radius is 1500km, can reach the Spratly Islands. about 
10OOkm from South China, less the 30 minutes of flight time. 'O' Even though the 
majority of the originally purchased 72 Su-27s are deployed with the 'Nanjing (N. anking) 
Nfilitary Region which embraces the East Sea Fleet responsible for Taiwan and Japan. at 
least 24 Su-27s are reported to have been deployed with the PLAN Air Force 
(PLANAF) on Hainan Island. 'O' In addition, Beijing plans to produce some 150 Su-27s 
and Su-30s under Russian licence. Taking into account that China's adversaries are 
primarily Vietnam and the Philippines, even China's small number of Su-27 could create 
a military threat to them. 
The PLAN has made efforts to modernise since the early 1980s. Each of the three 
Fleets (North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet) consists of "more than 300 
ships, including major surface combat vessels, submarines, and vanous kinds of 
... See Bin Yu, 'NATO's Unintended Consequence: A Deeper Strategic Partnership ... Or More", CSIS 
Pacific Forum Comparative Connection: China-Russia (2Q 1999), available at http: //www. csis. org/ 
pacfor/cc/992Qchina-rus. html; Bin Yu, "Coping With the Post-Kosovo Fallout", CSIS Pacific Foruin 
Comparative Connection: China-Russia (3Q 1999), available at http: //www. csis. org/pacfor/cc/ 
993Qchina-rus. html; Brian Hsu, "China's Air Force to Get New Missile", Taipei Times, 10 May 
2000, available at http: //taiwansecunty. org/TT/TT-051000. htm; "China Deploying S-300 Anti- 
Aircraft Missiles Opposite Taiwan: Report", China Times, 29 March 2000, available at 
http: //www. chinatimes. com. tw//cnglish/epolitic/89032814. htm; and "Israel Acts To Defuse Row With 
U. S. Over China Spy Plane Deal", Agence France Presse, 19 June 2000, available at http: H 
taiwansecurity. org/AFP/AFP-061900. htm. Regarding a purchase of AWACS system, Phalcon, China 
concluded a contract with Israel in 1996. However, this $250 million deal was forced to cancel in July 
2000 due to the pressure from the United States which provides Israel with $3 billion aids annually. 
After this cancellation, Russia was reported to have discussed the sale of 4-6 Benev A-50E advanced 
radar aircraft with the China's top general in November 2000. For the detail of the AWCS case, see 
Jim Lobe, "Israel Yields to US on Key China Deal", Asia Times, 14 July 2000, available at 
http: //www. atimes. com/china/BG14AdOl. htm]; "Israel Acts To Defuse Row With U. S. Over China 
Spy Plane Deal"; "Israel Tries To Defuse China Arms Dispute With U. S. ", Inside China, 29 June 
2000, available at http: //www. insidechina. com/news. php3? id=173588; and "Russia Ready to Sell 
Radar System Blocked by US", Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November 2000, available at http: /, 'Nv', %w. 
smh. com. au/news/00 1 1/20/text/world 1 I. h1ml. 
Nayan Chanda, Rigoberto Tiglao and John Mcbeth, -Territorial Imperative", Far Eastern Econotnic 
Review, 23 February 1995, p. 16 
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speedboat; as weH as other combat support ships such as landing craft. supply vessels. 
and mine-laying vessels". 1" In the 1990s, Luhu-class destroyers and Jiangit -ei- class 
ffigates, were introduced. China also acquired resupply and amphibious assault ships. 
Those new ships were mainly allocated to the East and South Sea Fleets. However, most 
of the ships other than the newly acquired ships are outdated and lack crucial equipment 
such as electronic support measures (ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM) and an)Y 
effective air defence systems. Although China ordered four modem Kilo-class 
submarines from Russia, some existing 100 diesel-electric submarines are regarded as 
obsolete. PRC leaders' recognition of deficiencies in naval operations led to the purchase 
from Russia and Israel of an airborne radar system, anti-ship cruse missile technologies 
and two missile destroyers (Sovrem enny-class) in 19 9 7. "" 
Judging from these recent purchases, the capabilities of the PLAN and PLAAF 
have been improving in terms of equipment. However, the existence of sophisticated 
hardware does not mean that it is operationally effective. Whether this hardware will 
contribute to enhancing capabilities should be considered in relation to vanous other 
factors, such as personnel quality and training, and logistic support. 
The PLA has created "rapid reaction units" (RRUs) in order to "strengthen 
mobility and operational coordination in preparation for small-scale, low-intensity 
warfare in and beyond China's border areas", in accordance with the strategic shift to 
limited local war. ill The PLAN has its own RRUs and each RRU for the three Fleets 
10' Patrick E. Tylar "China to Buy 72 Advanced Fighter Planes from Russia7, New York Times, February 
7,1996, cited in Felix K. Chang, "Beijing's Reach in the South China Sea7, Orbis 40(3), 
1996, 
p. 364. 
109 Arthur S. Ding, `Fhe PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific", 
Issues & Studies 31(g), 1995, p. 4. 
110 Kim, "A Reality ChecV, pp. 345-346. 
''' Ibid., p. 341. 
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consists of surface vessels, submarines and naval air force planes. 
112 The PLA N janne 
Corps, revived in 1980, was aRocated to the South Sea Fleet in order to deal with 
military conflict in the South China Sea. 
Both the PLAN and the PLAAF have made efforts in respect of training and 
exercises. For example, the PLAN doubled its training cruises during the 1980s, "' and 
the destinations of those voyages included the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and 
the West Pacific. An exercise related to the South China Sea was held in June 1993 by 
the Guangzhou Military Region, which "emphasised landing operations im, olving sea- 
and airborne troops, anti-landing operations, offensive and defensive operations in 
mountain area and air cover". 
114 The PLAAF also began intensive training in the 1990s. 
However, the PLAN has not conducted any long-distance naval exercise. "' 
PLAAF pilots have not trained extensively over open ocean. In addition, it is 
pointed out that the average flying time of Chinese pilots (PLAAF and PLANAF) is 
between 80 and 150 hours per year, much less than that of their Malaysian and 
Singaporean counterparts (more than 200 hours). 116 Partly because of this, and partly 
because of fear of damaging new and expensive aircraft, their technique of pilotMg is 
hmited to little more than basic manoeuvres. Moreover, due to the trahiing programmes 
based on service-specific mission, not only are pilots from the two services incompatible, 
but also there are training barriers even within services. 117 Thus, PLAAF pilots for Su- 
27s have not received training for air support for naval units; this would expose the naval 
unit to a greater vulnerability to adversaries. 
112 Ding, "The PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific", p. 5. 
... Renmin Ribao, I August 1988, cited in Lin, "Chinese Military Modernization", p. 729. 
114 Ding, "The PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific", p. II 
115 Kim, 44A Reality ChecV, p. 346. 
116 Chang, "Beijing's Reach in the South China Sea", p. 363. 
117 Ibid., p. 364. 
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Another point to be mentioned concerns the consequences of the PLA*s 
commerci volvement. This dates back to the early days of the Red Anny in the late 
1920s and it was originally aimed at easing the burden on local people of keepMg the 
armed forces. However, the introduction of the 'open-door' policy and the reduced 
military budget during the 1980s increasingly transformed the nature of the PLA as a 
nfflitary organisation. "' First of all, there were widespread suspicions among civilian and 
military leaders that business activities tended to be performed at the expense of training 
PLA members and that military facilities, such as vessels and aircraft, and airports were 
used for commercial purposes. Second, making money and 'money worship' on the part 
of troops undertnined discipline. The CMC's occasional warnings such as "ensure 
fulfilment of combat readiness and training" and "Many armies in China and abroad have 
lost their fighting capacity and been defeated by peace or by themselves""' clearly 
indicate substantial erosion of soldiers' morale and discipline and the PLA's capability. 
Thus, President Jiang banned PLA involvement in business in March 1999, a move which 
the generals supported. However, it was revealed in early 2000 that the PLA was still 
involved in business. 
In addition to personnel problems, the elements which are expected to support 
combat also face challenges. Regarding what the Chinese expect to become forward 
118 The following paragraph depends on Ellis Joffe, "The PLA and the Economy: The Effects of 
Involvement", in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang (eds. ), Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact 
on Security (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 11-34; and Stacey Solomon, "The PLA's 
Commercial Activities M the Economy: Effects and Consequences", Issues & Studies 31(3), 1995, 
pp. 21-43. 
119 FBIS-Cl-R-90-132 (10 July 1990), p. 32 and FBIS-Cl-B-93-141 (20 July 1993), p. 32, cited in ibid., 
p. 41. 
120 See Willy Wo-Lap Lain, "Generals Support PLA Enterprise Ban", South China Morning Post, 15 
March 1999, available at http: //www. scmp/com/; Susan V. Lawrence and Bruce Gilley, "China 
Bitter 
Harvest: The Handover of the Military's Business Empire Has Stirred up a Homet's 
Nest", Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 29 April 1999, pp. 22-27; Mark Magnier, "Chmese Military Still 
Embedded in the Economy", Los Angeles Times, 9 January 2000, available at 
http: //taiwansecurity. org/LAT/LAT-010900-Chinese-Nhlitary-Economy. htm; and -Militarv 
Is Back 
in Business", Asia Times, 19 April 2000, available at http: //www. atimes. com/china/BD 
I SAdO I. html . 
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bases, they constructed an air base and anchorage on Woody Island (in the Paracels) In 
1971 and an air field on Fiery Cross Reef (in the Spratlys) in 1988. The former. in 
particular, is considered to extend "the theoretical reach of Chinese air power far 
south"). 
121 Since the majority of Chinese aircraft do not have the range to fly directly fi7om 
Hainan Island to the Spratlys, an airbase between south China and the Spratlys can sen, e 
as a forward base. Its 2700-metre runways are long enough to support all types of 
Chinese combat aircraft. However, the airstrip is not designed for heavy aircraft hke Su- 
27s, while the tiny island space (1.88 kM2 ) allows only limited munitions and fuel 
reserves, and offers little space for aircraft shelter. Under humid and briny climatic 
conditions, the Su-27 can rapidly deteriorate without appropriate protection. 122 Judging 
from this information, Woody Island's potential as a forward airbase is not very great. 
Thus, China's acquisition of air-to-air refuelling capability will be important. 
However, this requires skilful piloting, because aircraft and tankers must act in concert In 
terms, of altitude and velocity, while maintaining close distance. Taking into account the 
facts that Chinese pilots for Su-27s have had no training over open ocean and that their 
flying time is very limited, air refuelling is quite a demanding task. Regarding refuelling w ý_; 
of ships at sea, it is believed that Chinese capability remains still rudimentary. "' 
If China had an aircraft carrier now, would many problems disappear'? According 
to the Ming Pao daily, China"s first aircraft carrier (48,000 tonnes) is expected to be 
ready for service in 2005. It will be capable of carrying 24 fighter planes. China is said to 
be planning to build a finiher aircraft carrier every three yearS. 124 Having aircraft camers 
Jencks-, "rhe PRC's Nfilitary and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", p. 93. 
122 Chang, "Beijing's Reach in the South China Sea", p. 361. 
123mniý "A Reality ChecV, p. 346. 
124 "China's First Aircraft Carrier Ready for Service in 2005: Report", Agence France Presse, 12 January 
2000, available at http: //taiwansecurity. org/AFP/AFP-01 122000-Aircraft-Camer. htm. Robert S. Ross 
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would surely enhance China's ability significantly. Hmvever. since it is believed that 
China needs at least three aircraft carriers, due to its inferior managerial skýUs and 
logistical facilities"' China has to prepare for astronomical fiinding. In addition, just 
acquiring an aircraft carrier does not mean that it can achieve its missions. because 
operation of an aircraft carrier requires the most modem technology and pilot skit1s. The 
aircraft carried are likely to be vertical take-off planes and/or helicopters. Pilots for 
vertical take-off planes, especially, need skill in landing and take-off in all weather 
conditions. In addition, the carrier needs to be protected, especially from air and surface 
missiles. Thus, an early warning system and adequate anti-air and anti-surface missile 
systems are vital. Without them, '61an aircraft carrier would present itself as a 'floating 
corpse"'. 126 As of August 2001, China has not satisfied these conditions in order for the 
aircraft carrier to demonstrate its full capacity, nor even completed building the first such 
ship. 
In sum, the PLA's capabilities are assumed to be greatly enhanced in terms of 
hardware. Taking into account the fact that the Taiwan issue has been one of the top 
security concerns for Beijing since the establishment of the PRC, the majority of 
advanced weapons which were purchased mainly from Russia was allocated to the East 
Sea Fleet which is responsible for Taiwan. 
The real challenge for China is to control effectively what it occupied. According 
to a book titled Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?, which was originally 
intended "for limited and controlled distribution within China", and which is considered 
to be written in part to promote the Navy's interests, the Spratly Islands are easy to 
predicted that 'the first carrier is expected to be operational between 
2005 and 2010, and the third 
around 2020'. See Ross, "China 11. Beijing as a Conservative Power", p. 
3 8. 
125 Ibid. 
126 You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's 
Mantime Strategy in the 
1990s", Pacific Review 4(2), 199 1, p. 147. 
233 
Chapter 5: China's Attitude towards the South China Sea Disputes 
capture but difficult to hold. Therefore, China needs at least one aircraft carrier to hold 
the Spratlys. "' Considering the fact that China's primary adversaries in the South China 
Sea are the militarily weak Philippines and Vietnam, the South Sea Feet could defeat 
them. However, under the conditions that the first aircraft carrier has not been 
completed, that Woody Island does not serve as an effective fonvard base. and that 
support system and pilot skill are insufficient, the PLA has a long way to go just to seize 
and hold the whole Spratlys. 
4. Prospects for China's future behaviour in the South China Sea 
China's behaviour in the South China Sea can be largely explained by the 
combination of geopolitical calculation and the PLA's capabilities. In the case of the 
Paracels battle in 1974, it was imperative for Beijing to block expansion of the Soviet 
Union's influence in the region after Vietnam was unified. And the adversary \N,, as a 
militarily weak South Vietnam, whose strongest ally, the United States, was not 
expected to intervene. Although China successfully seized the whole Paracels, the 
Spratlys were beyond its reach. It should be recalled that the PLA's first excursion to the 
Spratlys was not conducted until 1980. 
The change in geopolitical structure since the mid-1980s and the modernisation of 
the PLA Navy in particular since the early 1980s gave China an opportunity to enter the 
Spratlys. When the 1988 military clash with Vietnam occurred, relations between Beijing 
and Moscow were improving, while those between Beijing and Hanoi, and between 
Hanoi and Moscow, were deteriorating. Thusý the chance of the Soviet Union's 
intervention on behalf of Hanoi was perceived as quite low. Moreover, the Vietnamese 
12' Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese MilitarY: Where It Expects Wars -- 
Where It 
Doesn't", Orbis 38(3), 1994, p. 359. Munro's article introduced the major points of this 
book. 
translated into English. 
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forces were weaker than the Chinese forces and China Nvas better prepared for the 
possible battle. 
Building structures on Mischief Reef in 1995, when US intervention was unlikelv. 
was also well-timed. Since the US withdrawal from Subic Bay in the Philippines in 199,22. 
relations between Washington and Manila had been deterioratmg. In addition. the 
Philippines' armed forces were one of the weakest among the ASEAN states. The 
enhancement of the structure in 1998/99 was conducted when the regional states were 
preoccupied with the economic crisis. The US position towards the South China Sea 
disputes had been made clear by that time; Washington would stay neutral to the disputes 
as long as free navigation in the South China Sea was guaranteed. Chinese additional 
presence on Scarborough Shoal since the beginning of 2000 was also facilitated by 
America's neutral stance. 
Since Beijing has already confirined that creeping expansion of its South China Sea 
presence to Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal has been risk-free in tenns of 
intervention by extra-regional great powers and ASEAN's united voice, the extent of the 
PLA's capabilities are more likely to determine China's behaviour in the future. Judging 
from the past pattern, the reason why Malaysia and Brunei have not been targeted 
appears to be that the waters and features claimed by Malaysia and Brunei are still 
beyond the reach of the PLA. As long as China believes that the whole South China Sea 
is its territory, she will not hesitate to 'recover' the unoccupied features one by one. as 
soon as the PLA is able to hold as well as seize them. 
Since Beijing does not want to alienate ASEAN totally, however, it will proceed M 
a manner that avoids the ASEAN states forming a united front. In other words. 
China 
needs to exploit ASEAN's lack of shared policy towards Beijing. In addition, 
China 
wants some ASEAN states such as human rights, 
democracy. 
, at 
least, as allies on issues 
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and the US pursuit of the TMD system. Moreover, China does not want to dama-ge its 
pursuit of other objectives, such as membership of the WTO and hosting the 200S 
OlyTnpic Games, which require an image of China as a responsible and peaceful state. On 
top of that, Beijing needs a peaceful security environment in order to achieve economic 
modernisation. Thus, creeping expansion seems the least provocative way for the 
Chinese to strengthen their position in the South China Sea. In the long-term China may 
be looking forward to controlling the entire sea. 
It should be noted, however, that China is likely to deal with the South China Sea 
disputes in relation to her other strategic objectives, such as reunification with Tai,, N, an 
and the US-led TMID system in Asia. Since China asserts that the South China Sea 
disputes should be resolved only by the concerned claimants, her relations with other 
claimants, or more precisely, the balance of power vis-a-vis other claimants. primarilý' 
influences China's behaviour under the condition of no US intervention. However, 
China' behaviour in the South China Sea will also be influenced by relations with Taiwan 
and the United States, because Beijing is likely to handle the disputes in the Spratlys in 
the context of its broader national security concerns. 
Chapter 6 
A Return to International Relations Theory 
Empirical studies about the South China Sea disputes have traditionally focused on 
legal aspects, mainly due to the debate in the United Nations about Law of the Sea 
during the 1980s. In the main, the issue attracted academic research beyond legal 
consideration particularly after the military clash between China and Vietnarn In the 
South China Sea in 1988. Most of the empirical studies try to explain China's behaviour 
in the South China Sea by focusing on domestic factors (such as the PLA's capabilities, 
domestic politics including the PLA's influence on decision-making, econoMIc necessity 
including increasing energy demand) and/or international factors (such as international 
security environment and geopolitical consideration). Despite the fact that a number of 
observers have studied the disputes from various aspects', there seems to exist a 
For the detailed history of the South China Sea disputes, see Marwyn S. Samuels, Contestfor the South 
China Sea (New York and London: Methuen, 1982); and Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys., (Singapore: 
Dolphin Books, 1995). For China's relations with the ASEAN states and China's ASEAN policy, see 
Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", Adelphi Paper 298,1995; Joseph Y. S. 
Cheng, "China's ASEAN Policy in the 1990s: Pushing for Regional Multipolarity", Contempormy 
Southeast Asia 21(2), 1999, pp. 176-204; and Zhao Suisheng, "China's Periphery Policy and Its Asian 
Neighbors", Security Dialogue 30(3), 1999, pp. 335-346. For China's Spratly policies (including the 
South China Sea in China's strategic thinking), see Chen Jie, "China's Spratly Policy: With Special 
Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia", Asian Survey 34(10), 1994, pp. 893-903; Herbert S. Yee, 
"Beijing's Policies Toward Southeast Asia and the Spratly Islands in the Post-Cold War Eraý', Issues 
& Studies 31(7), 1995, pp. 46-65; Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys", Issues &Studies 31(7), 
1995, pp. 18-45; and Shee Poon Kim, "The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 19(4), 1998, pp. 369-387. For the Chinese View about these disputes 
(excluding legal discussion), see Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys!; and Ji GuoXMg, "China Versus 
South China Sea Security", Security Dialogue 29(l), 1998, pp. 101-112. For ASEAN's China policy 
and a view about the disputes from the ASEAN side, see Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Controversy in 
the Spratlys: Exploring the Limits to ASEAN's Engagement Policy", Issues & Studies 34(9), 1998, 
pp. 95-123; and Tim Huxley, "A Threat in the South China Sea? ", Security Dialogue 29(l), 1998, 
pp. 113-118. For an analysis of China's behaviour in the light of its geopolitical consideration, see 
Samuels, Contestfor the South China Sea; Esmond D. Smith, Jr., "China's Aspirations In the Spratly 
Islands", Contemporary Southeast Asia 16(3), 1994, pp. 274-294; and Ian James Storey, "Creeping 
Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Disput&', Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 21(l), 1999, pp. 95-118. For an analysis based on China's military capabilities, see Felix K. 
Chang, "Beijing's Reach Jua the South China Sea", Orbis 40(3), 1996, pp. 353-374. For an analyi, 
which focuses on China's economic aspects, see Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and 
Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection", Survival 37(2), 1995, pp. 44-59; and %fichael 
Studeman, "Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea: ldentifýing the Tngocrs ot- 
"Expansionism ..... Naval War College Review 51(2), 1998, pp. 68-90. For a discussion that a 
combination of China's geopolitical consideration and its military capabilities best explains China's 
behaviour, see Ang Cheng Guan, 'The South China Sea Dispute Revisited", Australian Journal of 
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consensus among observers about China's future behaviour in the South China Sea: 
namely, what Storey terms 'creeping assertiveness 9. 
This chapter tries to explain whether 'creeping assertiveness' is in accordance , N-Ith 
International Relations theory, particularly the realist point of view. The reason for 
adopting the realist position is that 'creeping assertiveness' seems too self-restrained a 
behaviour for realpolitik- oriented China to adopt. One possible answer is that the PLA's 
capabilities have not yet been enhanced sufficiently to secure control over the whole 
Spratlys area. From a realist perspective, a lack of military capabilities would seem to be 
a sufficient answer. 
However, the development of military capabilities is usually subject to decisions at 
a higher level (defence policy), which in turn must be compatible with other objectives in 
the overall foreign policy. Foreign policy is fortned on the basis of a state's national goals 
and objectives, which in turn, are largely detennined by its security enviroment. In 
short, the flow of a state's consideration about how to defend itself is as follows: 
geopolitical structure or security enviromment 4 national goals and objectiVes --) foreign 
policy 4 defence policy and strategy 4 military capabilities. When a change in security 
enviromnent and/or power relations with other states occurs, states review their previous 
national goals and objectives and set new ones. This leads to new foreign poficies, under 
International Affairs 54(2), 2000, pp. 201-215. For a discussion that focuses on domestic politics and 
China's economic security aspects, see John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: 
The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests", China Quarterly 132,1992, pp-999-1028. 
For other discussions, see Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea", 
International Security 19(l), pp. 169-194; Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: 
Where It Expects Wars -- Where It Doesn'f, Orbis3g(3), 1994, pp. 355-372; 
Eric Hyer, "The South 
China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements", Pacific Affairs 69(l), 
1995, pp. 34-54; Ralph A. Cossa, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: 
Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict", CSIS PacNet Newsletter #16,17 April 1999, available at 
http: //www. csis. org/pacfor/Pacl699. html; and Chris Roberts, Chinese Strategy and the Spratýv 
Islands Dispute, Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre working paper 
No. 293 (Canberra, 1996). 
Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness-, p. 99. For the argument that China may intend to recover Spratlys by 
military means, see Smith, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands", p. 282. 
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which military thinking and defence strategy are adjusted. Based on these considerations. 
a target level for military capabilities is ultimately set. In order to achieve this Loal. 
mihtary budgets are allocated, mflitary organisation is restructured and militan. - 
modernisation is pursued through purchasing weapons, and educatIng and training 
personnel. Thus, assuming that China will be more assertive just because the PLA*s 
capabilities are enhanced is too simple, although it is also true that shortcoming in PLA 
capabilities had blocked Beijing from expanding in the Spratlys until the 1980s. In other 
words, China's perceived 'creeping assertiveness' should be assessed in the broader 
context of its overall security concerns. 
Regarding geopolitical structure, China has been enjoying its most peaceful 
security envirom-nent ever since the end of the Cold War, in the sense that Beijing does 
not face any imminent military threat. Although Beijing again perceives Washington as a 
threat due to the latters dominant role (politically, economically and militarily) in a 
unipolar world, Washington's pursuing the TMD system, and its military support for 
Taiwan, the tension between China and the United States has not reached a point of 
military conflict. 
On the one hand, this benign security enviromment has enabled Beijing to 
concentrate on one of the top national objectives, economic development. On the other 
hand, China's leaders have been able to pay more attention to recovering 'lost territory', 
another key national goal. After the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, 
the next target is obviously Taiwan. Beijing's threats against Taiwan during the latter's 
presidential campaign in early 2000, that the island's indefinite postponement of 
reunification talks with the mainland would result in Chinese military action A-ere 
intended to influence the outcome of the election. However, these threats also 
demonstrated Beijing's fear and frustration about the Taiwanese increasing reluctance to 
239 
Chapter 6: A Return to International Relations Theory 
reunify with the mainland under communist rule. It Ls clear in even-body's eves that the 
more time passes, the more difficult it will be for China to get Taiwan back. Compared 
to Taiwan, the South China Sea is not such a serious concern. First of aH, afl other 
claimants are after all weaker than China militarily, and even ASEAN's cumulated 
military capabilities cannot match China's. Second, judging from past experience, no 
other claimants will militarily challenge China's occupation, although some of the 
claimants, most likely the Philippines and possibly Vietnam, may create tensions by (for 
example) removing China's sovereignty markers from the features. Thirdly, the United 
States is unlikely to intervene on behalf of its allies, particularly the Philippines. 
Beijing's past practice shows that it has been pragmatic enough to compromise on 
particular issues when larger strategic questions are at stake. For example, during its 
negotiations with Japan for normalisation of relations in 1972, Beijing compromised by 
setting aside the issue of sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku islands because China 
3 
wanted to employ Japan as an ally to encounter the Soviet threat. Thus, the South China 
Sea disputes should also be considered in the wider strategic context of China's security 
issues. 
The two top objectives of economic development and recovering territory had led 
China into a contradictory foreign policy towards the Southeast Asian states. On the one 
hand, Beijing needs a peaceful security environment in which China can concentrate on 
economic development and economic reforms. This means China prefers to be a good 
neighbour to them. On the other hand, China cannot afford to allow other claimants to 
keep inffinging what it claims as its maritime territory. Besides, the South China Sea has 
been increasingly important for China in many ways; for fishing, as a potential energý- 
resource and as a trading route. Thus, Beijing wishes to recover islands, reefs and other 
' Hyer, '7he South China Sea Disputes", p. 44. 
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features whenever there seems to be an opportunity to do so. which will antagonise the 
ASEAN governments. However, being a good neighbour does not necessarily mean that 
China should compromise. Beijing can still be a good neighbour even after conducting 
selfish behaviour, if only the regional states accept, or at least, acquiesce to it. The 
Chinese leaders know this will happen, partly due to the power balance between China 
and the ASEAN states, and partly due to ASEAN's lack of a common China policy. This 
was observed in the 1998/99 reconstruction of M[ischief Reef, when Beijing was able to 
exploit ASEAN's disarray and preoccupation with the financial crisis. 
China's revised strategic thinking in the mid-1980s, which transformed 'people's 
war' into 'people's war under modem conditions', and 'luring the enemy m deep' mto 
'meeting the enemy at the gate', was a product of a changed security environment. As a 
result, the navy took over from the ground forces as the primary focus of modernisation. 
On the navy side, the assertion that China must defend its maritime territory in the South 
China Sea from other claimants' inffingement of Chinese sovereignty is an effective tool 
not only to promote the navy's status but also to gain a greater budget and more 
advanced weapons. ' The PLA Navy won the 1988 battle with Vietnam over Johnson 
Reef However, Vietnam subsequently seized features in the Spratlys immediately after 
the battle. Thus, by the end of the 1980s many naval officers had come to anticipate that 
another military clash with Vietnam was likely in the near fature. ' China's subsequent 
purchase of Su-27s from Russia along with the expansion of the airfield on Woody Island 
(in the Paracels) were steps towards providing air support for the navy operating in the 
Spratlys. ' China has also been not only energetically importing advanced weapons from 
4 Ibid., p. 45; and Kim, "The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking", p. 373. 
5 Munro, " Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military". 
6 Chang Pao-Min, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands", Contemporary Sowlieast Asia 
12(l), 1990, p. 37. 
Smith, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands", p. 282. 
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Russia (for example, S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and Su- /s, Su-")Os) but also 2- 
manufacturing some weapons under Russian licence, (e. g. Su-27s, and possibly Su- 
30s/Su-30MKs in the fature). ' Although most experts view the PLA's power projection 
capabilities as still insufficient to control the whole Spratlys, fialher strengthening of the 
PLA combined with China's past behaviour in the South China Sea could lead other 
claimants, the Philippines in particular, to perceive a real threat. However, military 
capabilities are only last part of the long and complicated process that influences states' 
behaviour in the sense that it must be subordinate to higher level considerations. Thus, 
assuming that enhancement of the PLA's capability will directly lead to China's further 
aggressiveness is too simple, while 'creeping assertiveness' appears too low-profile for MI 
an increasingly militarily strong China. 
China's security environment has been more peaceful in the post-Cold War era 
than ever, its military has been modernised and the United States is unlikely to be 
involved in the disputes unless its SLOC is interfered with. These conditions seem to 
give Beijing a golden opportunity to regain the Spratlys. However, China's recent 
behaviour in the South China Sea (construction on Mischief Reef in 1995 and 1998/99 
and stronger niflitary presence in the Scarborough Shoal area since the beginning of 
2000) has been relatively low-profile in the sense that China has not engaged in the 
military clashes since 1988. 
This can be called a policy of restraint. ' Then, why does China restrain its 
aggression? It is true that China needs a peaceful enviromnent and the PLA lacks 
Bin Yu, "NATO's Unintended Consequence: A Deeper Strategic Partnership ... 
Or More7% CSIS 
Pacific Foruin Comparative Connection: China-Russia (2Q 1999), available at http: //wviA,. csis. 
org/pacfor/cc/992Qchina-rus. html; and Bin Yu, "Coping With the Post-Kosovo Fallout", CSIS Pacific 
Forum Comparative Connection: China-Russia (3Q 1999), available at http: //www. c-:, Is. org/ 
pacfor/cc/993 Qchina-rus. htmi. 
Sheng, "Beijing and the Spratlys", pp. 18-20 and pp-3 3 -3 7. 
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'strategic reach"' to place the Spratlys under its control, Are these reasons sufficient to 
explain China's restraint, though'? This is where power analysis provides a good 
explanation. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, power should be measured in the light of domain and 
scope; that is, power is a matter of 'who influences whom (domain) , vith regard to what 
(scope)'. In the discussion here, the domain is both China and the ASEAN states and the 
scope is the South China Sea disputes. China wants ASEAN to stop resisting Beijing's 
efforts to 'recover its territory', while ASEAN wants China to refrain from taking 
unilateral actions which may upset the status quo. Thus, which party, China or ASEAN, 
is more influential on the other will determine the course of the disputes. And this, in 
turn, will be largely determined by each party's psychological toughness (or weakness). 
China has influenced ASEAN more than vice versa in some ways. First of aU, 
China has been strengthening its bargaining leverage by increasing the number of features 
it occupies in the Spratlys, without facing any serious political or military challenge from 
other claimants. All claimants know that a greater number of occupations puts a claimant 
in a stronger position during bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations aimed at finding a 
resolution, particularly under the condition that the regional code of conduct seeks to 
freeze the status quo. Thus, the number of occupations is important. While China has 
been gradually altering the status quo by seizing the features on which other claimants, 
Vietnam and the Philippines in particular, assert their sovereignty, no other claimants 
have seized features under Chinese control. This is so because the other claimants 
recognise that 1) China would certainly retaliate, 2) Beijing would not hesitate to use 
force in retaliation; and 3) China's armed forces are stronger than Vietnam's and the 
Philippines' even though most of the PLA's weapons may be outdated by Westem 
Ang Cheng Guan, "ASEAN, China and the South China Sea: A Rejoinder", Security Dialopie 30(4), 1 
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standards and the volume of advanced weapons acquired since the 1990s is too small to 
enhance PLA capability significantly. This recognition works as a deterrent against the 
other claimants. Conversely, Beijing does not worry about any serious challenge from 
them and is able to take advantage of their psyche. Thus, China does not need to convert 
the power resource (possibility of retaliation) into actual exercise of power (retaliation). 
In this regard, China influences not only individual claimants but also ASEAN. as a 
negotiating partner for seeking a resolution of the disputes, more than vice versa. 
Secondly, Beijing has effectively used a fungible power resource while the ASEAN 
states were preoccupied with the Asian financial crisis. China's resistance to the pressure 
for devaluation of its currency not only brought it status as a responsible great regional 
power but also caused disarray among the ASEAN governments over how to respond to 
China's resumption of construction on Mischief Reef. Thereby China escaped opposition 
from a united ASEAN. Although China's economic conditions did not require 
devaluation, there was a widespread anticipation that China might follow other Asian 
states that had devalued their currencies in order to strengthen their export 
competitiveness. Of course, whether or not to devalue the yuan was determined by 
China's economic situation. However, the ASEAN governments had a vague anxiety 
that China might devalue in retaliation to ASEAN's protest against the 1998/99 Mischief 
reconstruction. This anxiety prevented ASEAN from forming a united voice against 
Beijing. This case also shows how the ASEAN states in general are vulnerable to even 
the possibility of China's retaliation. It is obvious that ASEAN could influence China 
little except when ASEAN could speak with one voice. Although China compromised bý 
agreeing to discuss the Spratly issue in various meetings and conclude a regional code of 
1999, p. 427. See also Chang, "Beijing's Reach in the South China Sea". 
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conduct, it did not refrain from taking unilateral actions (reconstruction on Mischief Reef 
and enhanced military presence in Scarborough Shoal). 
These examples demonstrate the importance of the psychological factor. because 
power is essentiaRy a matter of 'who influences whomT One reason for the 
psychological imbalance is historical. The Chinese are proud of themselves as having 
been a centre of civilisation for nearly four millennia (middle kingdom mentality). 
However, many Southeast Asian political entities were recognised through Imperial 
China's relatively benign tribunal system until Western powers colonised this region III 
the nineteenth century. Thus, both China and the ASEAN states possess a sense of 
patron-client hierarchy. 
However, if ASEAN was determined to form a united voice against China's 
unilateral actions which seemed to counter the spirit of the ASEAN's Declaration 
(1992), ASEAN might have been able to draw another compromise from Beijing as the 
fonner did in 1995. However, ultimately ASEAN's constraint policy towards China 
could become an appeasement policy. Constraint policy refers to a combination of 
engagement and balance of power; that is, while trying to tie China into international 
society through a network of economic interdependence and various institutions, 
ASEAN also depends on the US military presence to counter-balance China. " The 
ASEAN states know that economic interdependence and multilateral security talks such 
as the ARF and the second track talks alone are not sufficiently effective to restnct 
China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Under these conditions, the realist 
assumption predicts that weaker states will form an alliance so as to make a balance 
between themselves and the target stronger state. However, rivalry among the ASEAN 
members, their different attitude towards China, and their fear of provoking China 
" De Castro, "The Controversy in the Spratlys". 
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preclude this course. As a result, the only option left for the weaker states is to 
'bandwagon' to another great power. This is why the ASEAN states have to depend for 
their security on the US military presence. However, the United States has distanced 
itself from the South China Sea disputes so as not to be involved unless its SLOC 
security is undermined. The lack of explicit backing by the United States made the 
ASEAN governinents too cautious to confront Beijing. On the contrary, Beijing's 
increasing assertiveness has been in accordance with its strengthening military 
capabilities, along with economic success. States' psychological toughness must be based 
on military might. Since Beijing is psychologically and mffitarily stronger than any of the 
other claimants, it does not need to be particularly aggressive by historical Chinese 
standards, although it may be viewed by others as aggressive. 
Another factor, besides power relations between China and the ASEAN states, is 
that China finds some value in employing ASEAN as an ally in its wider strategic 
considerations. The two most important strategic concerns are relations with the United 
States and the so-called Taiwan issue. Beijing-Washington relations have not been 
always stable since the end of the Cold War. Political tensions were created over such 
issues as human rights, China's trading status, US trade deficit to China, China's 
economic and political reforms, NATO's bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade (May 
1999), China's alleged spying on US nuclear technology (May 1999), US pursuit of the 
TMD system and the EP-3 spy plane incident (April 2001). Beijing can employ some 
ASEAN states, Malaysia and Singapore in particular, to form a united front against the 
US pressure on human rights issue and political reform issues. Besides, 
ASEAN has 
expressed its concern over the TMD system, 
12 which China also opposes. Regarding the 
12 Mahesh Uniyal, "SE Asia Frowns on US Nfissile Shield Plan", Asia Times, 27 July 
2000, available at 
http: //www. atimes. com/se-asia/BG27AeOl. html. See also Nfichael J. 
Green and Toby F. Dalton, 
"Asian Reactions to U. S. Nfissile Defense! ', NBR (National Bureau of Asian Research) 
AnaýySis I I("), 
November 2000, available at http: //www. nbr. org/publications/analysis/vol 
I InO/Essay. html. 
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Taiwan issue, President Chen Shui-bian was elected against Beijing's will. Although the 
island has never declared de jure independence, it is apparent in Chinese leaders' eyes 
that Taiwan is increasingly unwilling to reunite with the mainland. If political tension 
between Beijing and Taipei backed by Washington escalated to the point of either party 
taking military action (for example, a Chinese blockade), how ASEAN would respond to 
it and whether or not it would support the United States politically and militarily are 
uncertain, because the ASEAN states appear to fear China more than the United States. 
As long as ASEAN is useful to Beijing in its pursuit of its wider strategic objectives, 
China will try not to alienate ASEAN. However, the Chinese leaders cannot give up, 
under any circumstances, their aim of recovering 'lost territory' in the South China Sea 
(and elsewhere). Some ASEAN states may protest at China's behaviour in the South 
China Sea, but overall power relations between Beijing and ASEAN are clearly 
favourable to China. 
For realpolitik-minded Beijing, creeping assertiveness - increasing the number of 
occupations by seizing features under other claimants' control in a way that will not 
trigger an ASEAN united front against it or US intervention - is the most rational 
choice, particularly when Beijing cannot control the whole Spratlys, for a number of 
reasons: 1) it provides the maximum gain for China in its pursuit of the contradictory 
policies of 'good neighbourliness' and 'recovering the Spratlys'. That is, China can gain 
territory while still maintaining good relations with ASEAN; 2) it is likely to cause 
disarray in ASEAN which gives Beijing all Opportunity to manoeuvre and exploit the 
situation; 3) although the United States is unlikely to intervene in the disputes, creeping 
assertiveness will surely not provoke the US; and 4) the psychological power balance is 
favourable for China vis-a-vis ASEAN, so Beijing does not necessarily need to be 
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aggressive. Thus, creeping assertiveness is in accordance with a maxi'mini strategy. and Cý -1 
realist thinking in International Relations theory. 
"I 
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This research has two purposes. One is to chaRenge the flourishing 'Hberal peace' 
argument in International Relations theory from the realist position, by demonstrating not 
only that China's behaviour in the South China Sea can be largely explained from a 
geopolitical viewpoint but also that Beijing is skilful in using relations of econorruc 
interdependence as a power resource and maximising its gains while minimismg its costs 
in international institutions. Although the 'liberal peace' argument focuses on hoxv such 
factors as democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions make 
states peaceful, this thesis tries to identify which factor is more influential on states' 
behaviour in general, and China's in particular. Another purpose is to explaM 
theoretically the conventional wisdom drawn from observing China's practice in the 
South China Sea that her future behaviour is likely to be characterised by 'creeping 
assertiveness'). 
Regarding the first point, liberals in International Relations theory started to 
declare their triumph at the end of the 1980s when the Cold War was over, against the 
background that liberal democracies (the West) won a victory over non-Eberal 
'democracies' (the socialist carnp). Since then, a considerable amount of research which 
has intended to prove the positive correlation between liberal democracies and peace. 
using statistical methods, has been published. Some argue that democratic states do not 
fight each other, though they may be aggressive towards non-democratic states, as m the 
case of the Gulf War in 1990. Another faction in the liberal school argues that deepening 
economic interdependence will lead states to act more peacefully because states ,, vill 
refrain from behaving aggressively for fear of destroying economic relations with other 
states, the cost of which may outweigh the benefits of such behaviour. Another faction m 
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the liberal school focuses on the rule-binding effect of increasingly strong international 
institutions. 
On the other hand, realists assert that the most important thing for any state is its 
survival. Under the anarchical condition in which there is no world government to rule 
states, each state basically has to depend for its survival on its own resources. However. 
each state occupies a specific position in the international system in terms of power. 
which determines the range of policy choices and actions available to it. The crucial issue 
for a state's survival is how to maxirnise its power vis-a-vis its potential enenues. 
Whether or not the domestic regime is democratic is not an important matter for 
survival. Realists also counter-argue against liberals that economic interdependence 
works not only as a constraint on states' behaviour but also as a power resource. In 
addition, realists attack another faction of liberalism, liberal institutionalism, arguing that 
international regimes and their rules tend to reflect the balance of power and the 
dominant states' values. In this sense, even international regimes which appear to be 
placed beyond sovereignty on a particular issue are not irmnune to power politics. 
Chapter I dealt with this debate between realists and liberals over the issue of 
which international factor among balance of power, economic interdependence and 
international institutions is most likely to affect states' behaviour. It argued that the 
realist position seems more convincing in explaining states' international behaviour. 
because, first of all, states have higher national interests - such as survival of the state 
(and the regime), sovereignty and territorial integrity - to protect, even if doing so may 
reduce the economic and political benefits of economic interdependence. 
Secondly, the argument of the interdependence school is flawed in some xvaý's- 
First of 0, the economic interdependence school argues that interdependence should be 
measured mainly by the trade dependency of a state. However, econonuc 
25) 
Conclusion 
interdependence is deeper in the financial area in the sense that one state*s financial 
problem rapidly spreads to other states. In addition. advocates of economic 
interdependence have not agreed over what kind of factor should be mcluded when 
measuring economic interdependence. Thus, without closer definition the argument 
cannot form the basis for a reasonable discussion. What is a more serious problem for the 
economic interdependence-peace argument is that it ignores the political fi7arnework in 
which economic activities are possible. For example, the rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War created two political and military blocs. 
In the Westeim bloc, US allies and friends were prohibited from trading freely with 
countries in the Soviet bloc while they had access to a huge US market and could trade 
with each other, thereby deepening economic interdependence among them. Arguing that 
econonuc, interdependence leads to peace without paying attention to this Cold War 
structure is flawed. In addition, contrary to the interdependence school's argument that 
the less dependent party is likely to use the interdependence relationship as a source of 
power, the more dependent party can also use interdependent relations to exert power. 
Thirdly, the 'peace through rule-binding' argument of liberals can also be 
challenged as follows. Since the formation of international institutions has usually been 
initiated by developed states, the rules of regimes tend to reflect these states' values and 
norms. Moreover, international institutions sometimes work as an arena of power politics 
as in the case of the sanctions imposed on China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre in 1989. Immediate suspension of international loans to China was a 
reflection of the interests of the United States, which dominates the major international 
economic institutions such as the World Bank and INT and which reacted most 
confrontationally to the massacre. Furthermore, since most international institutions lack 
strict enforcement measures, they can do little about the free-riding problem. And 
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because of the lack of enforcement, collective sanctions against the violators of the rules 
tend to be less effective. Under these conditions, the effectiveness of rule-bmding seems 
fragile. States are bound by their own political will, not necessarily by the rules and 
norms themselves. If economic interdependence and international institutions are not free 
from power politics, realism is more accurate in pointing out that the major motive of 
states' behaviour is power. 
This IR debate was applied to China in order to examine whether the conclusions 
drawn in Chapter I can explain China's international behaviour. It was obsei-ved that 
Beijing's international behaviour was influenced by relations vis-a-vis two superpowers 
during the Cold War. The Korean War and the Vietnam War were perceived by Mao as 
serious security threats from the United States, because Chinese leaders were concerned 
about the US policy of containing communism. Formation of SEATO (1954) accelerated 
China's sense of encirclement. However, the border war with the Soviet Union in 1969 
meant that Moscow replaced Washington as Beijing's primary enemy. Subsequent 
rapprochement with the United States enabled the PRC to form alliances with not only 
Washington but also the ASEAN states in order to contain the Soviet threat. However, 
China has come to perceive the United States as an enemy again in a unipolar world after 
the Cold War. Eventually Beijing turned its eyes to Moscow in the hope of using Russia 
to form a counter-balance against Washington. This is a typical case of a state attempting 
to create balance in order to prevent a hegemon from emerging or to undermine the 
hegemon's power, as realism assumes. 
Economic interdependence has had a two-way effect for China: it has been both 
constraint, and power resource. Since China's economic development is dependent on 
developed states' markets, capital and technology, Beijing depends on them more than 
vice versa. In this regard, China is expected to be more constrained in its policy makmig 
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than Western states. A typical example was Beijing's obtaining MEN status from the 
United States. Since the Clinton administration hnked such status to China*s human 
rights performance, every year Beijing had to compromise (for example. by releasing 
political dissidents) when the US Congress started a debate over whether or not to grant 
MNF status to China. On the other hand, Beijing has learned that US multinational 
corporations' investment in China is a useful tool to influence America's China policy, 
because these companies vigorously lobbied to abandon the linkage policy and to grant 
NIFN status to China. These corporations were worried that unstable Sino-US relations 
might have a negative influence on their business, particularly after Beijing cancelled the 
purchase of Boeing aircraft and bought Airbus Industrie's aircraft instead. Although the 
multinational companies' primary purpose in lobbying was to secure their China business, 
their lobbying also served China's interests. As demonstrated in the cases of the French 
and German govenu-nents' decision to refrain from selling weapons to Taiwan, Beijing is 
skilful in using Western governments' and their private companies' commercial interests 
in China as an effective tool to pursue its national objectives. In this regard, it appears 
that Beijing, the more dependent party, is less constrained over policy-making by 
economic interdependent relations than the Western governments. 
In various international institutions, China not only pursues a maxi/mini strategy 
but also conducts power politics whenever it can. Beijing's status as a UN Secunt, \ 
Council 'Penn Five' member provides it with a veto right, thereby enabling it to block 
any UN agendas and resolutions which it perceives as against its interest. A typical 
example is Beijing's blocking of Taiwan's bid for UN membership. In addition, although 
Beijing is a borrower from the World Bank, its threats forced the Bank to bend its 
internal rules about loans, so that China secured money for some projects which would 
not otherwise have been funded. In the case of the South China Sea disputes. China 
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made a smaU compromise, agreeing to talk about the Spratly issues with the ASEAN 
states. However, it was successful in negotiating with ASEAN to ensure that such a 
discussion should be held at various ASEAN-China meetings, but not at the ARF. Since 
Beijing's basic position about the Spratly issue is that it must be discussed only by the 
claimants, excluding the outside powers, China's small compromise sen7ed to secure 
larger benefit. In this sense, China secured a maximum gain by accepting minimum cost. 
Overall, China's international behaviour supports the realist position more than 
that of the liberals, when focusing on such factors as balance of power, econormc 
interdependence and international institutions. These three elements are intemational 
factors in the sense that they are beyond one state's control. However, international 
behaviour varies from state to state, even though some states occupy a similar rank in the 
international system in terms of power. Chapter 3 examined the roles of domestic factors 
such as type of regime (democracy or non-democracy), decision-making system, culture, 
decision-makers' personalities and perception/misperception. It was argued that 
international factors largely determine the range of options available to a state, while 
domestic factors play a central role in choosing options. These domestic factors were 
applied to the Chinese case in Chapter 4. It was argued that the fact that China's 
aggressiveness has declined over time is more related to its decision-making system than 
the regime type itself, contrary to the 'democratic peace' argument, because China's 
undemocratic nature has not changed fundamentally since the foundation of the PRC in 
1949. Although an argument based on 'strategic culture' provides insight in 
understanding a particular state's behavioural pattern, the formation of that strategic 
culture is not free from the influence of the balance of power among its neighbours. In 
general, great powers have tended to invade and absorb their smaller neighbours. xHe 
these smaller states were forced to stay in a defensive position, rather than initiating wars 
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against the stronger powers. Thus, this pattern of interactions must have contributed to 
the great powers forming a relatively offensive strategic culture, while the smaller states 
formed a relatively defensive strategic culture. In addition, obsen-ation of China's past 
aggressive behaviour shows that Chinese leaders have decided to go to war when they 
perceived a serious military security threat along its borders. Findings about domestic 
factors suggested that intemational factors, geopolitics in particular, largely deten-nine 
the range of actions available for a state, while domestic factors largely determine which 
option the state actually chooses. This fonnula fits China's overall international 
behaviour. 
Chapter 5 focused on China's behaviour in the South China Sea. The South 
China Sea is important for the PRC in terms of fishing, as a potential source of energy 
and as a trading route, in addition to its sovereignty claim. Thus, the motivations of 
Beijing's past aggressive behaviour., particularly against Vietnam, were under debate. 
Examination of the South China Sea disputes demonstrated that China's behaviour was 
influenced more by geopolitical considerations and the PLA's capability than by the need 
to secure energy resources and other economic necessities. The 1974 operation over the 
Paracels appears to be related more to Beijing's anticipation of expanding Soviet 
influence in the region after the reunification of Vietnam than to the oil factor. The 1988 
battle with Vietnam can best be explained if we assume that China wanted to test the 
strength of Vietnam-Soviet ties in the circumstances that the Soviet Union had been 
preoccupied with its political and economic reform, thereby decreasing its commitment 
to Moscow's allies' affairs. Since the expectations of large oil reserves in the South 
China Sea had been disappointed by the time of this battle, and China was not a net ofl 
importer until 1993, the oil factor was largely irrelevant as a significant influence on 
Beijing's motivation. One important factor is that China, for the first time. buflt an 
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observation station on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys in 1988. This imphes that China 
was increasingly confident about undertaking military operations in an area far beý-ond its 
coast, although the PLA was still at the begfiuling of naval modenusation. The 
construction of a 'fishermen's shelter' on Mischief Reef in 1995 can also be seen as a test 
whether the United States would intervene on behalf of its ally, the PhilippMes. after 
withdrawing from Subic Bay in 1992. In both 1988 and 1995, the probabifity of 
intervention by the Soviet Union or the United States was quite low. In addition, the 
armed forces of Vietnam and the Philippines were perceived as weaker than China's. 
Thus, China's realist behaviour was confinned in the South China Sea. 
However, China's recent behaviour such as the construction activity on Mischief 
Reef (1995 and 1998/99) and its stronger presence in the Scarborough Shoal area (2000 
onward) appears low profile, compared with the military clashes with Vietnam in the 
past. Most observers agree that China's future behaviour in the South China Sea wiU be 
typified by 'creeping assertiveness'. However, this creeping assertiveness appears too 
self-restrained for realpolitik-oriented Beijing. Chapter 6 examined whether such self- 
restrained behaviour is in accordance with realist assumptions (this thesis' second 
purpose). It was argued that creeping assertiveness is indeed a rational option for China 
in pursing its maxi/mini strategy in some ways: 1) China can increase its occupation 
while maintaining overall good relations with the ASEAN states; 2) it will not trigger US 
intervention, although China knows Washington's neutral position towards the Spratly 
disputes; 3) it causes ASEAN disarray which Beijing can take advantage of; and 4) not 
only the military balance but also the psychological balance are in China's favour. so it 
does not have to be particularly aggressive by its own standards. 
This dissertation has examined China's general international behaviour and its 
more specific behaviour in relation to the South China Sea, using International Relations 
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theory as a basis for discussion. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the South China Sea 
disputes are complicated in terms of the number of factors to be considered. such as 
sovereignty, legal aspects, the energy factor, and the strategic and econornic interests of 
outside powers. In addition, China is likely to handle the disputes in the context of its 
wider security concerns: the Taiwan issue, the United States' pursuit of establishing sea- 
based TMD system, and other internal security concerns such as separatist movements in 
Tibet and Xinjiang and the Falun Gong problem. All of these are directly connected with 
the CCP's legitimacy and the integrity of the Chinese state. 
Although how China's other security concerns affect the South China Sea 
disputes was beyond the scope of this dissertation, paying attention to this issue is 
important in understanding the Beijing government's psyche and predicting more 
accurately its behaviour in the South China Sea. Another important point is to analyse 
the likely reactions and behaviour of outside powers such as the United States and Japan, 
because if tension between China and one or more of the other claimants were to 
intensify to the point of another military clash, these states' possible actions would surely 
enter into Beijing's calculation. Thus, these points need to be explored in further 
research. 
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